To Have Done with Forgiveness: Capitalism, Christianity, and the Politics of Immanence by Snediker, Timothy
University of Denver 
Digital Commons @ DU 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 
1-1-2016 
To Have Done with Forgiveness: Capitalism, Christianity, and the 
Politics of Immanence 
Timothy Snediker 
University of Denver 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd 
 Part of the Economic Theory Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of 
Religion Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Snediker, Timothy, "To Have Done with Forgiveness: Capitalism, Christianity, and the Politics of 
Immanence" (2016). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1148. 
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/1148 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital 
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
 
To Have Done With Forgiveness: 






the Faculty of Arts and Humanities 




In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 


















© Copyright Timothy Snediker 2016 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 ii 
Author: Timothy Snediker 
Title: To Have Done With Forgiveness: Capitalism, Christianity, and the Politics of 
Immanence 
Advisor: Prof. Carl Raschke 
Degree Date: June 2016 
 
Abstract 
 This essay seeks to formulate a critical account of the genealogical link between 
capitalism and Christianity by interrogating the ontology and the processes of 
subjectivization which subtend these two apparently disparate social and political 
formations. To this end, I make use of the philosophical thought of Gilles Deleuze, in 
particular his readings of Spinoza, Foucault, Nietzsche, and Sacher-Masoch. The central 
themes of the essay—the identity of God and money, and the vicissitudes of the creditor-
debtor relation—culminate in a theory of a theodicy of money, which deploys an 
apparatus of forgiveness in order to obscure and displace the stakes and the site of the 
game of guilt and innocence. In short, to produce, by means of the Christian logic of 
forgiveness, a subject of forgiveness capable, not only of standing guarantor for herself, 
but as the ground of the formal freedom and formal equality required of liberal 
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circumstance which perhaps testifies to a human relation irreducible to that which is 
investigated herein—and one should be grateful for that. There are many—human and 
nonhuman—without whom this essay would have been inconceivable. The first of these 
is Sean Capener, whose friendship and critical advice truly made the tiny germ of this 
essay flourish. I am grateful to the faculty who have guided and encouraged me from the 
outset of this project to its final form: Carl Raschke, Thomas Nail, Sarah Pessin, and 
Robert Urquhart (with special thanks to Gregory Robbins, who was willing to take part in 
the committee without any prior knowledge of the project). Additionally, this work would 
never have been completed without the material, emotional and spiritual support of my 
family—especially Steve and Marcia—who love without condition. And to my partner in 
life and in crime, Elyse: thank you for your love, and for putting up with me these last 
few months.  
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It is a question of belief and desire. Belief and desire are 
everywhere. Even is no one really wants money—it is always a 
means, never and end—everyone believes in money, everyone 
desires money, or, rather, money is the reality, the interiority of 
belief and desire in which we dwell. It is not we who desire money; 
it is money that desires in us. 




When you will have made him a body without organs, 
then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions 
 and restored him to his true freedom. 
 
Then you will teach him again to dance wrong side out 
as in the frenzy of dance halls 
and this wrong side out will be his real place. 













 God or Money. One can read this phrase, with Christ’s dictum in mind, as an 
imperative to alternatives, a choice between two incommensurable devotions: “You 
cannot serve both God and money.” God or Money. In this first case, it is a matter of 
purifying, rectifying, or redirecting one’s desire. Here desire is that which expresses 
one’s lack; desire names an object one needs to fill the lack. Hence desire is not only 
eschatological and soteriological, it is existential and ontological; desire is orientation of 
one’s being toward this or that: this is the Good, that is Evil, and so on. More precisely: 
one should not desire money. One should desire God, even, and especially if, this 
communion with God requires jettisoning all hopes for prosperity, security, happiness—
all of the rewards that money promises. A pure asceticism, perhaps, where every thought 
of worldly gain perishes or disappears into the beatitude of the ‘highest’ poverty. Or 
perhaps there is some middle ground one can find, where the accumulation of money (not 
to speak of its circulation) might be a means towards charity, towards righteousness. 
Perhaps God is the end to which money is a means; perhaps desiring is worshiping and 




faith a function of desire. Perhaps, in drawing near to God, money draws near to us. 
When one speaks of God and money, registers of meaning multiply and invert 
themselves; sense gets fractured. One can never be sure of where one is, or what is up 
and what is down, except for these two words—God and money—which wait like 
lighthouses in the murk, or sing like sirens, or both. 
 One can read this phrase in yet another register, where the conjunction is a sort of 
desultory equivocation, God or money or whatever; or still yet another register, where a 
loose identification takes place—God, or money, God (or money)—said as if in a 
whisper, apologetically, as if the Christ we mentioned above were leaning in, 
eavesdropping on the secrets of desire—may God forgive us. Still another register, 
though it is for us the final register: Deus sive Monēta.1 Spinoza groans and turns in the 
earth, in a Christian cemetery in the Hague. Christ winces. God or money, God = money, 
God is money: in its cruel literality each and every iteration of this perverse Spinozism 
sends our better angels running; one feels the air go out of the room; one feels a certain 
disgust. From the perspective of a certain piety, nothing could be further from the truth. 
Yet from the point of view of another piety—the piety with which this essay is 
                                                
1 I have chosen the Latin term Monēta for this perverse rendering of Spinoza’s Deus sive 
Natura for two reasons, or rather, because of two goddesses: Mnemosyne and Juno, each 
of which bears Monēta as an epithet. In the latter case, Juno gained her epithet by virtue 
of her role as the protector of the funds stored up in her temple, testifying already to the 
link between divinity, money, and finance. The former case, which is in my opinion the 
more interesting one, the divine personification of memory, Mnemosyne, also takes the 
name Money, Monēta. That there is a decisive link between money and memory is yet to 
be demonstrated, but let it suffice to say that inasmuch as one always begins with a 






concerned—this is perhaps the most common, albeit unconscious, thought. Not a vulgar 
declaration of money as one’s god, one’s personal, particular god; rather the 
impersonality of the simple, unadorned faith of a living being in the altogether 
unremarkable promise and power of money. Rather than speaking of faith in this or that, 
one should rather speak of faith in general—a general credit that has purchase, so to 
speak, everywhere, in and for everything.  
 All of this is to say—simply, finally—that the subject of this essay is money. Or 
God, if you’ll pardon the expression. Pace Nietzsche, it will be necessary to inquire how 
and to what extent the rumors of God’s death have been exaggerated. One should rather 
ask whether God, rather than dying, having been dead, being dead, has been transformed 
into money.2 And what are the thresholds or critical points in God’s transformation. And 
whether or not God has been money all along and what it would mean to say such a 
thing. And how could God forgive God for it all, for everything, forever and ever, amen. 
  
                                                
2 Giorgio Agamben, “God didn’t die, he was transformed into money.” (Interview) URL: 
https://libcom.org/library/god-didnt-die-he-was-transformed-money-interview-giorgio-











Chapter 1 – Introduction: Capitalism and Christianity 
 1.1 That capitalism is a religion is perhaps not readily or immediately apparent. 
One speaks rather of ‘elective affinities’ between capitalism and Protestantism—
according to Max Weber, of course, and to a certain Adam Smith. A whole literature, by 
turns sociological and economic, rises up under the aegis of capitalism, attesting to its 
natural history: capitalism is a culmination, natural and even beautiful; it is the harbinger 
of freedom to the same extent that it was, or is, inevitable. Yet Walter Benjamin, in an 
early, enigmatic fragment, manages to say something different. “Capitalism,” writes 
Benjamin, “is a purely cultic religion, perhaps the most extreme that ever existed.”3 
Despite the unpolished, provisional character of his reflections, Benjamin manages to 
isolate several crucial features of the religion called capitalism. Rather than atonement, it 
creates guilt, or debt.4 It puts an end to the transcendence of God. Rather than killing God 
                                                
3 Walter Benjamin, “Capitalism as Religion,” Selected Writings, Vol. 1, ed. Michael W. 
Jennings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 288. 
 
4 Benjamin refers to the “demonic ambiguity” of the German word Schuld, which 
signifies in two registers: guilt and debt. Nietzsche had already pointed this out in the 




off, capitalism incorporates God into human existence. It is a pure concretization of 
religion, a pragmatics or a utilitarian faith. Benjamin even goes so far as to directly refute 
Weber’s thesis, albeit without mentioning the latter by name, when he claims that “[t]he 
Christianity of the Reformation period did not favor the growth of capitalism; instead it 
transformed itself into capitalism.”5 Benjamin’s thesis is as succinct as it is radical: 
capitalism is not just any religion, or merely one religion among others—it is the religion, 
Christianity.  
 Numerous theorists have written on the question of the links between capitalism 
and Christianity—even Marx himself—so it is by no means novel to proclaim that there 
exists a privileged link between the two. Yet Benjamin’s argument is of another order: he 
insists upon the identity of Christianity and capitalism, rather than a relation of analogy or 
a mutual reinforcement. The present essay should be read as an attempt to think through 
this identity—to think it through—with a view toward our present dilemma, namely, the 
material conditions of neoliberal capitalism. The method pursued herein is loosely 
genealogical, understood in the sense that Foucault gives to this term: what is at stake is a 
history of the present.6 I cannot replicate Foucault’s erudition, nor the astonishing breadth 
                                                                                                                                            
ambiguity decisive for a critique of forgiveness, and will be incorporating the semantic 
slippage throughout the text. As a procedural note, then: despite the fact that there are 
real differences between the registers of debt and guilt (and one should not simply seek to 
collapse them), the reader is advised to take into account their ambiguous connections. 
 
5 Ibid., 289. 
 
6 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan 





and depth of his research. Nevertheless, I appeal to the genealogical motif in order to 
explore, to the extent it is possible in an essay of this size, the crucial importance for our 
own time of the emergence of capitalism in history as a certain transformation, not only 
of Christianity, but of God. Giorgio Agamben has perhaps said it best, apropos of the 
incessant proclamations and repetitions on the theme of the death of God: “God didn’t 
die, he was transformed into money.”7 It is not that God existed before money, and 
ceased to exist in being transformed into money; nor is it the case that money did not 
exist before God became money, as if one could point to a date on a calendar when this 
fateful metamorphosis took place. It is rather that God and money have always been 
implicated in one another (in this regard, the prescience of Nietzsche’s thesis in On the 
Genealogy of Morals is decisive). The emergence of capitalism marks the beginning—
which should not be confused with an origin—of a process by which money, so to speak, 
becomes adequate to its idea. The latest development, which should not be confused with 
a culmination, of capitalism into its neoliberal, financialized forms marks yet another 
transformation of God into money. It is to this neoliberal ‘present’ in which we live that 
this essay addresses itself—specifically to the primacy of the creditor-debtor relation, 
which supplements and subtends the capitalist-worker relation. Yet in order to make such 
an address, one must investigate the ground upon which neoliberal capital emerged. It has 
thus been necessary to incorporate some cautious historiographical notes into the text, 
                                                





specifically with regard to the conditions of possibility of the emergence of the capitalist 
mode of production as such. 
 This essay is conceived as an intervention in at least two registers. The first 
recognizes and wishes to build upon the exigency and importance of the recent work of 
Gil Anidjar, who has responded to the preponderance of so-called critical work on 
religion by raising what he refers to as ‘the Christian question.’ I treat Anidjar at greater 
length below (Chapter 5), but for now let it suffice to say that his project aims to 
determine—if not once and for all, then at least in service of political critique of 
contemporary discourse—whether it makes sense to speak of Christianity as a religion. In 
Anidjar’s view (shared, mutatis mutandis, by Talal Asad, Tomoko Masuzawa, and 
others) Christianity is not a religion—not quite. The ‘category’ of religion, especially 
‘world religions’ is rather a stratagem of secularization, of a certain self-overcoming by 
which Christianity dissimulates itself, disguises itself as secular, and establishes religions 
as its others. One must be open to the possibility that discourse on religion is a Christian 
discourse, that one should speak of the Christianity of religion. Against the twinned 
tendencies with which scholars of religion address their object—to find, on the one hand, 
what is essential or sui generis in it, or, on the other hand, to reduce religion to social 
construction, false consciousness, and so on—against this Anidjar proposes an 
alternative: one must raise the Christian question. This involves positing the following 
paradox:  
Either Christianity is a religion and there are no others (because without 
Christianization and the globalization of Christianity, none of the so-called ‘world 




refer to themselves as such). Or, there are religions in the world—according to 
one definition or another—but Christianity is not one of them.8 
 
 Part of the burden of this essay is to untangle the labyrinthine relations and 
transformations that the terms religion, capitalism, and Christianity undergo on their way 
to, and in, the present. Hence the first register of the present essay seeks to ascertain how, 
and to what extent, one can speak univocally of Christianity and capitalism, of God and 
money. The second register follows from the first, and concerns the question of 
forgiveness—that is to say, the political economy of forgiveness. One cannot grasp the 
nature of the identity of God and money without this decisive reference to forgiveness. In 
this regard, there are certain misconceptions about forgiveness that need to be dispelled at 
the outset, even if they can only be fully substantiated at the conclusion.  
 One should speak of forgiveness as a history. Yet one speaks rather of a history of 
forgiveness; or of forgivenesses, in the plural, so as to respect the internal differences of 
this concept (which is not merely a concept): forgiveness asked of another, or of oneself; 
forgiveness with or without conditions; forgiveness with or without any economic 
consideration. In this regard, Jacques Derrida’s provocation, in his short essay, 
“Literature in Secret,” seems exemplary of a novel thought of forgiveness—it announces 
or introduces the possibility of a political reading of the history that is forgiveness. This 
provocation arrives apropos of a certain reading of the Noahic event, in which God’s 
                                                
8 Gil Anidjar, “Of Globalatinology,” Derrida Today, 6.1 (2013): vii, ed. Nicole Anderson 
and Nick Mansfield, 14. Note also the more robust, if labyrinthine, critique in Anidjar’s 
most recent monograph, Blood. The exigency of the Christian question there assumes an 
intensity scarcely thinkable. See Gil Anidjar, Blood: A Critique of Christianity (New 





double retraction or repentance for creating “humans who are evil in their hearts,” and for 
the Deluge intended to erase that mistake, precipitates a scene of forgiveness that 
implicates, first and foremost, the very God who would ostensibly dispose of, or 
dispense, forgiveness. Derrida thereby suggests the following: “forgiveness is a history of 
God. It is written or addressed to the name of God. Forgiveness comes to pass as a 
covenant between God and God through the human.”9  
 I propose a political reading of forgiveness in light of the contemporary crises of 
neoliberal capitalism, specifically the ascendency (or more precisely, the perseverance) of 
the creditor-debtor relation, and the power to forgive that is the truth of this relation. 
(This essay is an exercise of theory, but my hope is that it will have practical implications 
for the ongoing debt resistance movements, which have assumed a pivotal and tactical 
position in the struggle against neoliberal austerity. Debt may well be the lever by which 
the fortresses of capital are overturned. I will address the specifics of these political 
movements in the Conclusion.) As I said above, in order to effect this political reading of 
forgiveness I have had recourse to a claim espoused, to varying degrees, by various 
theorists (Jacques Derrida, Philip Goodchild, Giorgio Agamben, even a certain Karl 
Marx): that God, far from having deceased in the 19th century, has rather been 
transformed into money. This identity of God and money is not simply speculative; it is 
rather a self-masking or strategy of secularization by which capitalism reproduces itself 
as a religion, and in which God and money are continually absolved. This is why Deleuze 
                                                
9 Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death and Literature in Secret (Chicago: The University of 





and Guattari can claim that Nietzsche’s insight in the second essay of On the Genealogy 
of Morals describes not only the “stroke of genius” of Christianity, but of capitalism 
itself: money as a self-valorizing transduction or circulation, where the body of the 
human serves as transductor or conduit. Human beings qua debtors are the material 
condition of forgiveness—the immediate elements of God’s self-satisfaction, or auto-
absolution.  
 My central claim is that forgiveness is a strategy or apparatus of power which 
captures the body—the very existence—of the debtor as the material of forgiveness. It is 
not we who need, desire or undergo forgiveness, it is God who forgives God in us. 
Inasmuch as God is money, inasmuch as capitalism is the religion par excellence, any 
possible critique of capitalism will inevitably find itself confronted by, and implicated in, 
a theodicy of money. To wit, any future critique of capitalism must effect a general 
reversal. It is not ideology which grips us and causes us to see and to speak, it is rather 
theodicy that names the ventriloquism which we undergo, consummate, and perform. 
 
 1.2 The essay is divided into two parts. Part I begins by pursuing two separate, yet 
integrally related, courses. The first course is an inquiry into the objective nature of 
political economy, drawing on the univocal ontology of Spinoza and the laws of general 
economy, the latter which were explicitly formulated by Georges Bataille. At stake in 
Part I—which temporarily brackets the critique of forgiveness—is the possibility of 
conceiving a pure plane of immanence upon which all of the circulations, 




theory of immanence by reading Bataille and Spinoza together via Lucretius and the 
ancient atomists. Chapter 3, the second course, is an inquiry into the subjective nature of 
political economy, namely, the processes—and I emphasize the plural here—of 
subjectivization that accompany, and provide a crucial political and economic feedback 
into, the movements of the general economy. I confess that my central concern lies with 
the latter course: my aim is to elucidate the conditions under which an indebted subject or 
a subject of forgiveness can be constituted; though it should go without saying that, 
inasmuch as this work is a materialist account of the nature of money and subjectivity, 
the former course—the objective, material conditions of political economy—must in a 
real sense determine the latter. In the last instance, there are not two separate natures, but 
two sides of a single process which nevertheless possesses in itself a directionality, or 
more precisely an imperative to consumption, a will to power, a volatile, productive 
entropy. The subject is not a separate being which undergoes the operations of an 
apparatus or the general movement of an economy; the subject is the expression of these 
operations. The investigation, in Part I, of these two ‘natures’ (general economy as the 
thought of pure immanence, or an ontology of power; the apparatus as a modulation of 
power, a machine for the production of subjects) will enable us to proceed to a critical 
theory of money qua credit-debt differential and finally to a critical-constructive theory of 
subjectivity qua forgiveness (Part II).  
 Agamben’s very broad definition of the apparatus—the generality of which owes to 
his ambitious, perhaps too ambitious, project of theological genealogy—will have to 




nothing less than a general and massive partitioning of beings into two large 
groups or classes: on the one hand, living beings (or substances), and on the other, 
apparatuses in which living beings are incessantly captured. […] I shall call an 
apparatus literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, 
determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, 
or discourses of living beings.10 
 
We will have cause to attenuate this description of apparatuses below, according to 
Deleuze’s reading of Foucault’s theory of power. In the meantime there are several points 
of which we should take note: 
 1. An apparatus is not properly a thing; it is rather a constellation or diagram of 
power relations, which has the dual effect of capturing living beings and producing 
subjects in or alongside these living beings.11 The key point here is that there is not a 
diachronic progression of capture which eventually gives way to subjectivization: 
subjects are produced as captured, as they are captured, inasmuch as they are captured.  
 2. The term ‘apparatus’ and the term ‘economy’ are interchangeable (or more 
precisely, are in relation to one another) only on the condition that ‘economy’ refers, a la 
Bataille, to a restricted economy. In other words, the general economy is not an 
apparatus—it is rather the processual totality out of which a particular apparatus emerges 
and to which every apparatus returns. General economy is the thought of a pure plane of 
immanence (Spinoza’s infinite substance) which is expressed by degrees of power. 
                                                
10 Giorgio Agamben, “What is an Apparatus?,” in What is an Apparatus?, trans. David 
Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 13, 14. 
 





Hence, one can consider money an apparatus inasmuch as money is a system which 
directs and redirects flows of energy, and which produces a subject. 
 3. In what follows I will consistently attempt to push money out of the register of 
an apparatus and into the register of general economy money as generic, as a general 
credit, or as the plane of immanence upon which apparatuses appear. The apparatus that 
will consume most of our attention is, for reasons that will be laid out below, the 
apparatus of forgiveness. Forgiveness understood as a means of money, rather than an 
escape from it. Forgiveness conceived and performed as a spectacular, lavish, hyperbolic 
means of maintaining a paradoxical equilibrium, and of producing a subject to live in this 
tenuous equilibrium, and to work for it without end. 
 Why this emphasis on forgiveness? What’s wrong with forgiveness? Moreover, 
what does forgiveness have to do with money? 
 
 1.3 At first sight, not much. A fully-developed, robust answer to these questions 
will only be possible at the conclusion of this essay. Whereas Part I brackets the question 
of forgiveness in order to lay out a plane of immanence or ontology of power, Part II 
resumes, or commences, the investigation of forgiveness beginning with a reading of 
Nietzsche’s second essay in On the Genealogy of Morals. In terms of introducing the 
content of Part II, let it suffice to mention three of the manners in which one might think 
the relation of forgiveness and money.  
 The first is somewhat obvious (though, as we will see, in its very clarity it tends to 




personal debts, sovereign debts, student debts, or any other sort of debt is a 
fundamentally economic affair that nevertheless refers to an outside of economy. Less 
obvious is the fact that forgiveness is, under this rubric, supposedly that which escapes 
economy; forgiveness is aneconomic, and in a certain sense it is that to which all 
economy refers itself, a limit-concept or an exception.  
 The second relation between forgiveness and money is less intuitive, but it follows 
from the formula Deus sive Monēta: only God forgives. There is a certain religious or 
theological register in which forgiveness obtains, or becomes adequate to, its concept. In 
order to grasp the manner in which Christianity and capitalism mutually reinforce one 
another—or what is more, the literal identity of the two—one must investigate the 
structure and genesis of money. The upshot of this investigation is two-fold: first, that 
Christianity, far from being one religion among others, is better understood as a political 
economy (conversely, capitalism is a religion); second, that money, aside from its 
function as medium of exchange, store of value, and unit of account, is essentially and 
fundamentally credit. I note in passing that this investigation, rather than refuting the 
Marxian conception of money qua general equivalent, will confirm it and push it, from its 
position in the concreteness of exchange, into a transcendental register. 
 The third relation between forgiveness and money is in a sense a synthesis of the 
first two: at the limit of the creditor-debtor relation is forgiveness. Whether possible or 
actual, the power to forgive is what ultimately distinguishes the creditor from the debtor 
(the creditor himself may be in debt to another creditor, and so on). A specific 




double genitive: the subject of forgiveness is at once the personal subject who asks for 
forgiveness or receives it as a ‘free gift’ (the debtor) and the impersonal or trans-personal 
giving of forgiveness (the creditor). Or, to put it in Nietzsche’s terms, the subject of 
forgiveness refers to both man and God, debtor and creditor, and above all to the figure 
that links them inextricably: Christ, God-man, general equivalent—or even, at the limit, 
capital itself, since Christ effects a return greater than that which was invested. To be 
Christ-like, then, is to position oneself as the central conduit of the circulation of 
forgiveness, site of exchange, or means of payment of the debt. To be Christian is not 
only to be forgiven, but to have the power to forgive. 
 
 1.4 This essay is situated squarely in the context of late capitalism, especially vis-a-
vis the veritable explosion of discourses regarding the financial collapse of 2007-2008. 
Various volumes have appeared in the wake of the financial crisis, including, but not 
limited to Philip Goodchild’s Theology of Money,12 Maurizio Lazzarato’s The Making of 
Indebted Man13 and Governing By Debt,14 David Graeber’s Debt: The First 5,000 
Years,15 Philip Morowski’s Never Let A Serious Crisis Go To Waste16—all of which, 
                                                
12 Philip Goodchild, Theology of Money (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009). 
 
13 Mauricio Lazzarato, The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal 
Condition, trans. Joshua David Jordan (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2011). 
 
14 Maurizio Lazzarato, Governing by Debt, trans. Joshua David Jordan (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 2013). 
 





among the many others, have contributed to the formulation of the present work. The 
project of formulating a concept of money as credit-debt has never been more germane to 
radical politics. In the context of late capitalism and the twinned neoliberal projects of 
financialization and governmentality, the creditor-debtor antagonism has replaced the 
formerly ascendent capitalist-worker struggle. As Lazzarato puts it:  
Neoliberal capital imposes and governs an asymmetrical class struggle. There is 
only one class, reconstituted around finance, the power of credit money, and 
money as capital...The working class is no longer a class. Workers do indeed have 
an economic and sociological existence: they form the variable capital of the new 
capitalist accumulation. The ascendency of the debtor-creditor relation has 
marginalized them politically once and for all.17 
 
 In addition to the contemporary interventions mentioned above, two giants of the 
19th century play an essential role in what follows, both of whom have been mentioned 
already: Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche. I take as axiomatic Marx’s description of 
capitalist accumulation through expropriation of surplus value, as well as his concept of 
money qua general equivalent. I wish only to nudge the concept of money into a slightly 
(though the implications of this shift are radical) different register, as prompted by 
Nietzsche’s path-breaking second essay of On the Genealogy of Morals, in which he 
provides perhaps the first counter-argument against the anthropological theory of 
money’s genesis or origin in exchange. That money is essentially credit remains to be 
demonstrated, of course—not to mention its specific structure and mode of production, 
                                                                                                                                            
16 Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived 
the Financial Meltdown (New York: Verso Books, 2014). 
 





which is, as Sean Capener has shown, analogical.18 This essay is in some ways a response 
to the reactivation of the centuries-old Scholastic debate between univocity and analogy, 
where a radical Spinozism (typified by Deleuze) faces off against a so-called Radical 
Orthodoxy (of which theologian John Milbank is the exemplar). It should be clear that I 
locate myself squarely on the side of univocity (or immanence). In any case, one can say 
that in the case of money, it is less a question of whether or not money is good or evil, 
than between a political theology of money conceived in all of its ambiguity, and a 
capitalist theodicy of money which affirms and enacts the cruelty of the status quo: 
pantheism versus monotheism.  
 Inasmuch as the capitalist mode of production requires the creditor-debtor relation 
in order to emerge and late neoliberal capitalism requires debt to function, we will say 
that capitalism deploys, or is, an apparatus of forgiveness. Has this always been the case? 
Or is the creditor-debtor relation a novelty in the history of capitalism? My preliminary 
claim is that capitalism inherited, or rather parasitized, the creditor-debtor relation from 
Christianity: there is not an ‘elective affinity’ between Christianity and capitalism, a là 
Weber, but rather—following Benjamin’s radical claim—strictly literal identity of the 
two. Capitalism inaugurates a sort of apotheosis of money: God becomes money, not in 
the sense of a culmination or a telos, but at the level of the everyday experience of the 
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capitalist subject, who is not only in debt, but is, qua subject, always subject to 
forgiveness. Benjamin expresses this situation perfectly:  
It adds to our understanding of capitalism as a religion to realize that, to begin 
with, the first heathens certainly did not believe that religion served a ‘higher,’ 
‘moral’ interest but that it was severely practical. In other words, religion did not 
achieve any greater clarity then about its ‘ideal’ or ‘transcendental’ nature than 
modern capitalism does today. Therefore it, too, regarded individuals who were 
irreligious or had other beliefs as members of its community, in the same way that 
the modern bourgeoisie now regards those of its members who are not gainfully 
employed.19 
 
 The piety invoked above, in the preface, has precisely to do with this practicality. 
Money is a praxis before it is a theory, though this fact should by no measure be taken to 
mean that theory is irrelevant or doomed to banal description. Everything depends on 
whether it is we who practice money or money which practices us, with us, for itself. We 
will have to determine the extent to which our praxis (which is to say our freedom) is tied 
up with a theory of money, and to what extent the concept of a general credit—a faith 
common to all things, human or not—can illuminate the conditions of our enslavement, 
to which we are party, and of which we are a part. I have opted to pursue this 
determination through an inquiry into the conditions and operations of the apparatus of 
forgiveness, whereof the human is, as the material condition of forgiveness, the very 
relation between God and God. Guilt cries out to guilt: the human is the echo of this 
eternal howl. 
 Perhaps, in the end, it is inevitable that one attaches oneself to a thinker or to an 
image of thought, in which and from which one thinks. It will become clear that this 
                                                





essay owes much of its theoretical instruments and impetus to Gilles Deleuze. Whatever 
the strengths and weaknesses of such a decision, I have set out to write an essay, not on 
Deleuze, in the style of a philosophical biography or history, but rather with Deleuze—
with his concepts and his image of thought. I will address this methodological problem at 
more length below (Interlude), but let it suffice to say that the proper name “Deleuze” 
refers, for me, not to a doctrine or an Urdoxa, but to a problem. At the risk of recursion, I 
can only point the reader to Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (especially Chapter 4), 
in which he insists that it is always problems and questions that make us think, force us to 
think. The positivity and the intensity of a problem—which charges the thinker with a 
responsibility to think, charges the thinker with thought—against the tired and neutered 
labor of a proposition: this is one of the choices that must be made at the outset of any 
theoretical undertaking.  
 Our problem is forgiveness. In order to address this problem, to answer the 
imperatives of its questions, it is necessary to begin by laying out the plane of immanence 
upon which the inquiry, so to speak, takes place. I therefore turn first to Spinoza’s theory 
of substance (Chapter 2) and to Foucault’s theory of power and subjectivity (Chapter 3). 
Once the ontological and subjective stakes have been laid out, the question of the 
apparatus of forgiveness will be taken up in Part II (Chapters 4 and 5). This preparatory 
work is essential, and, when the time comes, it will throw the complex of concepts—
money, credit-debt, forgiveness—into sharp relief. 













Part I  













Chapter 2 – General Economy (Materialism) 
 2.1 Perhaps it is strange to begin an essay on money and forgiveness with a 
meditation on Bataille and Spinoza—not to mention Lucretius. Nevertheless, this chapter 
will lay the groundwork for understanding what, precisely, is meant by the expression 
material of forgiveness. That such a groundwork must necessarily appeal to metaphysics 
need not imply that the analysis is lost in abstraction, hence a failure to grasp the 
concreteness of economy and subjectivity, but rather the contrary: everything to come 
depends on whether or not one can conceive economy in general, that is to say, in terms 
of pure immanence.  
 The concept of general economy was first formulated by Georges Bataille in 1949, 
with the publication of the first volume of his treatise on political economy, The Accursed 
Share. The work marks a pivotal attempt to overturn the prevailing economic doctrines of 
the time, and to a large extent its import has been unappreciated by economists. This state 
of affairs may stem from the fact that, as Bataille himself admits, the book  
did not consider the facts the way qualified economists do, that I had a point of 
view from which a human sacrifice, the construction of a church or the gift of a 




to make clear the notion of a ‘general economy’ in which the ‘expenditure’ (the 
‘consumption’) of wealth, rather than production, was the primary object.20 
 
In other words, it is perhaps too much to ask for an entire profession to drop what they 
are doing and submit to a foreign, seemingly contradictory economic paradigm. For what 
it is worth, I myself am neither a qualified economist, nor even an unqualified one. My 
interest in Bataille’s theory is experimental and, so to speak, adventurous: inasmuch as 
the concept of a general economy allows for a critical examination of the nature of 
money and forgiveness, I intend to pursue this adventure to the end, and cannot evaluate 
Bataille’s theory strictly according to its ‘theoretical’ merits. Others, more or less 
qualified, will have to judge whether or not my own deployment of Bataille’s theory is of 
any worth, or if on the contrary, the whole effort is a waste.  
 Bataille, for his part, is clear that what matters most is, precisely, waste. And he is 
clear about the stakes involved in his theory. They are, in a manner of speaking, cosmic: 
“Changing from the perspectives of restrictive economy to those of general economy 
actually accomplishes a Copernican transformation: a reversal of thinking—and of 
ethics” (25). A theory of general economy is an attempt to think outside of any particular 
economic activity, such as an exchange, and to take account (though even this language 
does not suffice, since ‘accounting’ is always the abstraction of a given situation from the 
total movement of energy) of the whole.  A theory of general economy incorporates the 
rather simple truth that all particular activity on earth is a moment or modulation of the 
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cosmic movements and transformations of superabundant energy—in our case, solar 
energy (28). It is not at all that we lack energy. Quite the contrary: there is too much 
energy. Against any reference to scarcity as the driving economic force, Bataille 
substitutes the fact of extravagance, surplus, and ebullition:  
The living organism, in a situation determined by the play of energy on the 
surface of the globe, ordinarily receives more energy than is necessary for 
maintaining life; the excess energy (wealth) can be used for the growth of a 
system (e.g., an organism); if the system can no longer grow, or if the excess 
cannot be completely absorbed in its growth, it must necessarily be lost without 
profit; it must be spent, willing or not, gloriously or catastrophically. (21) 
 
 From the perspective of a restricted economy, which is finite and particular, one 
can speak endlessly of ‘economic necessities.’ For example: the imperatives of austerity 
politics, promulgated by creditor institutions, which always require ‘restructuring’ of 
debtor nations; their budgets and social services must be cut in order to respond to the 
‘necessity’ of managing to pay the debt. A nation that lacks the liquid assets to make 
good on their payments must submit to the ‘necessities’ of managing the global economy. 
(Later, we will highlight the vapid moralism of this ‘necessity’). Bataille, on the contrary, 
will insist that from the perspective of a general economy, there is never such a lack, but 
rather an  abundance of energy which must nevertheless be dissipated in one way or 
another—whether by spending (paying the debt, or issuing new debts) or by squandering 
(canceling the debt). Inasmuch as the difference between creditor and debtor nations is 
entirely contingent (especially since the debt was taken on precisely in order to 




necessity is revealed to be more a strategy of power rather than an implacable necessity—
though one detects the presence of an ‘iron hand’ in either case. 
 What interests us now is precisely the fact that, from the perspective of general 
economy, lack is a product rather than a pre-existing material condition or a 
transcendental condition. No doubt, scarcity is a reality, as those in poverty and those 
with ample means alike will attest. Nevertheless, scarcity or lack only appears as such, in 
all of its reality, from the perspective of a restricted economy, with respect to specific 
means and ends.  “We know very well where lack and its subjective correlative come 
from,” write Deleuze and Guattari, consciously echoing Bataille, “Lack is created, 
planned, and organized in and through social production.” Lack “is never primary; 
production is never organized on the basis of a pre-existing need or lack.” Rather “it is 
lack that infiltrates itself,” taking itself for or presenting itself as a fundamental factum 
from which all economic calculation proceeds. In a vulgar sense, one need only look at 
who is lacking for resources and who possesses (or disposes of, which amount to the 
same thing) an abundance of resources: “The deliberate creation of lack as a function of 
market economy is the art of a dominant class.”21  
 Contrary to the assumption that lack or scarcity is natural (and pervasive)—an 
assumption that marks, moreover, an entire orthodoxy, featuring so many priests of 
capital divining the rational movements of the market—Bataille insists that the problem 
is not use but waste. It is true that it is a matter of one’s point of view; Bataille admits as 
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much: “From the particular point of view, the problems are posed in the first instance by 
a deficiency of resources,” whereas “they are posed in the first instance by an excess of 
resources if one starts from the general point of view” (39). But note that Bataille 
immediately adds: “Doubtless, the problem of extreme poverty remains in any case.” 
Which is to say, raising oneself to the perspective of general economy is by no means a 
magical cure-all, a fix for all economic issues forever. Rather, the general point of view is 
a way of thinking differently, of posing problems differently, and if the perspective of 
general economy does not promise a solution from the first instance it is because in the 
last instance there is no solution—since every last instance is but the first instance of a 
new problem. The global movement of energy is not somehow blocked or generated by 
the newfound perspective of general economy; it is a real which is newly problematized, 
newly apprehended. 
 
 2.2 The fact or truth of general economy is that once a given system reaches the 
limits of its growth (and it will have reached this limit via its production and development 
of its surpluses) the only option left to it is to destroy or squander the abundant wealth of 
energy that always remains. The surplus “must be dissipated through deficit operations,” 
or, what amounts to the same thing, by consumption (22). The problem, Bataille claims, 
with economic science is that it  
merely generalizes the isolated situation; it restricts its object to operations carried 
out with a view to a limited end, that of economic man. It does not take into 
consideration a play of energy that no particular end limits: the play of living 
matter in general, involved in the movement of light of which it is the result. On 




the question always posed in terms of extravagance. The choice is limited to how 
the wealth is to be squandered. (23) 
 
 That Bataille emphasizes perspectivism, or multiple points of view onto economic 
activity is not an argument for relativism. It is not that the general and restricted points of 
view are two independently true perspectives which take the same object and maintain 
their truth autonomously, but rather that general economy is the truth of restricted 
economy, the latter which nevertheless maintains or guarantees its particular truth 
inasmuch as it is an abstraction from the general. One could speak of the two ‘forms of 
appearance’ of economic activity as being mutually exclusive, but we should rather, 
following Deleuze, insist that “there is no longer either invariable form of variable point 
of view on to a form. There is a point of view which belongs so much to the thing that the 
thing is constantly being transformed in a becoming identical to point of view.”22 The 
point of view to which we attach ourselves, with which we identify, is that of separate 
beings who alternately undergo the movements of energy and in certain cases dispose of 
the means to redirect or redistribute the energy. Again, it is not that this point of view (of 
ourselves) is not true, but that it obtains its truth in light of the general truth that 
humanity—the separate beings that we are, taken together—is but the most intensive, 
most developed dissipative system in history. History itself is the catalogue of our 
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destructions and consumptions through which we make ourselves, and are unmade (“Men 
make their own history, but they do not make it as they please”).23 
  As Bataille says: 
Man is not just the separate being that contends with the living world and with 
other men for his share of resources. The general movement of exudation (of 
waste) of living matter impels him, and he cannot stop it; moreover, being at his 
summit, his sovereignty in the living world identifies him with this movement; it 
destines him, in a privileged way, to that glorious operation, to useless 
consumption. (23) 
 
One should perhaps qualify this ‘destining,’ since it can also be a condemning, or 
damning. The difference between comprehension and incomprehension of the general 
economy does not change or nullify the final outcome (dissipation or squander of surplus 
energy). “We can ignore that fact that the ground we live on is little other than a field of 
multiple destructions,” writes Bataille. “Our ignorance only has this incontestable effect: 
it causes us to undergo what we could bring about in our own way, if only we 
understood” (23). This is necessity, but in a wholly different register than that of the 
moralizers: necessity of nature, rather than economic necessities which are incessantly 
naturalized in late capitalism. This is why Bataille claims that, in addition to implying 
interventions into public affairs (i.e. massive redistributions of wealth without 
reciprocation), the exposition of general economy aims firstly at humanity’s 
consciousness, which is determined by being (or the movements and transformations of 
                                                






energy), but which can, in becoming self-consciousness of its position as “a roundabout, 
subsidiary response to the problem of growth,” realize the profound truth that  
just as the herbivore relative to the plant, and the carnivore relative to the 
herbivore, is a luxury, man is the most suited of all living beings to consume 
intensely, sumptuously, the excess energy offered up by the pressure of life to 
conflagrations benefiting the solar origins of its movement. (37) 
 
 This state of affairs, or rather this general condition of humanity, has important 
political implications, some of which we hinted at above. The question, in essence, is 
how it is possible for us to become adequate or identical to the point of view of general 
economy; or, in another, ethical register: how do we become worthy of what happens to 
us? How do we become worthy of the wealth, the circulations and surpluses of energy—
some of which are transformed into money—that are bestowed upon us? The fact that 
Bataille continually refers to the surplus of energy to which we are subject as ‘wealth’ 
cannot be written off as a metaphorical or figurative use of language. We must insist on 
the literality of this wealth of energy: not all energy is money, but all money is energy, 
albeit transformed or produced under certain conditions yet to be determined. Suffice it 
say that what is at stake is the extent to which money plays, and the conditions under 
which it inherits this capacity or ability to play from the “play of living matter in 
general.” Moreover, one should recall the apparatus of money—or more precisely, of 
forgiveness—that accompanies the conservative posture of humanity at present: to 
maintain economic and political order by producing increasing amounts of total debt with 
no real hope of expiation (or, in Bataille’s terms, destruction), and to produce indebted 




business of humanity is too serious. To the question—how can we become worthy of 
what happens to us?—I can only provide a provisional answer. That we are implicated in 
a game that is beyond our control is without question; hence the imperative to challenge 
not only this or that rule of the game, but to call the game itself into question, and thereby 
to invent a new game.   
 Bataille offers us an inkling of what such a game might consist of: 
Man’s disregard for the material basis of his life still causes him to err in a serious 
way. Humanity exploits given material resources, but by restricting them as it 
does to a resolution of the immediate difficulties it encounters (a resolution which 
it has hastily had to define as an ideal), it assigns to the forces it employs an end 
they cannot have. Beyond our immediate ends, man’s activity in fact pursues the 
useless and infinite fulfillment of the universe. (21, my emphasis) 
 
Lest we become confused, Bataille observes in the endnote to this passage that 
“fulfillment designates that which fulfills itself, not that which is fulfilled,” and “infinite is 
in opposition both to the limited determination and to the assigned end” (191). And if we 
remain confused, it is perhaps because, as Bataille admits, “the materiality of the 
universe” is never anything but a “beyond of thought” (ibid.), echoing, as we will see, 
and at the very outset of his project, the fundamental problematic of the ancient atomists.  
 “The beings that we are,” claims Bataille, 
are not given once and for all: they appear designed for an increase of their energy 
resources. They generally make this increase, beyond mere subsistence, their goal 
and their reason for being. But with this subordination to increase, the being in 
question loses its autonomy; it subordinates itself to what it will be in the future, 
owing to the increase of its resources. In reality, the increase should be be situated 
in relation to the moment in which it will resolve into a pure expenditure. But this 





Difficult indeed. Bataille describes this transition to a self-consciousness which has 
nothing as its object as a transition to “pure interiority.” However, and this is the wager of 
this chapter, one could name this ‘consciousness of nothing’ otherwise. One could see in 
this for-nothing a pure exteriority, or what Foucault and Deleuze refer to as the outside, 
which in fact destroys the interior-exterior distinction; the outside which is not the 
subtraction of objects from the subject’s consciousness, leaving behind an empty subject, 
but rather the dissolution or dissipation of the subject-object distinction altogether—a 
transcendental field, or a plane of immanence, in which there is pure play, but no players 
to speak of.24  
 This brings us to Spinoza.  
 
 2.3 In his own way, Spinoza revives the Epicurean tradition of materialism.25 This 
is not to say that Spinoza simply repeats the dictums of atomism; rather, Spinoza 
retrieves and affirms the thought of Epicurus and Lucretius, pushing atomism and 
materialism to their limits, which is to say, to infinity. We saw that Bataille referred to 
the materiality of the universe as a “beyond of thought.” I want to suggest that we avoid 
thinking (pace, perhaps, Bataille himself) of this beyond as a transcendence. On the 
contrary, the materiality of the universe is that which is closest to thought, its utmost 
concern: not a beyond for thought, but a beyond of thought. At the turning point of Book 
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II of the Ethics26 (IIP13: its lengthy scholium and the resulting Postulates), Spinoza gives 
an account of the “simplest bodies” (corporibus simplicissimis), or what amounts to the 
same thing: of atoms.27 At the risk of transgressing the absolute separation of the 
Spinozan parallelism (e.g. the attributes of Thought and Extension are parallel to one 
another but have no causal connection to one another; see IIP1-6), perhaps we can see in 
Spinoza’s radical propositions regarding simple bodies echoes of the theses of the atomist 
materialism of Lucretius.  
 Spinoza claims that “the first thing which constitutes the actual being of a human 
Mind is nothing but the idea of a singular thing which actually exists” (IIP11). (Spinoza 
will not cease to insist on this predicate of ‘actual existence.’)  He makes a decisive move 
in P13: “The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, or a certain 
mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else” (IIP13). Spinoza clearly 
means to indicate the human body when he refers to this ‘certain mode of extension 
which actually exists,’ but there is, in fact, no reason whatsoever that one cannot read this 
term, ‘body,’ in the register of the simplest bodies, which, as we will see, turn out to be 
properly unthinkable. The human body, after all, is a composite body, or a conjugation of 
simple bodies which lie upon one another or communicate their motions to one another 
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“in a certain fixed manner,” such that these bodies “compose one body or individual” 
(IIP13A’’Def.). The simple bodies which make up a composite body are “distinguished 
from one another only by motion and rest, speed and slowness” (IIP13A’’), rather than by 
virtue of a substantial distinction (since all bodies are precisely bodies or parts of a single 
substance, or God). According to IIP26, “the human mind does not perceive any external 
body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the affections of its own body” (my 
emphasis). The upshot of this is that the mind, though it is radically distinguished from 
the body, requires the body as the condition of perception of these simple bodies. The 
mind does not perceive these simple bodies directly or adequately since, according to the 
parallelism, it can only perceive these bodies via its idea of its affections; hence the 
corollary proposition, “Insofar as the human mind imagines an external body, it does not 
have adequate knowledge of it” (IIP26Cor., my emphasis).  
 What is it to imagine? Spinoza puts it this way:  
The affections of the human body whose ideas present external bodies as present 
to us, we shall call images of things, though they do not reproduce the [external] 
figures of things. And when the mind regards bodies in this way, we shall say that 
it imagines. (IIP17S, my emphasis) 
 
Hence, the human mind cannot directly perceive simple bodies via the affections of the 
body, but only their aggregates or composites, and these only by way of images. 
Likewise, thought cannot think these simple bodies except by forming inadequate ideas 
of them, yet they nevertheless actually exist. How is this so? Whether or not humans 
sense the simple bodies or the atoms, and whether or not the mind can adequately think 




and thought by God (“Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without 
God”). Inasmuch as God is a single infinite substance, of which all bodies and ideas of 
bodies are modes—viewed from the perspective of the attributes of Extension and 
Thought, respectively—God both is and has in itself an adequate idea of the simple body; 
and inasmuch as the union of the human mind (attribute of Thought) and the human body 
(attribute of Extension) are in or of God, the simple bodies or atoms actually exist for the 
mind and the body, even if the mind does not possess an adequate idea of them. Despite 
being imperceptible and unthinkable, the simple body or the atom is for thought and for 
sense only on the condition that it is of God, which is to say, of Thought and Extension.  
 Here we reach the point of trespass of the parallelism, if it is indeed a trespass at all, 
as described by Deleuze in his essay on Lucretius:  
The atom is that which must be thought, and that which can only be thought. The 
atom is to thought what the sensible object is to the senses: it is the object which 
is essentially addressed to thought, the object which gives food to thought, just as 
the sensible object is that which is given to the senses. The atom is the absolute 
reality of what is perceived. That the atom is not, and cannot be perceived, that it 
is essentially hidden, is the effect of its own nature and not the imperfection of our 
sensibility.28 
 
The atom is not the sensible object, but to each of these corresponds a ‘minimum’ which 
constitutes their nature. “The indivisible atom is formed of thought minima, as the 
divisible [sensible] object is composed of sensible minima.”29 As is well known, in 
Epicurus, an infinity of atoms fall through a infinite void, straight down, as it were. Yet 
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Lucretius manages to say something different: “in their fall the atoms collide, not because 
of their differing weights, but because of the clinamen,” or the reason for the collisions or 
relations between atoms.30 In the void all atoms fall at an equal velocity, and in a sense, if 
this were to remain the case in the absence of the clinamen, one could effectively say that 
nothing whatsoever happens in the void: the atoms merely fall, infinitely, at the same 
speed, with no differentiation or action, no thought. Yet the clinamen does intervene. 
(Note that the clinamen had already been postulated by Epicurus. Nevertheless the 
clinamen in Lucretius does not come upon the atoms in the void as if from the outside, 
but is internal to the motion of the atoms. It is in the nature of these ‘first-beginnings’ to 
swerve.)31 
 We have seen that the atom belongs to thought, but more profoundly it is the 
necessary condition of thought: “the atom moves ‘as swiftly as thought,’” or is the very 
movement of thought. Deleuze expresses this determination of thought as follows: 
In the void, the velocity of the atom is equal to its movement in a unique direction 
in a minimum of continuous time. This minimum expresses the smallest possible 
term during which an atom moves in a given direction, before being able to take 
another direction as the result of a collision with another atom. There is therefore 
a minimum of time, no less than a minimum of matter or a minimum of the atom. 
In agreement with the nature of the atom, this minimum of continuous refers to 
the apprehension of thought. It expresses the most rapid of briefest thought: the 
atom moves ‘as swiftly as thought.’32 
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Yet thought would not think without collision or differentiation. Thought requires a 
synthesis or an originary direction that would serve as its sufficient condition. If the 
movement of thought (or of atoms) occurs in a minimum of continuous time, the 
synthesis of thought must necessarily be accomplished “in a time smaller than the 
minimum of continuous time. This is the clinamen.”33 Spinoza’s radical innovation is to 
conceive of the atom and the sensible as immanent to a single infinite substance or 
process (analogous to the ‘procession’ of atoms in the void). The dualism of atom 
(Thought) and sensible object (Extension) is rendered, in Spinoza, as a difference of 
attribute but not of substance. The simple body in Spinoza is the unity of atomic thought 
and sense perception: formally distinct, but materially or substantially one.  
 This will have crucial implications for our analysis of debt and forgiveness below, 
but for now let it suffice to say that the infinite, absolute Spinozan substance is—in 
Thought and Extension, atom or object—purely material. Or rather that “attributes are 
like points of view on substance; but in the absolute limit these points of view are no 
longer external, and substance contains within itself the infinity of its points of view upon 
itself.”34 Matter is not the ‘brute stuff’ of experience; it is inseparable from movement, 
speed, always in varying degrees of infinity. In this regard, one should speak of flows of 
matter-energy rather than of discrete, particulate atoms. This is why it was necessary to 
begin with Bataille’s account of the movement and flow of matter-energy, so as to set the 
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stage for a reading of Spinoza that neither falls victim to a banal atomism, nor to an 
idealism in which Thought is privileged over Extension (Spinoza’s greatest contribution 
was to have insisted upon a pure plane of immanence or substance in which, or on which, 
everything is ontologically equal). 
 
 2.4 On the one hand, in order to understand our contemporary situation, in which 
God has become money, it is necessary to insist on the fact that there is but one 
substantial economy, understood as an infinite, infinitely modified, substance, or what 
amounts to the same thing—the immanence of every restricted economy. If a given 
economy or system appears transcendent to another it is precisely because one has not 
considered the whole, from which every economy emerges and to which it returns. On 
the other hand, the only chance of reaching a coherent theory of Spinozan chance (the 
paradox of our freedom) is to insist on the identity of spontaneity (clinamen) and 
necessity (immanent causation).  
 No doubt, the Epicureans resisted a simple reduction of the clinamen to either 
contingency or necessity—in any case, the disagreement between the Stoics and the 
Epicureans concerned causality and destiny, rather than chance and necessity.35 
Nevertheless, Deleuze highlights a potential obstacle for the identity we have just 
proposed: the clinamen manifests “the irreducible plurality of causes or of causal series, 
and the impossibility of bringing causes together into a whole.” In what sense can one 
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speak of a synthesis of Spinozan necessity (and the implied Whole that would express the 
unity of causes) and an irreducible plurality of causes? Spinoza himself provides us with 
a clue in IP18, where he claims that “God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all 
things.” A transitive cause is a cause in which the effect is outside of the cause, it leaves 
the cause or is distinguished precisely by the fact that it is forced outside of the cause by 
the cause (this is the case in Neo-Platonic emanation). By contrast, a cause is immanent 
when its effect is ‘immanate’ in the cause, rather than emanating from it. What 
defines an immanent cause is that its effect is in it—in it, of course, as something 
else, but still being and remaining in it. The effect remains in its cause no less 
than the cause remains in itself.36 
 
 Hence, God—according to Spinoza’s claim in IP25S—qua immanent cause “must 
be called the cause of all things in the same sense in which he is called the cause of 
himself.” And moreover, “particular things are nothing but affections of God’s attributes, 
or modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way” 
(IP25Cor.). The triadic structure of Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura comes into full view only 
when considered in terms of pure immanence: substance is nothing other than the unity 
that is said of its modifications, the latter which are infinite, determinate, and affective. 
Immanence is “a theory of Being in which Unity is only a property of substance and of 
what is.”37 Which is to say, what is is different, difference itself, equivocal but equal: 
“pure immanence requires as a principle the equality of being, or the positing of equal 
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Being: not only is being equal in itself, but it is seen to be equally present in all beings.”38 
Immanence is the literal equality of being, of all beings inasmuch as each being is 
differentiated qua mode but remains in God; conversely, God, inasmuch as God is 
affected or modified by the modes God expresses, is a field of individuation or self-
affection as much as God is a nomination of unity.39  
 This, then, is how one should read Deleuze’s clarification on the nature of the 
clinamen, with a view toward a theory of Spinozan chance: 
The clinamen or swerve has nothing to do with an oblique movement which 
would come accidentally to modify a vertical fall. It has always been present: it is 
not a secondary movement, nor a secondary determination of the movement, 
which would be produced at any time, at any place. The clinamen is the original 
determination of the direction of the movement of the atom. It is a kind of 
conatus—a differential of matter and, by the same token, a differential of 
thought…40 
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39 In a decisive passage of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze describes the manner in 
which Spinozan substance must be thought in order to render it a pure plane of 
immanence, where being is said of its constitutive differences. “With Spinoza, univocal 
being ceases to be neutralized and becomes expressive; it becomes a truly expressive and 
affirmative proposition. … Nevertheless, there still remains a difference between 
substance and the modes: Spinoza’s substance appears independent of the modes, while 
the modes are dependent on substance, but as though on something other than 
themselves. Substance must itself be said of the modes and only of the modes. … 
Nietzsche means nothing more than this by eternal return. Eternal return cannot mean the 
return of the Identical because it presupposes a world (that of the wilt power) in which all 
previous identities have been abolished and dissolved. Returning is being, but only the 
being of becoming.” See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 40-41. 
 





Note that the clinamen is not God; the swerve is not simply another name for substance. 
Nor is the clinamen an attribute or a mode of substance. It is not a property of substance. 
The clinamen is power, it is the infinite differentiality of power. It is the materiality of the 
modes. With the clinamen qua power expression is already re-expression, repetition, 
desire, differentiality: a conatus of immanence in which Spinozan necessity and 
Epicurean contingency coincide (where ‘conatus’ signifies, as in Spinoza, a ‘striving to 
persevere in one’s being’ [IIIP6], but where ‘being’ is becoming—as Deleuze says, “the 
being of becoming”41). The clinamen does not come from outside in order to modify 
immanence, but names the movement proper to immanent causality, which proceeds 
neither from the cause to the effect, but gathers the cause and effect together in 
immanence. A torsion, a swerve, or a folding of immanence, qua immanence.  
 We will therefore call transcendence any concept or operation in which a hierarchy 
of being is naturalized, where transitive or emanative causality holds sway. Whether the 
naturalization operates according to a serial, analogical relation to a supereminent or 
supernatural term, or whether it functions by ostensibly ‘immanent’ criteria, in which 
beings ‘more or less’ resemble one another—all of this is transcendence, all of it 
analogy.42 Opposed to transcendence is immanence, though the opposition is by no 
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42 For a discussion of two central forms of analogy, see Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), esp. 233-237. The scholastics 
defined two central forms of analogy: analogy of proportion, and analogy of 
proportionality. In the case of the former, one defines a series of terms (a resembles b, b 




means dialectical, since transcendence is in fact produced by immanence as a 
transcendental illusion (and we will see that money is the site of such an illusion). 
Immanence is immanent to immanence alone; it is not immanent to something, but is 
immanent to nothing.  
 An economy, taken in the restricted sense, is a totality or a whole. But from the 
general point of view an economy is a dissipative system, and even then only one system 
among others. In truth, there is an economy or dissipative system wherever there is an 
individual or a self—each ‘local’ dissipative system being considered transcendent or 
separate from another, working sometimes in unison, sometimes not. We reach the 
general point of view only when we consider each instant or clinamen in terms of its 
modification of the whole (by IIP11). Even a cell is a dissipative system, as is any 
composite body. Nevertheless, a composite body such as a cell, even if its rate of growth, 
plateau and dissipation of energy are prodigious relative to its mass (or even to the sum of 
its parts, the simple bodies of which it is composed) cannot approach the cruel efficiency 
of human beings in terms of a power of consumption or destruction. That the human is 
the being most capable (on the Earth—a crucial qualifier) of growth and the dissipation 
of excess wealth is enough to indicate a fundamental relation between the transcendental 
                                                                                                                                            
latter case, one defines a structure (a is to b as c is to d) where each relationship between 
terms “realizes after its fashion the perfection under consideration: gills are to breathing 
under water as lungs are to breathing air….  As Deleuze and Guattari insist, “This 
problem [of analogy] is in no way behind us” (235), and we should pay careful attention 
to the analogies produced on our plane of immanence, particularly those relations which 
parasitize immanence itself, the literal equality of being. The Christian-capitalist analogy, 






illusion of money—which foists a false necessity on us, increasingly in the most intimate 
dimensions of our life—and the blissful myopia of economic science: a radically 
hierarchical and inequitable distribution of wealth results from our unique power to 
redirect and dissipate energy through labor, whether psychic or material.43 
 A human being is a conduit of energy, but is not separate from that energy, is not 
different in kind. The human is a “certain and determinate way” that energy (or flows of 
matter, since the difference is negligible from the perspective of immanence) is 
accumulated and dissipated—a mode or modification of the whole. The prospect or 
possibility of growth results from the capacity of human beings to form larger, more 
complex composite bodies (or assemblages), in which are invested increasing amounts of 
matter-energy, and from which can be extracted increasing amounts of wealth. However, 
and here Bataille and Spinoza are in agreement, growth is never growth in fact, if by 
growth we mean an increase or improvement upon the perfection or total volume of the 
Whole. “If one considers life as a whole,” writes Bataille, “there is not really growth but 
a maintenance of volume in general.” Rather than growth there is “a luxurious 
squandering of energy in every form.”44 By the same token, if in Spinoza immanence is 
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the Real, the all of reality, then one cannot transcend, increase or improve upon reality, 
since reality equals perfection (IID6).45 
 It is an integral feature of the capitalist mode of production to deny this absolute 
fact: to insist that growth can be, and is in principle, unlimited; to conjure ex nihilo a 
surplus value from its workers, inevitably subtended by a disavowal of the time and 
labor—the matter-energy expended—required for production; to subordinate the present 
to the transcendental illusion of a future of pure accumulation without expenditure; to 
produce, as a condition of its very survival, subjects qua debtors who work endlessly, 
rendering up their very existences, to securitizing and indemnifying this future; all the 
way down to the point at which the difference between creditor and debtor is naturalized, 
moralized and substantialized, where the creditor is endowed with a sovereign power to 
forgive and debtor is rendered powerless to refuse. The debtor qua material of 
forgiveness, reduced to an object for power. There exists a strategy of power or an 
apparatus of forgiveness, which neither adds to nor subtracts from immanence, but which 
in its good conscience and essential moralism considers itself, in spite of itself, in terms 
of a perfect, unconditional grace. The essentially Christian dimensions of the apparatus of 
forgiveness will become apparent below, in conjunction with its fundamental importance 
                                                
45 This is not to say, as Voltaire assumed Leibniz had said, that the world is perfect and 
needs no improvement. On the contrary, the world is a modulation or hallucination of 
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with Spinoza, that reality (that is, immanence) is perfection, is to say that the materials 
for our liberation and our repression are already in immanence: we need only seek out 





for the emergence of the capitalist mode of production and the production of capitalist 
subjects.  
 According to the Spinozan theory of substance, each mode does not merely refer to, 
but is a degree of power. Hence, the question of subjectivity must be posed in terms of 
power. The following chapter takes up this problem: how is a subject constituted in the 
given? What is the process by which a subject is produced in and by immanence? And 
what illusions (whether transcendental or empirical) accrue to this subject which takes 
itself for a transcendent object, or a transcendental ego, resembling a pre-eminently 
transcendent God? Whatever the case may be: the fact that the subject is a patient of the 
power relations which constitute it, that the subject is only active to the extent that it 
expresses its relations, does not necessarily mean that the subject is powerless. 
Powerlessness is in fact a power in itself, on condition that powerlessness is understood 
as precisely that which can be raised to the highest power.46   
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Chapter 3 – Power (Subjectivity) 
 3.1 Foucault’s theses on power are well known, if often misunderstood. Power: 
neither locus nor turgescence, rather circulation and production; not the sovereign State 
or the form of the law, but the always mobile and multiple apparatuses of discipline and 
surveillance, statistics and internment, sexuality and knowledge. It is not that the State 
has no power, or that the law is not characterized by the power it exerts in its formality 
and emptiness, it is simply that these are the terminal forms of power—they are 
produced. Power, insists Foucault, “must be understood in the first instance as the 
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which 
constitute their own organization.” Power as multiplicity of forces, process, struggle, 
serial supports, disjunctions and contradictions, isolations and conjunctions, and—
crucially—strategies, in which power is effected, “whose general design or institutional 
crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the 




nor centripetal; there is rather the “moving substrate of force relations” which produce or 
generate states of power that are irreducible, local, and unstable.47 
  One of Foucault’s most radical and provocative moments is precisely the point at 
which he declines to continue with an analysis of power at the homogeneous register of 
ideology and law, the master and the family, the State and the subject. Foucault’s move 
has the merit of rendering absolutely untenable any theory of power (and by association, 
any politics) which would attribute to power the status of a totality or a supreme unity. 
Power is rather the most common—absolutely common in its very heterogeneity, 
disparity and omnipresence. Power is a name before it is a thing, even if in being named 
it assumes the appearance or crystallization proper to a thing (institutions, enclosures, 
guillotines, etc.). One can speak of the “omnipresence of power,” writes Foucault, 
not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible 
unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or 
rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere, not 
because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. … One 
needs to be nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and not a structure; 
neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one 
attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.48 
 
 The immediate danger here is to posit power as something exterior to a society, or 
to the bodies of which society is said. Foucault insists that power is not something that 
can be acquired or shared, accumulated or dispensed, “relations of power are not in a 
position of exteriority with respect to other types of relationships,” such that one cannot 
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say that power ‘comes upon’ a mind or a body or a society, but is always immanent to its 
relations—power is this multiplicity of relations and nothing besides. One attributes 
power to a situation inasmuch as one names power, but power is not itself an attribute. 
“Power has no essence,” writes Deleuze, following Foucault, “it is simply operational. It 
is not an attribute but a relation.”49 What is called power “is characterized by immanence 
of field without transcendent unification, continuity of line without global centralization, 
and contiguity of parts without distinct totalization: it is a social space.”50 Yet if power is 
social it is nevertheless irreducible to subjects. “Power relations are both intentional and 
nonsubjective,” which is to say relations of power ‘lack’ a subject, but are nevertheless 
intelligible and imbued with calculation, always exercised in terms of a series of aims and 
objectives. Yet no one ultimately chooses or decides: “the logic is perfectly clear, the 
aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them,” 
hence the essential anonymity of strategies of power.51  
 Anonymity is not negative theology. Nor does it signify a pardon for those 
‘persons’ in ‘positions of power.’ On the contrary, the brilliance of Foucault’s “profound 
Nietzscheanism” is to have put to death forever the idea of an absolute Subject or God 
who pulls the strings of society. Appealing to the anonymity and impersonal nature of 
power relations does not buttress the identity of a transcendence which would guarantee 
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power in its deployment. The point is neither to apologize for God nor to attack God, but 
to show the void of the non-place where God was supposed to have been. Likewise, it is 
by no means the case that by insisting on the anonymous and nonsubjective ‘being’ of 
power one is giving cover to those persons who reside at the privileged nodes of power. It 
is simply to suggest that those persons who occupy ‘positions’ are mastered by power just 
as much as they are masters of power (power, after all, “passes through the hands of the 
mastered no less than through the hands of the masters”)52. It is precisely by attending to 
power relations as the movements and concatenations of energy and force on an 
impersonal transcendental field (prior to any subject) that one can begin to refuse the 
transcendence of God and masters alike, since every subject, human or divine, is 
produced by power. And this holds for social or political classes as well as the subjects 
that populate them, since “power flows through the ruling class no less than through 
those who are ruled, in such a way that classes result from it, and not the reverse.” The 
State and Law are crystallized forms of power; they merely effect the integration of 
power.53 
 Hence, one should identify relations of power and analyze them in terms of their 
differentiation and heterogeneity—a search for immanent causes—rather than in terms of 
global effects—the State, or Law (even the police, which are the corporeality of the latter 
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and pure violence of the former).54 Foucault’s method of this pursuit is diagrammatic. A 
diagram is simply a map that doubles the social field, “a cartography that is coextensive 
with the whole social field.”55 Yet if it doubles the social field it is not in order to 
represent the social field, but rather to produce a new kind of reality, to render speech and 
sight possible: the diagram makes intelligible—or is the intelligibility of—the continually 
varying and innumerable anonymous strategies of power. Foucault’s celebrated example 
of the diagram is Bentham’s infamous Panopticon, but Foucault does not merely refer to 
the Panopticon as a mechanism or field of visibility and invisibility (he does say this, but 
more profoundly locates in the Panopticon a pure function). “The panoptic mechanism,” 
he writes, “is not simply a hinge, a point of exchange between a mechanism of power and 
a function; it is a way of making power relations functions in a function, and of making a 
function through these power relations.”56 
 There is a reciprocity here that is proper to immanence: the multiplicity of power 
relations become functions in a function, but this function is nothing other than the 
execution or effectuation of the power relations which constitute it. Deleuze notes that  
the diagram acts as a non-unifying immanent cause that is co-extensive with the 
whole social field: [this] abstract machine is like the cause of the concrete 
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assemblages that execute its relations; and these relations between forces take 
place ‘not above’ but within the very tissue of the assemblages they produce.57 
 
This is why Foucault can maintain that there is a diagram for every social field, whether 
distinguished by geographical position, cultural difference, temporal distance, or 
historical process. A Greek diagram of the gymnasium and the agora. An Alexandrian 
diagram of conquest and expansion. A medieval diagram of the king’s body. A modern 
diagram of the State. It will become clear that we are interested not only in the specificity 
of diagrammatic functions and the forces embodied in them, but in the specific relations 
of power immanent in the diagram of late capitalism, to which the name creditor-debtor 
relation corresponds, without thereby exhausting the possibility of naming strategies of 
capital.  
 The creditor-debtor relation, according to Nietzsche, is the first truly social relation, 
inasmuch as it inaugurates a relation in which one can measure oneself against another.58 
Yet it would be a mistake to say that this relation has always existed as the primary 
relation of power, undisturbed or without transformation, throughout history, as if one 
could trace a continuous, immutable line through the accidents and vagaries of a 
historical continuum. The genealogical method which Nietzsche invented or discovered, 
and which Foucault picks up (as one picks up an arrow, shot by one thinker, and fires it 
further) and puts to his own use, does not consider the history of morality (or any history) 
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as a matter of linear development or continuity of evolution, which one could trace back 
to an unequivocal origin. Rather, genealogy identifies and analyzes points of emergence, 
discontinuities or events irreducible to culminations or final destinations (“the eye was 
not always intended for contemplation, and punishment has had other purposes than 
setting an example”59). Emergence is “always produced in a particular state of forces,” 
the struggles or conflicts between forces, struggles of power.60 Hence, morality emerges 
in the Nietzschean schema as a particular technique of ‘accounting for’ the human being 
in terms of its sociality—a subject emerges as the unique capacity to either dispense 
punishment (injured creditor) or to endure pain (insolvent debtor). Perhaps this ‘genesis’ 
of morality qua credit-debt relation subsides as early societies codify social relations and 
rituals, or disappears entirely as monotheism emerges, yet resurfaces in Christian theories 
of atonement. This is one dimension of the question raised in Part II: to what extent does 
Christianity repeat, simplify, or modify the creditor-debtor relation?  
 In any case, I am concerned precisely with the emergence, or intensification, of the 
creditor-debtor relation in late capitalist society. Yet this society is not the same society 
as those from which this power relation sprang. One must account not only for the formal 
nature of a power relation, but also for its historical transformation and appearance-
disappearance. There is an absolute heterogeneity of forces, multiplicities which take 
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only other multiplicities as their object (“force is never singular but essentially exists in 
relation with other forces, such that any force is already a relation, that is to say power: 
force has no other object or subject than force”),61 but in addition to the variation and 
complexity of this field of forces there is, or are, perceivable—or at the very least 
nameable—trends in the dispersion and dissemination of these forces: regimes, or 
apparatuses, of power. Before we can further explore the manner in which relations of 
power constitute a social field (not to mention the relation of this hypothesis to a 
Spinozist materialism) and produce a subject of that field, it will be necessary to explore 
these apparatuses and their (provisional) periodization. It will become apparent that one 
can perceive the credit-debt relation in each of these regimes, but to varying degrees and 
with more or less clarity.  
 
 3.2 Foucault outlines three distinct apparatuses—or modalities—of power.62 The 
first apparatus is characterized by the juridical or legal code, the ancient or medieval 
society of sovereignty, “which consists in laying down a law and fixing a punishment for 
the person who breaks it,” where the sovereign power, be it the impersonality of the early 
bureaucratic State or the monarch who embodies the State, maintains an absolute power 
over the criminal’s (the subject’s) death. The second apparatus is Foucault’s infamous 
                                                
61 Deleuze, Foucault, 70. My emphasis. 
 
62 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 






disciplinary society, characterized by surveillance, internment, enclosure, distributing 
bodies in time and space so as to organize productive power: power qua discipline, where 
discipline refers both to the production of individuals and to their ordering and 
organization. Discipline, considered in terms of the problem of crime (as with sovereign 
power above), is a sort of set of preventative measures or prophylactics of power, 
deployed at the level of the individual as measure or unit of a multiplicity. Foucault refers 
to the third apparatus by different names depending on the volume one consults: here it is 
security, there it is biopower (Deleuze, as we will see, follows William S. Burroughs, 
calling this third apparatus control). Nevertheless, this third apparatus, defined loosely, 
operates at the register of populations rather than discrete individuals. It is not that there 
are no longer any individuals to speak of, but that power is deployed as an inoculative 
measure; power ceases to concern itself entirely with producing a moral or disciplined 
individual and comes to address the problems of immunity, criminality, and insolvency in 
terms of probability—a statistics of power. The rate of crime becomes the subject of 
power, rather than the criminal himself, or the adjudication of a sentence for his particular 
crimes.  
 Or take Foucault’s example of the plague: sovereign power operates by binary 
divisions and exclusions (one is either a leper or one is not; the former are thrown out of 
the city); disciplinary power operates by enclosure  and surveillance (parts of the city are 
quarantined, homes subject to inspection); but security or biopower operates by 




medical campaigns that emphasize the importance of washing one’s hands).63 Yet despite 
the somewhat obvious periodization of these three apparatuses (ancient/medieval, 
modern, and contemporary), Foucault insists that there is not a “series of successive 
elements, the appearance of the new causing the earlier ones to disappear. There is not 
the legal age, the disciplinary age, and then the age of security.”64 It is rather as though all 
of these apparatuses co-exist in superposition. No doubt, disciplinary mechanisms could 
only emerge as a novelty in light of the ‘prior’ techniques of sovereign power, and the 
same would hold vis-a-vis security and discipline. “For example,” says Foucault,  
you could perfectly well study the history of the disciplinary technique of putting 
someone in a cell, which goes back a long way. It was already frequently 
employed in the juridical-legal age; you find it used for debtors and above all you 
find it in the religious domain.65  
 
One apparatus or another will emerge, or find itself cast in relief, standing out amidst the 
mechanisms and techniques of the other apparatuses, but in doing so it makes use of or 
appropriates certain features of these others.  
 Rather than a banal historicization or naive periodization, one should insist, 
according to the genealogical method, that apparatuses emerge according to the problems 
they are more or less capable of addressing. That is, a regime of power is organized 
according to an immanent problematic field, rather than according to an eternal or 
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transcendent dictum.66 Deleuze takes the term ‘control’ from William S. Burroughs to 
characterize the society or regime of power that ‘succeeds’ discipline without thereby 
taking leave of the latter. One should insist on the novelty of control societies without 
falling into the error of imagining discipline is gone for good; on the contrary, discipline 
gets re-deployed, re-imagined and re-expressed in terms of dividuals, continuous and 
varying modulations of power relations and the subjects produced therein, rather than the 
discontinuous or exclusionary processes of the ‘previous’ regimes. “Confinements are 
molds, different moldings, while controls are a modulation, like a self-transmuting 
molding continually changing from one moment to the next, or like a sieve whose mesh 
varies from one point to another.”67 Likewise, in accordance with the emphasis of control 
on populations, “we’re no longer dealing with a duality of mass and individual. 
Individuals become ‘dividuals,’ and masses become samples, data, markets, or 
‘banks.’”68  
 Strikingly, Deleuze suggests that money functions a privileged site of this 
transformation: 
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Money, perhaps, best expresses the difference between the two kinds of society, 
since discipline was always related to molded currencies containing gold as a 
numerical standard, whereas control is based on floating exchange rates, 
modulations depending on a code setting sample percentages for various 
currencies. If money’s old moles are the animals you get in places of 
confinement, then control societies have their snakes. We’ve gone from one 
animal to the other, from moles to snakes, not just in the system we live under but 
in the way we live and in our relations with other people too. Disciplinary man 
produced energy in discrete amounts, while control man undulates, moving 
among a continuous range of different orbits.69 
 
A host of mechanisms, techniques, and assemblages accompany these transformations, or 
are produced precisely as this transformation. Deleuze here keys in on a crucial point: the 
systemic changes are not merely abstract or formal, but effect novel, concrete social 
relations, and produce subjects which are grounded only in the shifting relations of power 
from which they spring. We are mistaken if we assume that there are pre-existing 
subjects upon which an apparatus acts. A subject—however insolvent—is as much a 
solution to a problem as is the apparatus that produces it; a subject is a solution to the 
second degree, or is the ‘result’ of a strategy, which always refers back to a diagram of 
forces which maps the contours or the singular points of a problem.  
 In an expression that is not only infamous, but which also has ramifications for the 
present essay, Deleuze claims that “control is short-term and rapidly shifting, but at the 
same time continuous and unbounded, whereas discipline was long-term, infinite and 
discontinuous. A man is no longer a man confined but a man in debt.”70 My aim here is 
not to adjudicate as to which regime of power the creditor-debtor relation belongs. In 
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fact, it ‘belongs’ to each of the three outlined above. In the same way that Foucault 
decries any accusation that he is attempting to formulate a general theory of power, and 
insists instead upon examining the particular, local and singular points in which, upon 
which, and at which power is applied or is expressed, so does my own analysis aim at 
isolating a particular apparatus that asserts itself (the apparatus of forgiveness) in terms 
of both the problematic field or milieu in which it arises (industrial and now neoliberal 
capitalism) and the specific subject it produces (the indebted or forgiven subject). The 
theory of a general credit is by no means a general theory of credit.71 The analysis of this 
apparatus of forgiveness—its effects, affects, and the subjectivity that it produces—is the 
subject of Part II. Yet before this analysis can be undertaken it is necessary to specify the 
conditions under which an apparatus emerges, the operations by which it effects its 
movements and processes, and the effects it produces—namely, the production of a 
subject. 
                                                
71 One of the differences between Foucault’s account of power, and Deleuze’s account of 
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interrogate the manner in which a theory of money qua credit can illuminate and 
accentuate the stakes of our contemporary situation vis-a-vis debt resistance and 
neoliberal austerity. How does a general credit—our collective faith in God or money—





 Before moving on I should note that I will henceforth reserve the term regime to 
refer to the periodization of the dispositifs discussed above: a regime of sovereignty, of 
discipline, and control or security. Apparatuses proliferate infinitely within regimes of 
power, as well as in their interstices, and each apparatus varies in itself according to the 
material conditions of its milieu; the only limit is the outside, from which apparatuses 
spring and to which they return. Hence, an apparatus can be as insignificant as a social 
network or a credit scoring system, or as comparatively prominent as a Constitution, a 
declaration of martial law, or a religious tradition. The essential character of the 
apparatus is preserved, even if it is multiplied indefinitely: an apparatus is a constellation 
of power relations which acts as an (always provisional) organizing principle of a given 
society and produces subjects as avatars and conduits of its constitutive power relations. 
Processes of subjectivization are inseparable from the concrete, seemingly impersonal, 
relations of power that define a milieu. 
 
 3.3 Foucault himself recognized the difficulty of defining the term apparatus, which 
is due less to any specifically mystical or mysterious occlusion of the apparatus, but 
rather due to its generality. He refers to this difficulty in an interview: 
What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous 
ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory 
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. 
Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of 
relations that can be established between these elements.72  
                                                






Giorgio Agamben has observed that the term dispositif is not only a crucial technical term 
for Foucault, but is a general term of analysis opposed to the ‘universals’ such as the 
State or Law. According to Agamben, apparatuses are “what take the place of universals 
in the Foucauldian strategy: not simply this or that police measure, this or that technology 
of power.”73 What the term apparatus refers to is precisely the networks or diagrams that 
can be ‘drawn’ or ‘mapped’ onto a differentiated and heterogeneous social field. The 
generality of apparatuses becomes a privileged and incisive instrument with which to 
probe the networks of relations of power which, in themselves, defy all generalization. 
 In his essay, “What is an Apparatus?,” Agamben proposes to further expand the 
“already large class” of apparatuses:  
I shall call an apparatus literally anything that has in some way the capacity to 
capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, 
behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings. Not only, therefore, prisons, 
madhouses, the panopticon, schools, confession, factories, disciplines, juridical 
measures, and so forth (whose connection with power is in a certain sense 
evident), but also the pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, 
navigation, computers, cellular telephones, and—why not—language itself, which 
is perhaps the most ancient of apparatuses—one in which thousands and 
thousands of years ago a primate inadvertently let himself be captured…74 
 
This expansion has the great merit of refusing to fall into a dogmatic position vis-a-vis 
Foucault’s description of the three historical dispositifs, in which one would insist that 
power is either sovereign or disciplinary or biopolitical, and that analyses of power are 
exhausted in these categories. Apparatuses proliferate, and subjects with them. The move 
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that accompanies this expansion of the class of apparatuses, however, seems to 
compromise some of the strength of the term. In the same essay, Agamben proposes a 
particular genealogy of the term apparatus, the continuity of which stretches back two 
millennia to the dawn of Christian theology.  
 The trinitarian Church Fathers, claims Agamben, were faced with the problem of 
accounting for both the immutability and ipseity (i.e. the being) of God and the divine 
government of the world, the effectuation of salvation history and so on (i.e. God’s 
activity). They had to appease the monotheists or ‘monarchians’ in their midst while 
affirming the deity of Christ. Their solution, which was in any case ingenious, was to 
make strategic reference to the Greek concept of oikonomia, which signified the 
administration or management of the household. Their argument, according to Agamben, 
went something like this:  
“God, insofar as his being and substance is concerned, is certainly one; but as to 
his oikonomia—that is to say the way in which he administers his home, his life, 
and the world that he has created—he is, rather, triple. Just as a good father can 
entrust to his son the execution of certain functions and duties without in so doing 
losing his power and his unity, so God entrusts to Christ the ‘economy,’ the 
administration and government of human history.”75 
 
The upshot of this turn of events is that oikonomia entered the Christian faith, referring 
not only to the worldly power of the Church (which dispenses God’s justice and grace) 
but also to the eschatological notion of an ‘economy of salvation,’ which grinds onward 
through history like a machine toward a certain, predetermined end. The link between the 
oikonomia of the early Church and the French term dispositif is an etymological one (one 
                                                





can perceive here Agamben’s often overt reliance on a Heideggerian hermeneutic of 
Being, which tends to over-privilege both etymology and the ‘destiny’ of certain 
enunciations of Being): the Latin translation of oikonomia was, and is, Dispositio.76  
 This is certainly not the end of the story. Agamben has, in fact, given a much more 
detailed account of the historical transformations this term has undergone in The 
Kingdom and the Glory,77 which traces seemingly every mutation of oikonomia 
throughout Western history—to which the short essay I have been citing refers only in 
passing. The issue with Agamben’s theological genealogy, as Alberto Toscano has 
recently pointed out,78 is that—contrary to Foucault’s insistence on the discontinuity and 
fundamental emergent genesis of apparatuses of power—for Agamben, the historical 
transformations of oikonomia and dispositio all refer back to a purportedly continuous 
Christian lineage. Underneath it all—all of the historical formations of power—it is just 
Christianity, always Christianity, which becomes therefore the truth—however 
occulted—of every history.79 As much as Agamben wishes to depart from Carl Schmitt’s 
notion of secularization (the infamous claim that “all significant concepts of the modern 
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theory of the state are secularized theological concepts…”),80 the danger here is that 
Christianity becomes the transcendent term to which all power refers.81 In Agamben, the 
apparatus is not too general; on the contrary, it is too specific, too narrow, too Christian. 
 I will raise this problem of historiography and genealogy again in Part 2, with 
regards to the question of the genealogical links between Christianity and capitalism in 
terms of the creditor-debtor relation. I locate my own analysis somewhere between 
Agamben and Foucault (inasmuch as one can grant the distance between them according 
to Toscano’s critique). That there is indeed a specifically Christian genealogy of power 
should not lead us astray: Christianity is itself an emergent, historical formation, but it by 
no means provides us with an unqualified continuity or a universal history with which to 
proceed. For now, however, I merely want to take from Agamben the notion that one can 
conceive of any number of apparatuses, which are indeed infinite in principle, and which 
must always produce a subject in response to a given exigency, be it social or political, 
religious or economic. Agamben’s insistence on the production of subjects by 
apparatuses stems, per usual, from the fact that the trinitarian split between God’s being 
and God’s action: “Action (economy, but also politics) has no foundation in being,” the 
latter which, inasmuch as it is the being of God, must remain separate and immutable. 
Hence,  
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the term ‘apparatus designates that in which, and through which, one realizes a 
pure activity of governance devoid of any foundation in being. This is the reason 
why apparatuses must always imply a process of subjectification, that is to say, 
they must produce their subjects.82  
 
 Contra Agamben, one must insist on the radical immanence of action and being, 
power and being. Agamben appears here to fall victim to a certain analogical conception 
of being. There is indeed (an) analogy at the heart of apparatuses, particularly the 
creditor-debtor relation and its apparatus of forgiveness, but a genealogy should concern 
itself not with apparatuses as they appear—rather with the conditions of their appearance 
and production.  
 
 3.4 A subject is always a subject of power. That is to say, in the same way that 
power is not exterior to social relations, but immanent to them and constitutive of them, 
the subject is constituted by power. We saw above that a diagram doubles every social 
field by investing it with power relations. The diagram is to the apparatus as the abstract 
machine is to the assemblage in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: one can 
think the heterogeneity and disparity of apparatuses or assemblages by assigning to their 
networks of relations a certain immanence, by mapping analytically the various 
investments, deployments and coagulations of power in terms of a diagram which can, in 
a provisional manner, render the ‘invisible’ relations visible according to forms of 
knowledge: “The diagram or abstract machine is the map of relations between forces, a 
map of destiny, or intensity, which proceeds by primary non-localizable relations and at 
                                                





every moment passes through every point.”83 And with regard to the reciprocal relation of 
power and knowledge, Foucault himself insists that “there is no power relation without 
the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge that does not presuppose and 
constitute at the same time power relations.”84 We will see that power and knowledge, 
while integrally related, are not perfectly reciprocal, since knowledges are precisely 
integrations of the differentiality of power.  
 
 In any case, power is a relation between forces, and these forces have nothing but 
other forces as their object. Deleuze notes, no doubt under a Spinozan influence, that 
“spontaneity and receptivity now take on a new meaning: to affect or be affected.”85 The 
question of affect is inseparable from an analysis of power, not only because of the 
obvious advantages of the language of affect for describing relationality, but because of 
the crucial legacy (retrieved by Deleuze) of Spinoza’s theory of affect. The degree of 
power of a given being (or mode of being) is determined by its capacity to be affected 
(IIID3), hence Deleuze’s quip, “tell me the affections of which you are capable and I’ll 
tell you who you are.”86 Affections are what a given being undergoes or dispenses with, 
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but affects are transitive, pre-personal, separate from a given subject. Affects are mobile 
intensities or becomings, transitions and passages. We saw above that there is a certain 
materialism latent in Spinoza’s Ethics; we should therefore take Deleuze seriously—
which is to say literally—when he says that “the power to be affected is like a matter of 
force, and the power to affect is like a function of force.”87 Deleuze pushes Foucault’s 
analytics of power and knowledge towards a topology of power and subjectivity. Affects, 
forces, relations of power are the movements of matter-energy on a plane of immanence, 
which must be conceived henceforth as a pure surface.  
 This surface has but one side (which Deleuze calls the outside, for reasons which 
will become clear); this single side is structured like a Möbius strip, where a torsion 
produces the effect of multiple sides—giving rise to the illusion of a dualism of minds 
and bodies enjambed in or by a soul, subjects and power opposed to one another, the 
illusion of transcendence and the ‘universals’ which are supposed to explain 
transcendence.88 Hence, there are three things to note about the structure of this surface. 
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Heterogeneity of power and knowledge: whereas the latter concerns, and is constituted as, 
strata (substances and formalized functions, forms of exteriority, i.e. sayability and 
visibility), power is, on the other hand, diagrammatic and distributive; power relations are 
non-localizable and constitute “anonymous strategies” which, though they differ in kind 
from stratifications of knowledge, are primary in relation to the latter and constitute the 
latter, effecting thereby the general organization of the social field in which the forms of 
knowledge are located.89 Ventriloquism of power: “No doubt power, if we consider it in 
the abstract, neither sees nor speaks...But precisely because it does not itself speak and 
see, it makes us see and speak.”90 Self-affection of force, or the fold:  
Force is what belongs to the outside, since it is essentially a relation between 
other forces: it is inseparable in itself from the power to affect other forces 
(spontaneity) and to be affected by others (receptivity). But what comes about as a 
result [of the fold] is a relation which force has with itself, a power to affect itself, 
an affect of self on self.91  
 
Apparatuses do not depart from the field that generates them; they are the self-
modulation or self-affection of the field, an immanent integration of the purely 
differential matrix of the outside.  
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 It is crucial to understand that when power is said to come from the ‘outside,’ this 
does not imply a beyond or a transcendent plane upon which power struggles play out, 
and of which our own knowledge and struggles are mere reflections or representations. 
Power is the formless form of the outside: “The relations between forces, which are 
mobile, faint and diffuse, do not lie outside strata but form the outside of strata...it is each 
stratified historical formation which refers back to a diagram of forces as though it were 
its outside.”92 Deleuze insists on this dimension of Foucault’s thought: force refers to an 
irreducible outside, “an outside which is farther away than any external world.”93 The 
two forms of exteriority (sayability and visibility) are external to one another and 
heterogeneous, which is to say that seeing and speaking do not converge on a given 
object (this is Foucault’s transformation of phenomenology into epistemology). There is 
necessarily a disjunction between speaking and seeing. Seeing and speaking are forms of 
knowledge, but “thinking addresses itself to an outside that has no form.”94 We said 
above that affects and forces are movements on a plane of immanence, but this risks a 
certain misunderstanding: affects, forces, and relations of power are not movements on 
the plane so much as they are movement of the plane—the “infinite movements caught 
within each other, each folded in the others, so that the return of one instantaneously 
                                                
92 Ibid., 84. My emphasis. 
 
93 Ibid., 86. 
 





relaunches another in such a way that the plane of immanence is ceaselessly being 
woven, like a gigantic shuttle.”95 
 The question arises: there is an outside, there is power, there are sets of forces that 
act upon one another, generating apparatuses, assemblages, non-localizable power 
relations—but is there, therefore, an inside? Deleuze’s reply: “The outside is not a fixed 
limit but a moving matter animated by peristaltic movements, folds and foldings that 
together make up an inside: they are not something other than the outside, but precisely 
the inside of the outside.”96 This inside of the outside is the subject; the subject is an 
effect of the folding of the outside. The subject is constituted as the ‘double’ of the 
outside, or rather the subject is the doubled-over-ness of the outside, as if a living torsion, 
or a vortex invested by a duration. The subject is not something different than the outside, 
but is the interiorization of the outside: 
[T]he double is never a projection of the interior; on the contrary, it is an 
interiorization of the outside. It is not a doubling of the One, but a redoubling of 
the Other. It is not a reproduction of the Same, but a repetition of the Different. It 
is not the emanation of an ‘I,’ but something that places in immanence an always 
other or a Non-self. It is never the other who is a double in the doubling process, 
it is a self that lives me as the double of the other: I do not encounter myself on 
the outside, I find the other in me.97 
 
 The outside is therefore a beyond, but as we saw above, it is a beyond of thought, 
rather than a transcendent beyond for thought, and it is the same materiality of the 
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universe that is of the subject. The subject is material, forged in the crucible of the 
struggle of forces and stratifications (apparatuses, power relations). Even thought is 
material: its condition of possibility is the formless form of the outside, pure matter-
energy which flows and folds, bifurcates and coagulates endlessly, infinitely. This is the 
thesis of univocity: the outside is being, but being is said in one and the same sense of 
everything (which is to say, all of its differences) of which it is said. Deleuze said as 
much in Difference and Repetition:  
Nietzsche meant nothing more than this by eternal return. Eternal return cannot 
mean the return of the Identical because it presupposes a world (that of the will to 
power) in which all previous identities have been abolished and dissolved. 
Returning is being, but only the being of becoming. The eternal return does not 
bring back ‘the same,’ but returning constitutes the only Same of that which 
becomes. Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming itself.98 
 
 Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche is by no means uncontroversial, but what it 
lacks in consensus it exceeds in intensity: immanence thought not as the totality from 
which one attempts to escape, but as that which one is—is in, is becoming. Hence the 
fundamental ambiguity of both Foucault and Deleuze with regards to power, since power 
is not that which represses or oppresses, but that which produces. That power can by 
turns dominate and invigorate, insist and resist, is precisely its importance. What is 
essential to understand about power is that it is not separate from the matter in which it is 
expressed, nor is the subject or subjectivities which are produced by power (in and of 
                                                





power) separate or detachable from power. Between one subject and another there are 
only folds of power, and between these folds of power there are only more folds.99  
 It will have been necessary to lay these groundworks for the analysis of the 
creditor-debtor relation, and for the investigation of the ‘affinities’ between Christianity 
and capitalism. It will become increasingly clear that the human being qua subject is the 
matter or material in which is invested the function of the apparatus of forgiveness. In 
order to come to terms with our contemporary political situation—in which the 
forgiveness of debts appears as a viable way, perhaps the only viable way, forward—we 
must learn to see and speak, so to speak, otherwise of forgiveness.100 Which is to say: we 
have to rethink, or think otherwise, of God. Or money, if you’ll pardon the expression. 
Money is first of all power, which is to say it is that plane of immanence upon which we, 
as subjects—whether indebted or forgiven, or both—are produced, and to which we 
return. It is only once we grasp the nature of money as that from which we emerge as 
crystals of value that we can proceed to the standard Marxist critique of money as the 
form of value.  
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Interlude (&) – General Credit and the Plane of Immanence 
 &.1 In “Faith and Knowledge,” Derrida speaks of an “experience of faith, of 
believing, of a credit that is irreducible to knowledge.”101 Derrida has in mind a certain 
“messianicity without messianism” in the tele-technoscientific milieu of 
“globalatinization” in which we live and breathe, and he is rightly famous for these 
interventions. Yet he goes on to say something else, still in the ambit of a reflection on 
religion, but verging on a more radical thesis, marking the opening or the appearance of 
what we will call a general credit.102 Derrida speaks of an “elementary act of faith,” 
without which “there would neither be ‘social bond’ nor address of the other, nor any 
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performativity in general” (80). Wherever the critique of mondialatinization develops, 
claims Derrida, wherever one names and challenges the increasingly blurred lines 
between Christianity and capitalism, liberalism and imperialism—there is confirmed “the 
fiduciary credit of an elementary faith which is, at least in its essence or calling, 
religious” (80-81). Derrida notes in a parentheses that this credit is the “elementary 
condition, the milieu of the religious if not religion itself” (81, my emphasis). Hence one 
speaks “of trust and of credit or of trustworthiness in order to underscore that this 
elementary act of faith also underlies the essentially economic and capitalistic rationality 
of the tele-technoscientific” (Ibid.).  
 This fiduciary credit is actualized both in or as the milieu of the religious and as the 
general structure of political economy of late capitalism. Without this elementary act of 
faith, there is no social bond, no society or sociality; and likewise no institutions, no 
constitutions, no sovereignty, no law, no performativity. One cannot even begin to 
conceive of agents and patients, actions and passions, positions and performances without 
reference to this general credit. Belief, faith, and trust are the linguistic indexes of the 
very sociality of the social. The upshot of this is that it is not one faith that is professed in 
God and another professed in the rule of law or in one’s neighbor. Certainly, there are 
determinations of faith which differ by degree and in kind. Yet at the same time there is a 
sense in which credit is said of all of these faiths and trusts in one and the same sense 
(univocity of money). This is why I went to great lengths in the preceding chapters to 
articulate and demonstrate the plane of immanence upon which all of our movements and 




license nor sophistry—in its perversion of Spinoza it is rather the truth of our collective 
life. When money becomes God, as I am maintaining, it is henceforth impossible to keep 
speaking of belief in the same register. One does not believe in money as if money were 
an object of belief, either somewhere in the exteriority of the world or in the interiority of 
the soul. One believes in money as that which makes belief in general possible. Belief in 
money now signifies, rather than an opinion or a desire conditioned by a lack (wherein 
one always wants or needs more money), a performance of the death of God.  
 The death of God, of course, does not signify an historical event, but a 
transformation of God into money. More precisely, the death of God is the performance 
of this transformation, its consummation and processual repetition in each and every 
social passion. In this regard, everything depends on whether or not one can affirm a 
theory of money qua credit, and, secondly, whether or not one can articulate a theory of 
credit in general. I will take up the specific determinations of this theory in Part II, but 
for now let it suffice to say that if money is, in its most fundamental nature, credit, then 
the primary or fundamental social relation is the creditor-debtor relation. As I will 
demonstrate, credit and debt are reversible: a credit given is a debt received, and a debt 
received is in turn credit given again. Every gift, every exchange, is a circulation of 
credit-debt. No doubt, in accordance with the Marxist monetary theory, money is only 
money in motion, and is that commodity which can be traded or exchanged for any other 
commodity, including itself. Yet one can push money into a further register: money is 
created as debt, as credit—money is always a promise of future value, whether it is 




bank note in exchange for a sandwich, that person is trading another person’s debt for the 
commodity.  
 Yet if credit and debt are reversible—if money is always credit and debt, and the 
only discernible difference between them depends entirely on one’s point of view, since 
in the abstract one is always a creditor or a debtor—by what means can one address the 
asymmetry between creditor and debtor? After all, speaking concretely, the creditor may 
be a debtor to another creditor, and the debtor may have several creditors. The 
reversibility of credit and debt is crucial for a theory of money qua credit, but it leaves 
one without any means of analyzing the real difference between creditor and debtor. No 
doubt one can simply point to the quantitative difference between creditor and debtor, the 
inequality that characterizes their respective wealth. Yet this still tells us nothing about 
the conditions of the asymmetry that grounds the creditor-debtor relation, and the manner 
in which the creditor-debtor relation grounds the process of exchange in the capitalist 
mode of production. My contribution to the vast literature on credit-debt relations is 
meager, but it aims precisely to address this lacuna. To wit, in accordance with 
Nietzsche’s insight in the second essay of On the Genealogy of Morals—what he calls 
“that stroke of genius on the part of Christianity”103—what distinguishes the creditor 
from the debtor is the power of the creditor to forgive.  
                                                





 In truth, it matters not whether the creditor actually forgives the debt or simply 
holds this power of forgiveness in reserve.104 In either case, the asymmetry grounded in 
this power to forgive is the primum mobile of the circulation of money, its inner circuit or 
innermost truth. As Deleuze and Guattari—following Nietzsche’s critique of the 
anthropological theories of the origin of exchange—realized in the 1970s, the question of 
the forgiveness of debts is closely related to the politics of the State:  
It has often been remarked that the State commences (or recommences) with two 
fundamental acts, one of which is said to be enact of territoriality through the 
fixing of residence, and the other, an act of liberation through the abolition of 
small debts. […] The abolition of debts, when it takes place, is a means of 
maintaining the distribution of land, and a means of preventing the entry on stage 
of a new territorial machine, possibly revolutionary and capable of raising and 
dealing with the agrarian problem in a comprehensive way. In other cases where a 
redistribution occurs, the cycle of credits is maintained, in the new form 
established by the State—money.105 
 
 And as Devin Singh has recently pointed out, debt cancellation is a particularly 
devious form of a sovereign exception, a bait and switch in which one accepts the 
cancellation of one’s debts inasmuch as one affirms the sovereignty of the one who 
forgives. “To be set free from debt obligation,” writes Singh, “is to be set free to continue 
to serve the sovereign. A celebration of the sovereign’s debt clearing is simultaneously a 
consent to be governed.”106 The contemporary demands for a massive cancellation or 
                                                
104 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 201. “…the perfection of power should tend to 
render its actual exercise unnecessary…” 
 
105 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 196-197. 
 






forgiveness of debts (consumer, student, mortgage, etc.) is well-intentioned, but it tends 
to obfuscate this crucial issue: debt forgiveness renders the debt infinite. The fundamental 
paradox of the credit-debt relation lies in its peculiar double-bind: the subjectivity of the 
debtor is that of the sinner, whose guilt is infinite and can only be expunged at the mercy 
of a creditor; but to have one’s debts forgiven is to be placed even further in debt, since 
one can never fully repay the other who forgives. Whereas one’s debt was unpayable de 
facto inasmuch as the principle was too great or the rate of interest too high, once the debt 
is forgiven, the debt becomes unpayable de jure. One’s debt circulates endlessly: it 
becomes the object of speculation. If, under neoliberalism, one becomes increasingly 
identified with one’s debts, then we can say that the neoliberal subject becomes an object 
or a function of speculative financialization. The debt is not meant to be repaid, it is 
meant to be managed. One manages to keep up with one’s payments, and one (that is to 
say, one’s debt) is therefore managed by one’s creditors, according to an optimal or 
minimally sustainable level of default. In an economic system built upon an infinitely 
expanding spiral of debt, the debtor becomes a privileged locus or conduit of the 
circulation of money.  
 The investigation of the subjectivity of the debtor—the neoliberal subjectivity par 
excellence—has been pursued by several authors, but Maurizio Lazzarato’s The Making 
of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition stands out both for its brevity 
and clarity, as well as its synthesis of Deleuze and Guattari’s insights in Anti-Oedipus 
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with the ‘facts on the ground’ in the wake of the financial collapse of 2007-2008. Despite 
the importance of the indebted subject to any critique of late capitalism and neoliberal 
austerity, I insist that one must push the analysis into yet another register: one must 
interrogate the conditions under which a subject of forgiveness is produced, specifically 
how and in what manner this subject undergoes and performs that peculiar ventriloquism 
that I have called a theodicy of money. The Christian dimensions of this stratagem of 
capital, upon which I insisted in the introduction, will become clear once the shift from 
indebted subject to forgiven subject is made. Chapter 4 takes up the question of the 
indebted subject, and the general credit which undergirds the apparatus of debt and credit. 
Chapter 5 continues the analytic shift from debt to forgiveness, and raises the crucial 
question of theodicy—the manner and the extent to which the subject of forgiveness is 
the condition according to which God or money forgives itself. 
 
 &.2 The foregoing analyses of general economy, the materiality of immanence, and 
the production of subjects as folds of force (or modes of substance, degrees of power) in 
the various apparatuses of an immanent political-libidinal economy are preparatory work 
for the investigation of the subject of forgiveness. Yet one thing remains to be clarified 
before embarking on the critique of forgiveness: the complex and often misunderstood 
notion of the plane of immanence. The logic of the plane of immanence is most clearly 
elaborated in Deleuze and Guattari’s What is Philosophy?, in which they claim that “the 
plane of immanence is not a concept that is or can be thought but rather the image of 




to find one’s bearings in thought.”107 Concepts populate the plane of immanence, rather 
than constituting it. The work of philosophy, according to Deleuze and Guattari is always 
the two-fold procedure of laying out a plane of immanence or an image of thought, and 
creating concepts with which to populate that plane. “Concepts are like multiple waves,” 
they write, “rising and falling, but the plane of immanence is the single wave that rolls 
them up and unrolls them.”108  
 Deleuze insists upon a decisive distinction between the plane of immanence 
(Deleuze’s conceptual translation of Spinozan substance) and the planes of immanence 
(or the plurality of images of thought) which a thinker can occupy, and which can be 
attributed to a given thinker. There is a plane of immanence which refers to the proper 
name “Plato,” just as there is a plane of immanence which refers to the name “Kant.” A 
concept or a method corresponds to each and it gives the image of thought its sense or its 
specificity: ‘eidos’ for Plato, ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ for Kant, etc. Deleuze 
and Guattari themselves recognize the difficulty in claiming that there is an ‘ultimate’ or 
‘primary’ plane of immanence while simultaneously insisting that each philosopher lays 
out a plane that is heterogeneous to the plane of another:  
But if it is true that the plane of immanence is always single, being itself pure 
variation, then it is all the more necessary to explain why there are varied and 
distinct planes of immanence that, depending upon which infinite movements are 
retained and selected, succeed and contest each other in history.109 
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 In the preceding chapters, and in what follows, I assume that there is, in fact, a 
single plane of immanence (univocity of being, or pure substance said of multiplicity) 
which is nevertheless subject to certain historical and political (not to mention 
philosophical and theological) determinations, such that one can speak of a ‘late 
capitalist’ plane of immanence. One of Deleuze’s crucial stipulations vis-a-vis the plane 
of immanence is that, given a thinker, that thinker cannot think her own plane of 
immanence, her own image of thought. One’s image of thought is necessarily that which 
one presupposes in order to think. Hence, in order to think the late capitalist or neoliberal 
plane of immanence, one has to presuppose another plane—and this is precisely why I 
have insisted on the univocity of money. 
 In contrast to a univocity of money, ‘our’ plane of immanence is dominated by the 
logic of analogy. Sean Capener has shown convincingly that, while credit is literal (or 
immanent, univocal—general credit), it is nevertheless produced as analogy.110 For our 
purposes, the creditor-debtor relation is the proof case for this claim: the creditor achieves 
a sort of transcendence inasmuch as the creditor holds in reserve the power to forgive, 
and this transcendence is said by analogy to God, since in the last instance it is always 
God that forgives. The social is always already analogical inasmuch as sociality begins—
in the “prehistoric labor” of humanity—with the credit-debt contract: “it was here that 
one person first encountered another person, that one person first measured himself 
                                                





against another.”111 Hence, at the beginning there is a promise and a memory, since the 
debtor’s existence is characterized precisely by a labor of memory (“straining toward the 
future”),112 and remembering becomes both means and end to settling the debt that cannot 
be expiated: the debtor “cannot ‘have done’ with anything.”113  There is a privileged 
relation between transcendence and analogy (and, crucially, a Christian history of this 
relation). “Transcendence,” writes Capener, “is always parasitic upon immanence; it can 
only arise by operating on immanence. At the same time however, it can only operate by 
foreclosing or denying the reality of the immanence upon which it operates.”114 Wherever 
transcendence appears it is always as a parasitization of immanence—a fog thrown up 
around immanence, which causes us to mistake the one for the other, to analogize, to 
settle for mere resemblances and to leave off thinking, to attribute to thought an 
exhaustion which should be said only of ourselves.  
 Yet one is still confronted with a central difficulty: how to distinguish between the 
plane of immanence and the planes of immanence which are so many variations of the 
pure surface of immanence? How does think analogy if one is always already folded into 
the analogical plane? Jorge Luis Borges, at the conclusion of “The Library of Babel,” 
provides perhaps the best image of such a thought. After the librarian-narrator concludes 
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his history of the infinite library (itself a stirring image, recalling Cusa and Bruno: “a 
sphere whose consummate center is any hexagon, and whose circumference is 
inaccessible”),115 the following footnote is folded into the conclusion:  
Letizia Alvarez de Toledo has observed that the vast Library is useless. Strictly 
speaking, one single volume should suffice: a single volume of ordinary format, 
printed in nine or ten type body, and consisting of an infinite number of infinitely 
thin pages. (At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Cavalieri said that any 
solid body is the superposition of an infinite number of planes.) This silky vade 
mecum would scarcely be handy: each apparent leaf of the book would divide 
into other analogous leaves. The inconceivable central leaf would have no 
reverse.116 
 
 In a certain sense, the footnote quietly undoes the entire preceding description of 
the library (which the narrator admits at the outset is a cipher for the universe). On the 
one hand there is the library, a single sphere whose networks of stairways and hexagonal 
reading rooms expands infinitely outward. On the other hand there is a single book 
composed of infinitely divisible pages. The difference between the two is subtle, yet 
crucial: whereas one can assign the name Hegel to the library, one can assign to the book 
the name of Leibniz. One ascends or descends in the library, and movement is always 
relative to an always de-centered center, but one divides in the book, and movement is 
always absolute, since division changes the very substance of the book. One is always 
within the library; the library is a total interiority. One is always without the book; the 
book is a pure exteriority. In the library, “the certainty that everything has been already 
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written nullifies or makes phantoms of us all,”117 but in the book one does not proceed 
without becoming a phantom capable of infinite sub-division, hence infinite 
transformation, according to the intensity of the bifurcations, implications and 
explications. (And note that the book is a vade mecum, a handbook or guidebook which 
one keeps constantly at one’s side—carrying and reading the book is a practice.)  
 The following must be affirmed of the plane of immanence: it is that central leaf 
(unthinkable) which has no reverse (pure surface). The planes of immanence are those 
“other analogous leaves” that divide into one another (“The disjunction has become 
inclusive: everything divides, but into itself; and God who is the sum total of the possible, 
merges with Nothing, of which each thing is a modification”).118  These analogous planes 
are ‘apparent,’ they appear as the effects of the movements and divisions of the pure 
variation of the plane of immanence:  
Every movement passes through the whole of the plane by immediately turning 
back on and folding itself and also by folding other movements or allowing itself 
to be folded by them, giving rise to retroactions, connections, and proliferations in 
the fractalization of this infinitely folded up infinity (variable curvature of the 
plane).119  
 
Given that we find ourselves on a plane of immanence dominated by the logic of analogy 
(and in which God has become money, credit, faith), one must presuppose a multiplicity 
of planes, each of which “has its own way of constructing immanence,” but each of 
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which is always immanent to immanence, the latter which is immanent to nothing.120 
Perhaps Deleuze and Guattari have Borges in mind when they claim that “the plane of 
immanence is interleaved.”121 And intraleaved, of course, since the planes not only 
overlap and envelope one another, but also bifurcate and divide into one another. The 
powers of the differential and the infinitesimal gain momentum, and when they achieve 
the infinite speeds (Spinoza) and cross the threshold of the minimum continuous time 
(Lucretius) they dissolve everything into dissimilitude—including, though by no means 
limited to, the transcendent identity of the creditor, and the self-memory of the debtor. 
 
 &.3 The foregoing analyses of general economy, immanence, power, and 
subjectivity, were, in this respect, a laying out of the plane of immanence upon which all 
of our passions and actions ‘take place.’ Our plane—our problem—is inextricable from 
the analogical production of credit-debt, of which the creditor-debtor relation is the social 
institution, and to which the power to forgive distributes the fundamental asymmetry of 
our political economy and our sociality. Analogy, even if it names the particular ontology 
to which we are subject, arises from immanence. Analogical credit depends for its 
condition of possibility a general credit, our common faith and practice, to which we 
mistakenly attribute so many transcendences, hierarchies and narrative naturalizations. 
The task of a critique of money (and the scene of forgiveness that subtends and 
                                                







consummates it) requires that this derivative plane of analogy be thought through and 
through. Deleuze and Guattari offer a final methodological imperative: 
We will say that THE plane of immanence is, at the same time, that which must 
be thought and that which cannot be thought. It is the non thought within thought. 
It is the base of all planes, immanent to every thinkable plane that dos not succeed 
in thinking it. […] Perhaps this is the supreme act of philosophy: not so much to 
think THE plane of immanence as to show that is there, unthought in every plane, 
and to think it in this way as the outside and inside of thought, as the not-external 
outside and the not-internal inside—that which cannot be thought and yet must be 
thought, which was thought once, as Christ was incarnated once, in order to show, 
that one time, the possibility of the impossible.122 
 
One cannot think that inconceivable central leaf, but one can perhaps show that it is there, 
as a principle or an imperative of division and folding—the purely differential surface of 
the outside. 
 I turn now to Nietzsche and Marx, and to several of their many interlocutors, in 
order to isolate the unique power of forgiveness that characterizes the plane of 
immanence in which we are implicated, the analogical production of credit, and the 
capitalist and Christian subjects that perform this credit. Make no mistake: analogy 
always testifies to an immanence that it cannot account for; an immanence which, 
conversely, can account for analogy, since in immanence everything is equal. The 
inequalities, asymmetries and hierarchies which are all too evident to us, and which form 
the relative horizon of our actions and our passions, are neither natural nor ‘simply 
economic’—on the contrary, they are political and social and are produced according to 
certain conditions which I will articulate below. In any case, acknowledging this state of 
                                                





affairs means that one must raise once again the Spinozist question: “Why do men fight 
for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?”123 The following 
analyses are an attempt to define the conditions under which such a question can be 
raised in the age of late capitalism, neoliberal austerity, and the death-spiral of 
indebtedness to which they give birth. 
 
  
                                                




























Chapter 4 – The Indebted Subject 
 4.1 One must begin with a promise. Or rather, and paradoxically, one always begins 
with a memory of a promise, and one—that is, the subject—is in a certain sense nothing 
but this memory or the maintenance of the memory. This is Nietzsche’s starting point in 
the decisive second essay in On the Genealogy of Morals: the ‘bad conscience’ which he 
intends to investigate has as its condition a certain cultivation of a memory for, or of, 
oneself. Opposed to the natural tendency of human beings toward forgetfulness—which 
appears as a positive or creative faculty of repression, by means of which human beings 
dwell in their living present—Nietzsche opposes the faculty of memory. This memory 
functions as an apparatus of conscience or responsibility, with the explicit aim of making 
the human being calculable and measurable. Why memory? The opening lines of the 
second essay are justly famous: “To breed an animal with the right to make promises—is 
not this the paradoxical task that nature has set for itself in the case of man? Is it not the 
real problem regarding man?”124 Memory is that faculty that, with respect to a given 
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promise, narrates or synthesizes the temporality of the human being who promises: 
preserving the promise itself in memoriam and securitizing or guaranteeing the future of 
the promise. The human being qua promising animal lives its present as a labor to 
maintain and sustain its promises—which is to say, its very being as human, its claim to 
humanity.  
 The Spinozan question, “Why do men fight for their servitude as stubbornly as 
though it were their salvation?,” here gains a concrete, material referent. The memory 
that Nietzsche seeks to interrogate is  
no mere passive inability to rid oneself of an impression, no mere indigestion 
through a once-pledged word with which one cannot ‘have done,’ but an active 
desire not to rid oneself, a desire for the continuance of something desired once, a 
real memory of the will… (58) 
 
The subject of memory, the trustworthy human being who promises, is “a dyspeptic—he 
cannot ‘have done’ with anything” (ibid.). Note that this term, ‘dyspeptic’ refers to the 
state or experience of indigestion. The dyspeptic, the human being who cannot ‘have 
done’ with anything, is the human being who cannot ‘pass to the act’—they cannot 
achieve to the movement which would liberate them.  
 This memory, which the human animal has “bred in itself,” is effected in a three-
fold manner. First, it provides the past with a determinate content and raises narrative, or 
narration of this past, to the status of a duty (the promise is made). Second, it “ordains the 
future in advance,” or creates a future as essentially promissory, anticipatory and 
obligatory (the will expressed in the promise must be discharged or enacted). Lastly, it 




the future as an open field of possibilities. The promising animal is therefore triply 
responsible: responsible to the past in which the promise was made, responsible for the 
future in which the promise will be fulfilled, and responsible in the present which 
assumes the character of an interminable labor.125  
 In a sense, this creation of a memory for the human being coincides with, or 
doubles, the becoming-human of human beings. To be human is to be able to promise. 
Whatever social organization that existed before the advent of the human qua promising 
animal represents, for Nietzsche, the prehistory of humanity (yet the promise is also a 
prehistory—its past, present and future). The methods and labors of prehistoric humanity 
culminate in a singular social relationship, which has not ceased to exercise itself even in 
modernity (we ‘moderns’ are still human, all too human). This social relationship, as 
Nietzsche quickly points out is none other than that between the creditor and the debtor. 
Inasmuch as sociality as such requires a minimum of commensurability126 between 
persons, the creditor-debtor relation is in a sense the originary social relation: “it was here 
that one person first encountered another person, that one person first measured himself 
against another” (70). History and sociality begin with this becoming-responsible of the 
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human being, and Nietzsche’s investigation—in spite of its blind spots—127is in this 
sense decisive: society is not, as the liberal consensus has it, based on exchange, but is 
rather constituted by the proliferation and circulation of debts.  
 This is why Deleuze and Guattari claim that “the great book of modern ethnology is 
not so much Mauss’s The Gift as Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals,” precisely because 
Nietzsche “does not hesitate, as does Mauss, between exchange and debt.”128 The second 
essay, to which we have addressed ourselves, is “an attempt—and a success without 
equal—at interpretating primitive economy in terms of debt, in the debtor-creditor 
relationship, by eliminating every consideration of exchange or interest ‘á l’anglaise.’”129 
I will return to the problems with Mauss’s (and Derrida’s) account of the potlatch, or the 
gift cycle, below. For now we require two of Nietzsche’s most crucial moves in the 
second essay, which are themselves linked: the “demonic ambiguity” of the German term 
Schuld, which has the sense both of ‘debt’ and of ‘guilt,’ and which we have already seen 
inflected by Benjamin in terms of the relation between capitalism and Christianity; and 
the method by which a memory was created, and is created, for the human—the cruelty 
and violence of mnemotechnics.  
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 A memory, to use Nietzsche’s phrase, must be burned in. “Man could never do 
without blood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory for 
himself,” writes Nietzsche, “pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics” (61). For his 
part, Foucault takes the up the particulars of this method for his own project in Discipline 
and Punish: a whole panoply of punishments, such as stoning, breaking on the wheel, 
boiling in oil, amputation, flaying alive, and so on. It is by means of this memory-making 
violence that human beings “as last came ‘to reason’” (62). Yet torture alone does not a 
responsible person make: the major moral concept of Schuld [guilt], claims Nietzsche, 
“has its origin in the very material concept of Schulden [debts]” (62-63). The specific 
memory by which human beings made themselves reasonable and calculable has as its 
internal logic the equation ‘injury = pain,’ the idea that an injured party (a jilted creditor, 
for instance) can recoup his losses by inflicting pain on the debtor who fails to settle the 
debt—“the idea that every injury has its equivalent and can actually be paid back, even if 
only through the pain of the culprit.” And this idea draws it power—in prehistory and 
even today, since, as Nietzsche says, “this prehistory is in any case present in all ages or 
may always reappear”—from the contractual relationship between creditor and debtor.  
 The ‘prehistory’ of which Nietzsche speaks is therefore nothing historical, it rather 
doubles history, trailing behind or before history like a shadow, or lies latent until it is 
actualized in concrete events. One can see immediately the parallel with the Foucauldian 
‘diagram’ which doubles the social field. Nietzsche’s prehistory is such a diagram: 
implicit in each and every social relation is this relation of the creditor and debtor, 




a loan) or the implicit debt one owes to society, to the community (e.g. Rousseau’s social 
contract). Society is a system of cruelty. “Cruelty,” write Deleuze and Guattari, “has 
nothing to do with some ill-defined or natural violence that might be commissioned to 
explain the history of mankind; cruelty is the movement of culture that is realized in 
bodies and inscribed on them, belaboring them. That is what cruelty means.”130 As we 
will see below, forgiveness (not only the act but, decisively, the whole scene of 
forgiveness) is neither an escape from, nor a resistance to, cruelty—it is rather the ground 
of cruelty, the condition of possibility of cruelty. Let it suffice to say, for now, that 
Deleuze and Guattari’s provocative claim—“There is no ideology and never has been”—
131gains all of its sense from the movements and machinations of this cruelty which takes 
the body of the debtor as its canvas and scroll.  
 Recall Agamben’s suggestion that the most ancient of apparatuses is language, “one 
in which thousands and thousands of years ago a primate inadvertently let himself be 
captured.”132 In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari’s insistence that debt is a matter of 
inscription on the psycho-material surface of the socius also gains its peculiar verve. 
Apropos of the mnemotechnic system of cruelty described by Nietzsche, they write:  
The sign is a position of desire; but the first signs are the territorial signs that plant 
their flags in bodies. If one want to call this inscription in naked flesh ‘writing,’ 
then it must be said that speech in fact presupposes writing, and that it is this cruel 
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system of inscribed signs that renders man capable of language, and gives him a 
memory of the spoken word.133 
 
The birth, discovery, or capturing movement of language—or logos—coincides with the 
emergence of the rational animal, the promising animal—the human being as such. The 
phrase, ‘memory of the spoken word,’ by no means signals that Deleuze and Guattari 
suppose that writing precedes speech in history, rather that speech presupposes writing 
understood as the prehistoric (or diagrammatic) inscription of a memory on the body.134 
Before it is language, logos is laceration. Nietzsche’s repeated question, “to what extent 
can suffering balance debts or guilt?” (65), is aimed precisely at the seemingly inherent 
human logic that punishment can resolve a debt—and only by means of a cruel 
inscription, as if the whole ‘history’ of morality were but an intricate, incessant tattoo, or 
a network of incisions in the flesh of the mind.  
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inscriptions described by Nietzsche, even if speech considered simply as communication 





 The ‘history’ of morality, then, with all of its concomitant tortures, lacerations, 
amputations and inscriptions, has a singular meaning: “to breed man, to mark him in his 
flesh, to render him capable of alliance, to form him within the creditor-debtor relation, 
which on both sides turns out to be a matter of memory—a memory straining toward the 
future.”135 The debt must be repaid, whether in terms internal to the contract (cash 
returned for cash dispensed) or in the extreme terms of the unpayable debt—by means of 
pain imposed by the creditor upon the debtor. The intellectual poverty of exchange as a 
paradigm for ancient societies is also the intellectual poverty of our own mistaken 
exchangist theories. The creditor does not receive anything in exchange, but according to 
Nietzsche extracts pleasure from the suffering of the debtor (64-65). There is an incipient 
sadism, a proto-sadism, at the heart of the creditor-debtor relation. “An eye must be 
invoked,” write Deleuze and Guattari, an eye that “extracts pleasure from the event,” as if 
a god who makes a spectacle of the suffering of the debtor. (Later we will see that the 
scene of forgiveness dramatized by Christianity is in fact a masochism in which God 
plays both the role of the spectacle and the spectator).  
 Nietzsche’s theory is decisive for at least two reasons. First and foremost, because 
it refuses any theory that founds society on the supposed mutuality of exchange, and 
installs the credit-debt relation at the center of human sociality. Secondly, but no less 
decisively, by insisting on the importance of the promissory as a fundamental category of 
the credit-debt relation, Nietzsche effectively inaugurates a theory of a general credit, 
                                                





even if it remains undeveloped. Taken together, the primacy of the credit-debt relation 
and the subjectivity that emerges in the promissory render possible a theory of money 
qua credit. The classic credit theory of money was published around the turn of the 20th 
century, by Henry Dunning Macleod and later Alfred Mitchell-Innes. My inquiry takes 
up the theory’s more recent iterations, notably Philip Goodchild’s Theology of Money. 
 
 4.2 Money emerges from exchange as general equivalent, and is in this regard a 
money-commodity, such as gold or silver. According to Marx, the simple commodity 
form is the germ of the money-form, and as such money would not encounter 
commodities as money unless it had previously encountered them as a commodity.136 
Money as medium of exchange or general equivalent does not possess in itself the power 
to make commodities commensurable, but rather serves as the measure of the abstract 
labor which distributes the commodities in exchange,137 yet this measure is an ideal 
measure of value, which always refers to the ‘hard cash’ of gold and silver coins which 
lurk within it.138 Likewise, money does not properly cause the circulation of 
commodities, but rather the converse: commodities generate money (a lá Feuerbach, 
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money is a “god among commodities”)139 and make money the means of their own 
circulation.140 Yet as soon as money emerges from the commodity-form, one can no 
longer consider exchange in isolation: if one trades a commodity for money (selling), one 
must then postulate a subsequent (or concurrent) exchange of the money received for 
another commodity (buying). Exchange requires a future, and it is the privilege of money 
to be that which gives such a future to exchange.141 In this regard, money is already 
credit, since it promises a future to exchange. Hence, in simple circulation, money is a 
means to an end, e.g. money as exchange-value makes possible the acquisition of a use-
value or a commodity. The transition from simple circulation to capital (C - M - C gives 
way to M - C - M) effectively renders money an end in itself, where the value of a 
commodity (determined by the labor-time invested in its production) is divorced from its 
exchange-value, and the resulting differential is appropriated by the capitalist as surplus-
value.  
 The following analyses are not intended to refute Marx’s analyses in Capital. I 
simply wish to demonstrate that one must also consider money in a different register—as 
that which makes circulation and exchange possible in the first place. Money is already 
credit in exchange in the sense that it gives a future to exchange, but money is above all 
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the transcendental field upon which exchange emerges as the principle social relation in 
the capitalist mode of production. The empirical function of money in exchange is 
grounded by its prior transcendental nature as the social and political milieu of the credit-
debt relation. Money first of all gives a future as such, by constituting the indebted 
subject whose being is determined by the imperative to labor to repay the debt; and, 
decisively, money is that which forgives the debtor, rendering possible the formal 
equality of all debtors to a single creditor. Money is both general equivalent and general 
credit. It is to this latter, transcendental, character of money to which this essay is 
addressed. Note, finally, that Marx himself notes that money must have its own objective 
social validity: there must be a minimal social consensus on the power of money, and it is 
the credit-debt relation which provides—or, more precisely, demands—this social 
consensus.142 I will explore these processes in more detail below. For now we turn to 
Goodchild’s account of money qua credit. 
 “Capital is the means of production which has itself been produced,” writes 
Goodchild. “Since everything has been produced, all means of production are capital.”143 
For its part, “money is a form of capital” (74), but money “effectively functions by 
concealing its nature as capital” (79). “Money promises production,” writes Goodchild, 
“It delivers this promise through the illusory representation of exchange value” (79, my 
emphasis). Beneath exchange lies credit, the being of money as the transcendental 
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condition of exchange. Hence there is not an identity of money and capital, but the latter 
gains its productive capacities from the promise of value effected by the former. 
Production always consumes a flow of matter-energy, the source of which, we saw in 
chapter 2, is the superabundant solar energy emitted by the sun. Capital is therefore the 
means of production (a productive machine) which consumes or takes hold of produced 
and productive capital (be it ’natural’ capital, in the case of raw materials, produced by 
stratification and condensation of sunlight, or ‘artificial’ capital, such as industrial 
machinery) in order to produce further capital or wealth. Yet the imperative to increase 
one’s wealth—or the wealth of society in which one lives—is unintelligible apart from 
money. Money is that which gives a future. 
 Marx was absolutely correct that only human labor-power is capable of producing 
value, but he declined to fully investigate the social relation by which labor is rendered 
necessary and by which value (the value of the credit-debt of the debtor) is measured. In 
this regard, Marxian political economy only stands to benefit from a theory of general 
credit, grounded in the asymmetry of the creditor-debtor relation. Goodchild has shown 
that we gravely mistake the nature of money if we remain content to define it simply as 
medium of exchange or general equivalent. Rather, money has its origins in contractual 
debt obligations. No doubt, exchange-value is the form of value, but money is that which 
promises value, and thereby imparts a social force to exchange-value: money gives a 
future to exchange.  
Exchange value is formed from imagining a condition in which capital is 
disassembled and sold. It is constituted entirely by anxiety or anticipation. 




embodies a future orientation. If prices are represented in terms of money, then 
money itself represents anticipations of the future. Money [as exchange value] 
therefore stands in the place of and represents credit. As the advance that is 
offered on the basis of credit, money, as the measure of prices, is essentially 
credit. (99) 
 
 Goodchild insists that in order to understand money, one must have recourse to a 
theological account of economy. This is not to say that one must resort to a mysticism or 
an argument from transcendence. On the contrary, one must understand the fundamental 
identity of God and money, in terms of the absolute authority of money in society.144 No 
doubt, atheists increasingly populate the public square, and belief in God is indeed 
diminishing in our so-called secular age. Yet everyone believes in money, and in this 
sense there are perhaps fewer atheists than one would think, if any at all. The God-like 
character of money to which we currently address ourselves is its absolute purchasing 
power. This is what is meant by general credit—a credit which, as we said above, has 
purchase in and for everything. By contrast, money as general equivalent—or money in 
exchange—exercises a relative purchasing power. The difference between the two is 
decisive: in the latter case, that of relative purchasing power, “whatever price is agreed in 
exchange, relative purchasing power remains unchanged in the act of exchange, since the 
value of the goods and that of the money are defined as equivalent to each other” (102). 
Money is a general equivalent inasmuch as it is that which equalizes or expresses the 
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value of any given commodity. Money is a general credit inasmuch as “it is the power, 
the potential to acquire value, that makes demands effective.” In terms of absolute 
purchasing power, “it is a question not of how much value is purchased…but of the 
power to purchase that much value” (102).  
 This absolute power to purchase value is essentially a social power. Money is the 
social power par excellence: it is a promise of value. This is why money may be “best 
understood through theology rather than economics, for the absolute purchasing power of 
money consists in the power of a promise. It consists in credit” (102). Moreover, just as 
one does not possess God but gains access to God through ritual and piety, “it is not 
essential to possess money; it is merely essential to have access to money” (103), which 
is to say, access to credit. A whole hierarchy of access results, operating according to an 
analogical conception of value—after the death of God (or, more precisely, as the 
expression and performance of the death of God) money is the value of values. Money 
represents itself as a transcendence or an in-itself. Yet one cannot simply say, riffing on 
St. Paul, that all things are possible with money—one should rather say that all things 
that are possible are possible with money. Money is a sort of reality principle that selects 
and distributes possibilities and futures: 
As the principle that makes demand effective, the supreme means of freedom and 
power, money is a reality principle: it promises the power to realize all other 
desires and values. It offers itself as the universal social means. As the supreme 
means of access to value, money is that which is of most social value. It is the 
precondition for the realization of all other ends. … Money thus posits itself as 
the supreme being, the focus of attention and desire, the principle for the 
realization of capital projects. Money posits itself as God, the principle of all 





 The foregoing analyses of the material-energetic nature of money (Chapter 2) now 
gain a new clarity. If one accepts the Spinozist thesis that there is but a single substance, 
said of its modes or modifications (understood as degrees of power) then the social 
substance of value, affirmed by Marx himself in chapter 1 of Capital, points to a certain 
slippage between the material and the social. Marx refers to the objective character of 
values in terms of a fundamental break between the physical or sensuous character of 
commodities (use-value) and the mode of being of the commodity as an “expression of an 
identical social substance, human labor,” such that their objective character as values is 
therefore purely social.”145 The division between use-value and value, internal to the 
commodity, refers itself to a prior division internal to the money form itself: money is 
both credit and debt. It must be said that Marx’s intent was not to investigate the social as 
such, but rather the form that sociality takes in the capitalist mode of production (the 
infamous formula of commodity-fetishism, which is “nothing but the definite social 
relation between men themselves … assumes here, for them, the fantastic for of a relation 
between things.” ).146 Marx excludes materiality from these relations, but this exclusion is 
perhaps not completely justified.  
 The slippage which we are investigating, between the material and the social, can 
only be understood with reference to the status of the debtor—more precisely, the very 
life, existence and body of the debtor—in the social sphere. No doubt, exchange is the 
                                                
145 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, 138-139. 
 





predominant social relation in capitalist societies, but this social relation is itself 
grounded in the creditor-debtor relation, and formalized by the apparatus of forgiveness. 
Markets are not illusions, but they are grounded in an illusion of the formal equality of 
market actors. This is why Goodchild claims that “The power of money is expressed 
through exchange” (106, my emphasis). Far from being a result of market society, 
“money makes markets possible.” It is because money emerged in pre-history, in the 
form of the creditor-debtor relation, that a properly capitalist society was able to develop. 
Even if money qua credit did not invent capitalism (in the sense that early industrial 
capitalism was rarely funded by bank loans), capitalism qua social system requires a 
socius that pre-exists it, upon which it operates as a parasite until it achieves the status of 
a social totality (perhaps with Fordism, but certainly with the advent of globalization, 
which, not coincidentally, corresponds to the explosion and hegemony of financial 
capital, where the ascendency of fiat currency147 testifies to a certain apotheosis of money 
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Economy and Ecology,” Situation Analysis, Issue 2 (Spring 2003), 8-9. And note the 
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as credit). Society is constituted by exchange in the capitalist mode of production, but 
“money is the condition of possibility of society as such” (106, my emphasis).  
 Goodchild himself admits that money is not the sole principle of social reality, but 
insists that in late capitalism, it has a “peculiar dominance, a spectral power” (68). I am 
inclined to agree, but I want to insist, in turn, that the spectral power of money doubles 
history and sociality, subtending and grounding social relations and historical 
consciousness in the manner of a Foucauldian diagram. I am also in cautious agreement 
with Goodchild’s assertion that  
It is no longer sufficient to oppose will and matter, representation and production, 
being and becoming, the one and the many, transcendence and immanence, for 
the relations between these dualisms are always mediated by a spectral power 
[namely, money] that authorizes their realization. (69) 
 
It is only possible to affirm these claims on the condition that each other former terms be 
collapsed into the latter terms, or, to put it another way, on the condition that each of the 
former terms emerges from the latter terms in the form of a transcendental illusion. This 
is indeed Goodchild’s approach, and the claims I am questioning are of an introductory 
sort, pointing toward a more fundamental, ontological nature of money. What matters is 
that one affirms that will emerges from matter, representation from production, being 
from becoming, the one from the many, transcendence from immanence, in precisely the 
sense that we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, where each of the former terms is a crystallization 
or congealing of flows of energy-matter. Hence the fundamental ambiguity of the phrase 




analogical structure of the credit-debt relation; on the other hand, money is the plane of 
immanence on which this structure arises.  
 One can grasp this paradox with reference to the processes of subjectivization 
described in chapter 3. If the credit-debt relation is a certain apparatus which coalesces 
and captures the human at a certain (even if indeterminable) point in history, namely the 
advent of language qua logos, then money produces a subject, and produces this subject 
precisely as indebted. More precisely, the indebted subject is a differential matrix (or a 
crystal) of credit and debt—the subject is the material conduit of belief and desire. We 
saw above, in chapter 2, that the Lucretian clinamen is power, and this remains true. But 
power is more profoundly desire, where desire is understood not as that which names 
what is lacking in the subject, but is rather the objectivity (in the Marxian sense of the 
term) of productivity, and lacks only the gravity of a debtor to start the machine: “Desire 
does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is missing 
in desire.”148 The indebted subject is the finite mode or fold in which substance—God or 
money—invests itself and expresses itself. Marx saw quite correctly that value is always 
a social production, but the social is desiring in and of itself, as Goodchild expresses in a 
stunning formulation: 
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It is a question of belief and desire.149 Belief and desire are everywhere. Even if 
no one really wants money—it is always a means, never an end—everyone 
believes in money, everyone desires money, or, rather, money is the reality, the 
interiority of belief and desire in which we dwell. It is not we who desire money, it 
is money that desires in us. (69, my emphasis) 
 
 Desire is therefore that differential power that totalizes the social and the material, 
the future and the past, the promise and the memory. The Marxian concept of labor must 
be said of the living present of the debtor who works to preserve the memory of the 
promise, and thereby guarantees or securitizes the future. The impersonality of desire 
produces a subject which labors to pay the debt, to make good on the promise. As 
Deleuze and Guattari put it: “The truth of the matter is that social production is purely 
and simply desiring production itself under determinate circumstances.”150 Desiring 
production, or the differential and heterogeneous flows of matter-energy, is indeterminate 
in itself. To avoid the pitfalls of representation and the reduction of the social to the act of 
exchange, it suffices to add the production of subjectivity as the form of the determinable, 
that which is produced as a temporal expression of desire, the pure modulation of desire, 
the incarnation of money in—or as—the human.  
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 4.3 The idea of the incarnation of money in the human being must be attributed to 
Marx himself, found in the 1844 manuscripts.151 Interestingly, the notion of money’s 
incarnation does not appear in Capital. I cannot speculate as to the reasons why such a 
magnificent articulation of the relation between the human being and credit should have 
been omitted from Marx’s masterpiece, but one can nevertheless glean from “Excerpts on 
James Mill” a concept of credit and debt—that is to say, money—that is in every sense 
decisive. Central to the theory of general credit is the idea that money must be understood 
as credit, and that credit must in turn be understood as reversible with debt. Credit and 
debt are purely reversible, yet asymmetrical. Before we can determine the nature of the 
asymmetry of the creditor-debtor relation, however, we must determine the nature of its 
reversibility and the specific production of subjectivity that results.  
 Against the tendency of modern economists to see the progression toward paper 
money and the banking system as a solution to the trouble of estrangement and alienation 
of commodity fetishism, Marx insists that the explicit development of money qua credit 
(which we maintain has always been the case in social systems, albeit implicitly) is rather 
an illusion of progress. Where Mill and others claim that the organized banking system is 
an “abolition of estrangement,” a “return of man to himself and thus to other men,” Marx 
locates a more profound “self-estrangement, dehumanization, all the more infamous and 
extreme because its element is no longer a commodity, metal or paper, but the moral 
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existence, the social existence, the very heart of man.”152 The commodity fetishism is not 
overcome in the capitalist credit-debt relation, it is radicalized and raised to the level of 
subjective production. Lazzarato, reading this same passage, writes: “With credit, Marx 
tells us, alienation is complete, since it is the ethical work constitutive of the self and the 
community that is exploited.”153 That is to say,  
For Marx, the creditor-debtor relation is at once different from and 
complementary to the labor-capital relation. If we put aside the content of the 
relation between creditor and debtor (money), we see that credit does not solicit 
and exploit labor but rather ethical action and the work of self-constitution at both 
an individual and collective level.154 
 
 Marx himself insists that we “should reflect on the immorality implicit in the 
evaluation of a man in terms of money, such as we find in the credit system.”155 In the 
credit relationship, the “talent and [the] labors serve the rich man [or the creditor] as a 
guarantee that the money he has lent will be returned,” and one can see here not only the 
disciplinary apparatus at work, but also an incipient biopolitics, since “the totality of the 
poor man’s social virtues, the content of his life’s activity, his very existence” are what is 
at stake: “For the creditor the death of the poor man is the very worst thing that can 
happen. It means the death of his capital together with the interest.”156 The debtor must 
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not only be trustworthy to gain access to credit, he must also be in good health. 
Decisively, it is always a matter of judgement. In an extraordinary passage which must be 
quoted in full, Marx clearly recognizes the violence of this judgement: 
Credit is the economic judgement on the morality of a man. In the credit system 
man replaces metal or paper as the mediator of exchange. However, he does this 
not as a man but as the incarnation of capital and interest. Thus although it is true 
that the medium of exchange has migrated from its material form and returned to 
man it has done so only because man has been exiled from himself and 
transformed into material form. Money has not been transcended in man within 
the credit system, but man is himself transformed into money, or, in other words, 
money is incarnate in him. Human individuality, human morality, have become 
both articles of commerce and the material which money inhabits. The substance, 
the body clothing the spirit of money is not money, paper, but instead it is my 
personal existence, my flesh and blood, my social worth and status. Credit no 
longer actualizes money-values in actual money but in human flesh and human 
hearts.157  
 
 Amongst its virtues, this passage confirms Nietzsche’s account of the creditor-
debtor relation. Though Marx will shift, in Capital, from the subjective or existential 
account of money qua credit to an objective or systemic account of the capitalist mode of 
production, one should not forget that the analyses from 1844 are nevertheless concerned 
with modern capitalist societies. Nietzsche’s ‘primitive,’ or ‘prehistoric’ account holds 
for capitalist societies just as much as our own historical milieu (and note that Marx’s 
infamous claim that we still live in prehistory here achieves a newfound clarity)158. It is in 
fact in the mode of the production of subjects as debtors that one can most clearly grasp 
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the reversibility of credit and debt. Money is created as debt (in the case of a loan or a 
promise) but a debt received is a credit deployed.   
 Note that debt is nearly always conceived of in terms of a lack. This idea makes a 
certain intuitive sense: a debtor is she who lacks the wealth required for this or that 
activity and is thereby impelled to take on a debt in order to meet the ‘necessities’ of 
economic demands upon her. But note also that already the debt is that which ‘fills’ the 
lack or deficit, such that debt, which is so often thought of as being a lack in itself is 
rather that which annuls the lack and makes possible any number of economic activities. 
Credit and debt are formally reversible.159 From the perspective of both the lender and the 
borrower, debt is a credit when extended to a borrower—a credit extended, a credit 
received; yet a credit is a debt from the singular perspective of the borrower, something 
which must be repaid; and a credit is a debt from the singular perspective of the lender, 
something to be recuperated. One can continue the reversals ad nauseum. Credit-debt, or 
money as such, is a matter of perspective, and being a subject is in essence a becoming-
identical to a perspective. Credit and debt are formally reversible, but materially 
unilateral: the creditor-debtor relation is asymmetrical, it is a relation of power. 
Interestingly, while we must insist that debt is not equivalent to lack, one can 
nevertheless lack credit—one can be considered untrustworthy, not to be credited. Yet 
the fact of lacking credit is not explicable by means of economic necessity, but is rather a 
                                                





matter of moral judgement. Money, not content merely to confess a monotheism, is 
always subtended by a profound moralism.   
 One of the many paradoxes of debt is that, rather than signifying or realizing a lack, 
debt is fundamentally productive. A single example will suffice for now. Consider 
student debt: the cost of higher education would be totally unfeasible for the majority of 
young people, except that these same young people are given ample access to credit, 
which is to say debt. Debt allows for social production in universities, but note the 
circularity of the financial aid system in higher education: costs are rising, therefore 
student debt rises; but the increase in debt is equivalent to an increase of money in 
circulation in general; when this process of increasing debt is paired with the austerity 
measures leveled against universities today, whereby tuition increases in order to cover 
the cost of the skyrocketing salaries of administrators, the cost of education can only rise 
by leaps and bounds. As Goodchild has noted, our “entire economic system functions as a 
spiral of increasing debt, with individuals, businesses, and governments committed to 
ever increasing levels of overall debt in the system as a whole.”160 Debt produces credit 
and credit re-members debt: or in terms of the formula for capital, money makes money. It 
is said that the formula for financial capital, or M - M’, fulfills the prophecy of The 
Communist Manifesto, where “all that is solid melts into air.”161 Yet this becoming-flux 
of money invites and produces a reflux and a congealing of matter-energy in the form of 
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the indebted subject. The ‘C’ of the formula for capital appears to have disappeared from 
the objective processes of capital as a result of financialization, but the frictionless and 
smooth flow of money is in fact impeded and blocked up everywhere and at every 
moment by the bodies which bear the value in themselves—in their very existence. 
 Money has, in effect, two faces—a Janus-faced God. On the one hand, credit is 
virtual, a spectral power that creates a future which much be guaranteed by the actuality 
of debt. On the other hand, debt is actual, or actualized and productive credit—and if 
there is a circuit between credit and debt, then it is to be found precisely in the body of 
the human subject, who must prove herself worthy of credit in order to take on the debt 
that she will then circulate in the form of banknotes or cash. In spite of the ‘subjective’ 
character of the credit-debt relation one must remember that the memory by which the 
debtor constitutes herself as worthy of credit is the very material memory of a blinding 
pain, the cruel affections of a mnemotechnics. Virtuality does not signify any unreality. 
“The virtual is real inasmuch as it is virtual,”162 meaning that the virtual and actual 
together constitute the real, the latter which is opposed to the possible. Virtual money 
(credit) is actualized as debt, as the obligation to fulfill a promise, and it is always debts 
that circulate and capitalize throughout the increasingly cloud-like structures of the 
capitalist mode of production. Together, virtual credit and actual debt possibilize, which 
is to say that they create a future. 
                                                





 In terms of the logic of credit and debt, it is more or less here that Christianity 
intervenes, providing the theological formulation of the incarnation of money: whereas in 
capitalism man has become money, in Christianity God becomes man. The Marxian 
concept of objectification is perfectly expressed by the figure of Christ, the God-man, 
who in his refusal of the distinction between the interiority and exteriority of the Godhead 
is the expression of the internal limit of capitalism, from which the capital-Christian 
assemblage departs and to which it returns as surplus: Christ is capital itself. And if we 
remain in the image of God but have lost the likeness, this has the effect of installing at 
the heart of subjectivity a desire to regain the likeness—our debt is immediately mistaken 
for a lack, rather than the principle of the production of God or money as such. Human 
existence becomes an infinite debt (though a ‘bad’ infinity, in which one simply lacks the 
time to settle accounts), and the world is immediately subjected to the moralism of an 
analogical monotheism: one’s only choice is to labor or to act in accordance with the only 
righteousness left. One must make money by becoming money. One must be Christ-like. 
The analogical formula for the production of money is thus: credit in itself is debt for 
itself. 
 As Lazzarato remarks,  
We are no longer the inheritors of original sin but rather of the debt of preceding 
generations. ‘Indebted man’ is subject to a creditor-debtor power relation 
accompanying him throughout his life, from birth to death. If in times past we 
were indebted to the community, to the gods, to our ancestors, we henceforth 
indebted to the ‘god’ Capital.163 
 
                                                





One of the aims of this essay is to remove the scare quotes from the word god, and to 
capitalize, so to speak, its first letter. Which is to say that from the beginning we are 
precipitated into an analogical hierarchy of being, in which a supreme being functions as 
the transcendent model for the earthly creditor, who keeps for himself his collection of 
debtors, who in turn form the variable capital of his exploits and satisfactions. The 
creditor is alternately benevolent or malevolent: benevolent when he gives or distributes 
credit in the form of a judgment; malevolent when he calls in the debt, where failure to 
pay the debt results in a psycho-material punishment. It is true that, for the moderns, 
debtors’ prisons seem like a distant memory, but capital has no pressing need for such 
prisons today.164 Society itself functions, just as much as language, as such a prison. 
More precisely, as Foucault saw already in Discipline and Punish,165 and as Deleuze 
observes, the soul itself—the subjectivity of the debtor—is itself a prison.166 Hence it is 
not adequate to simply say that we—as debtors—are in the credit-debt relation, so much 
as this relation is in us, our sole interiority.167  
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 4.4 Credit and debt are formally reversible inasmuch as debt incurred by the debtor 
is credit in terms of the capacity for the debt to enter into circulation and exchange. My 
intent in this essay is not to refute the Marxian concept of labor—it is still abstract labor 
which produces value—but in terms of the subjective production of the debtor, labor 
under financial neoliberalism takes the form of a work on the self. Hence the neoliberal 
paradigm of the entrepreneur of the self, where the memory-maintaining and future-
making character of the subject takes center stage. The distinction between a relative 
purchasing power of money and the absolute purchasing power of money, described by 
Goodchild, is above all a political distinction before it is an economic one, though its 
consequences are precisely economical. Given the reversibility of credit and debt (the 
‘demonic ambiguity’ of money itself), it still remains to isolate that which truly 
distinguishes the creditor from the debtor, aside from the more or less accidental 
inequality of wealth between them (e.g. The creditor is not prohibited from accumulating 
her own debt, and in fact is almost always in debt to another creditor. Moreover, as Marx 
intuited, the creditor is not in fact characterized by a strict autonomy, but depends on the 
                                                                                                                                            
man first developed what was later called his ‘soul.’ The entire inner world, originally as 
thin as if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, 
acquired depth, breadth, and height, in the same measure as outward discharge was 
inhibited. Those fearful bulwarks with which the political organization protected itself 
against the old instincts of freedom—punishments belong among these bulwarks—
brought about that all those instincts of wild, free, prowling man turned backward against 
man himself. Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in 
destruction—all this turned against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of 





trustworthiness and labor of the debtor—if the debtor were to die, the variable capital 
invested in the body of the debtor would be lost without reserve.) 
 The true distinction between creditor and debtor is a political and theological 
distinction: the power to forgive. We can approach the structure of this power of 
forgiveness by means of the subtle yet decisive difference between gift and credit.  
 The concept of gift, no doubt, was most famously formulated by Marcel Mauss in 
his anthropological and ethnographic investigation of the practice of potlatch (or gift-
exchange) in archaic societies: The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic 
Societies.168 More recently, Jacques Derrida published his own reflections on the subject 
of the gift, in Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money.169 My approach in dealing with these 
two texts will be to affirm a certain dimension of Mauss’s approach (his categorical 
denial of the existence of a ‘free gift’) while at the same time mounting a critique of 
Mauss’s hesitation between the credit-debt relation and exchange, as outlined by Deleuze 
and Guattari. With regards to Derrida, my approach is similarly equivocal, since, in spite 
of his effort to do so, Derrida does not escape the gravity of Mauss’s presuppositions and 
even introduces an element of transcendence into the economy of the gift, so as to escape 
the deadlock of the gift-cycle. I will address Derrida’s text in Chapter 5 below. The 
upshot of the present analysis, which will carry us through to chapter 5 and to the subject 
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of forgiveness, is that capitalism cannot be understood as a gift economy, and that 
attempts to transform or reform capitalism into such a gift economy will be doomed to 
failure so long as the function of the credit-debt relation goes unaddressed. Capitalism is 
indeed an exchange economy, but it is above all a promising economy.  
 It is clear enough from even the preliminary examinations of the kula/potlach, or 
the ritualized gift-exchange practiced by the various tribes referred to by Mauss, that the 
kula is a political ritual rather than an economic system. That it should have economic 
consequences (Mauss goes so far as to claim that “A free market exists between 
individuals of allied tribes,” where an alliance is constituted by the solemnity and gravity 
of the potlatch, thereby forming the condition of the so-called free market)170 is not 
surprising, but one should be wary nonetheless of attributing an autonomy to these 
consequences that abstracts from their political nuclei. The kula functions to engender 
alliances and foster associations. The case of intertribal kula, Mauss writes, is “merely the 
extreme case, the most solemn and dramatic one, of a more general system.”171 The kula 
is a sort of opening onto a circle or cycle of circulating gifts, such that “every kind of 
relationship is established outside the kula, which, however, always remains the purpose, 
and the decisive moment in these relationships.”172 Decisively, the kula is a contract that 
renders exchange in general possible. The central question, according to Mauss himself, 
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is how to account for the sanction imposed on the insolvent debtor, or the actor who fails 
to adequately provide a counter-gift in the kula: what is the nature of the force behind the 
obligation to make a counter-gift which equals or exceeds the value of the original 
gift?173 
 Mauss’s descriptions of the three obligations or essences of potlatch are instructive: 
each has to do with the production and maintenance of subjectivity, with the possession 
of—the ‘status’ of—having a face. The three obligations (to give, to receive, to 
reciprocate) all have the function of establishing the ‘worth,’ ‘value,’ or ‘identity’ of the 
person in question—in most cases the chief of a given tribe, who, by alternately 
establishing himself (receiving) and debasing himself (giving) opens the sphere of trade 
and exchange and sociality for his people. Mauss writes, “to lose one’s prestige is indeed 
to lose one’s soul. It is in fact the ‘face,’ the dancing mask, the right to incarnate a 
spirit…it is really the persona—that are all called into question in this way,” and can be 
gained or lost at the potlatch. One’s very identity is at stake. Yet it is the third of these 
obligations, the obligation to reciprocate, which poses a problem for thought.  
 “The obligation to reciprocate worthily is imperative,” writes Mauss. “One loses 
face forever if one does not reciprocate, or if one does not carry out destruction of equal 
value.”174 One loses one’s identity by failing to pay the debt, or what amounts to the same 
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thing, by failing to return the gift with interest within the term or time limit specified by 
either contract or convention. Moreover, Mauss identifies the explicit punishment for 
failure to reciprocate as debt slavery: “the individual unable to repay the loan or 
reciprocate the potlatch loses his rank and even his status as a free man.”175 There is a 
slippage here between loan and gift-exchange that points to a failure on Mauss’s part. 
Despite the fact that Mauss’s analysis has the virtue of refusing the idea—still peddled in 
Mauss’s time by modern economists and historians—that credit stands at the end of a 
long development of economic life that began with barter, Mauss’s theory still remains 
on the side of exchange, passing over the genetic character of the original, contractual 
potlatch in favor of a general theory of exchange. For Mauss, as should be evident by 
now, the point of departure lies in the nature of the gift, which, even if it “necessarily 
entails the notion of credit,”176 does not achieve to the generality of credit as the promise 
of value and the concomitant production of subjects qua debtors. 
 It is unclear whether Mauss would, in the last instance, subordinate the potlatch, 
with its circulation of gifts and counter-gifts, to a more originary conception of the 
contractual relation between creditor and debtor. To his credit, Mauss actually avoids the 
mistake that Graeber makes in Debt, when he suggests that a debt relation should be 
considered an exchange that has not yet come to a conclusion.177 For Mauss, the 
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‘exchange’ never equalizes, due to the imperative of excessive repayment, but this is not 
due to some inexplicable imperative to ratchet up the ‘terms’ of the exchange by repaying 
in excess—on the contrary, it is because the debt is infinite and goes, so to speak, all the 
way down. One is not supposed to repay the debt. One is supposed to manage the debt, 
and the practice of the potlatch should be understood as a ploy for power and identity, not 
for equality. In any case, Mauss expresses a certain optimism with regards to the origins 
of exchange and human sociality (since the potlatch, above all, functions as a mechanism 
for building solidarity and establishing identity), where by contrast Nietzsche takes the 
darker, more macabre and pessimistic view of the ascent of the human being to a rational 
order of sociality and identity. Despite the anachronism, it is Nietzsche who takes up the 
spear at the point where Mauss left it. To the question, “Whence the force of the sanction 
against failure to reciprocate?,” Nietzsche puts forward the cruel equation, injury = pain, 
and the invocation of an evaluating eye which extracts pleasure as a sort of surplus value 
from the debtor (“pain is like the surplus value that the eye extracts”).178 Pain and 
pleasure coincide in the economy of the credit-debt relation. 
Let us be clear as to the logic of this form of compensation: it is strange enough. 
An equivalence is provided by the creditor’s receiving, in place of a literal 
compensation for an injury (thus in place of money, land, possessions of any 
kind), a recompense in the form of a kind of pleasure—the pleasure of being 
allowed to vent his power freely upon one who is powerless, the voluptuous 
pleasure ‘de faire le mal pour le plaisir de la faire,’ the enjoyment of violation.179 
                                                                                                                                            
precisely when they money changes hands, when the debt is cancelled, that equality is 
restored and both parties can walk away and have nothing further to do with each other.” 
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 There is a pleasure principle at play in this jouissance of the creditor inasmuch as 
exchange is always oriented toward stasis, yet never complete; it never reaches its desired 
equilibrium.180 The obligation to pay the debt, or toward total compensation, is the 
manifestation of the inner necessity toward an impossible equality: e.g. the inequality 
characteristic of the distribution of the complex of flows of matter-energy which are 
harnessed by the respective actors in an exchange that is never consummate. The 
incommensurability of the human beings in the credit-debt relation grounds the now 
derivative necessity of exchange. The equality that is manifest in exchange in the 
capitalist mode of production always refers back to an imperative of commensurability, a 
commensurability which is achieved in the commodity-form, but remains in excess in the 
subjective production of the credit-debt relation. Inequality is the foundation of equality, 
incommensurability the ground of commensurability. The pleasure principle implicit in 
Nietzsche’s image of the evaluating eye is marked clearly by the attempt to close the gap, 
to collapse the gradient, which, in spite of every claim to formal equality in exchange, 
remains as a differential and productive difference between creditor and debtor—the 
‘origin’ of the social relation as such.  
 If money is a reality principle it is such precisely in the sense that it operates on the 
excess produced by the pleasure principle: all things that are possible are possible with 
                                                                                                                                            
 
180 Note that, for Freud, pleasure is not the intensification or amplification of stimuli, but 
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money. God or money is the absolute horizon of human possibilities before it is a 
medium of exchange, the latter which can only ‘realize’ relative horizons, according to 
the social production of value and the vicissitudes of human labor. We saw above that 
social production is desiring production (understood as the totality of the indeterminate 
flows of matter-energy) under determinate conditions. What is required for an 
understanding of the manner in which desiring production is determined as social 
production is the form of the determinable, or the subject as a temporal fold of power, 
with its triple responsibility to past, future and present.181 The dual nature of money: qua 
credit, the singular power of the promissory to create a future; qua debt, the unlimited 
power to circulate bodies as values. Taken together as credit and debt, money is the 
socius upon which the potlatch and the capitalist mode of production, their fundamental 
differences notwithstanding, inscribe their signs and symbols, their peculiar kinetics and 
circulations, their power and their knowledge.  
 Finally, it must be observed that it is in the last instance inadequate to say merely 
that there is no society without a promise. No doubt, it is true that inasmuch as they 
possess a temporality and a subject proper to their mode of production, all societies and 
all sociality as such are promissory in their nature, but one must nevertheless go further: 
there is, in fact, no society without a broken promise. The social is a sort of scar tissue, 
the congealed memory of a brand, a laceration, or an amputation inflicted as punishment 
for insolvency, irrationality, or any so-called asocial behavior. The social is just as 
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described by Deleuze in Difference and Repetition: “A scar is the sign not of a past 
wound but of ‘the present fact of having been wounded.”182 If revolutionary social 
antagonism has any aim it is precisely the reopening—the renegotiation or 
reorganization—of this psycho-social wound, this broken flesh. One must resist the 
moralism of money, since it is not enough to insist either on keeping promises, or 
breaking promises. The horizon of this question lies beyond Good and Evil. What is 
needed is a theory and practice of immanent evaluation, unfettered by the cords of 
analogy and transcendence.   
 The decisive difference between gift and credit is temporal: where the gift implies a 
time limit or a ‘term’ in which the counter-gift must be dispensed, the credit-debt relation 
is interminable, since the cycle is never closed and the contract never ends, precisely 
because it never properly began. One is born into an infinite, interminable debt.  
 In this regard, the “stroke of genius on the part of Christianity” identified by 
Nietzsche is in truth rather subtle, but its ramifications are enormous. One could already, 
prior to Christianity, understand a debt as infinite, but only as what Hegel called a ‘bad’ 
infinity, which is characterized by simple, linear addition (I owe 5 dollars today, but 6 
dollars tomorrow) according to a cardinal temporality and a constant rate of interest. In 
this regard, the form of the potlatch thus resembles a bad infinity: the gift-debts in 
themselves remain finite even if they have the capacity to circulate infinitely given an 
indefinite time. One might fall into a debt which one cannot afford to pay, even given a 
                                                





whole lifetime, but this ‘infinite’ indebtedness remains accidental. On the other hand, 
everything changes with the introduction of the Christian doctrine of salvation. The debt 
is rendered qualitatively or actually infinite: one is necessarily infinitely indebted.  
 
 4.5 The “stroke of genius” to which Nietzsche refers is the true turning point in the 
argument against Mauss and the latter’s interlocutors. “The advent of the Christian God,” 
writes Nietzsche, “as the maximum god attained so far, was therefore accompanied by 
the maximum feeling of guilty indebtedness on earth.”183 Nietzsche nods obliquely to the 
perceived secularization of Western society, “an irresistible decline of faith in the 
Christian God,” which corresponds to a “considerable decline in mankind’s feeling of 
guilt,” and even invokes a potential “victory of atheism” which would free humanity of 
its bad conscience.184 Yet he immediately pivots away from this scenario, confessing that 
despite having spoken as if the moralization of the concepts of debt and their integral 
connection to the a priori indebtedness to a deity had not taken place (that is to say, that 
“the faith in our ‘creditor,’ in God, had disappeared”), “the reality is, to a fearful degree, 
otherwise.”185 
 The Christian innovation, its stroke of genius—which laid the ground for the 
parasitization of Christianity by capitalism—is this:  
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God sacrifices himself for the guilt of the mankind, God himself makes payment 
to himself, God as the only being who can redeem man from what has become 
unredeemable for man himself—the creditor sacrifices himself for his debtor, out 
of love (can one credit that?), out of love for his debtor!—186 
 
What is worse than being subject to an infinite debt is to having one’s infinite debt 
forgiven, since any possibility of repaying the debt is really and absolutely foreclosed by 
the act of forgiveness. To be forgiven is to have one’s debt rendered absolutely 
inexpiable. And it is the power to forgive, which the creditor holds absolutely, which 
ultimately distinguishes him from his debtor. The creditor stands in an analogical relation 
to his debtor: the creditor gives—and forgives—but the debtor can never properly give 
back. Whatever the quantity of repayment the creditor ‘receives,’ this repayment is 
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temporal penalty to escape eternal loss. The idea of merit is associated with the 
performance of works that go beyond the obligatory (supererogatoria). According to 
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beyond what is commanded earn a surplus of merit. The idea that such superfluous merit 
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is found in Cyprian. This prepared the way for the Latin, Anselmian theory of the 
Atonement. Cyprian himself begins to apply the principle to the overplus of merit earned 
by Christ, and to interpret Christ's work as a satisfaction. To this language Anselm weds 
the claim that satisfaction is owed to God because of human disobedience, a disobedience 
that has offended God's justice. God's justice requires that humans do penance, make 
satisfaction. But, because of their sinfulness, they cannot make an offering or payment 
worthy of satisfying God's justice. Their works can never be meritorious enough. Christ, 
who is sinless, does this on behalf of humankind.  It cannot be stressed strongly enough 
that it was on the basis of the penitential system that the Latin theory grew up. The now 
classic discussion of the Christian doctrines of the Atonement is found in Gustaf 
Aulén, Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of the 





always infinitely insufficient. The debtor assumes an interminable quest to close the 
account, to make repayment properly and completely—the debt becomes a debt of 
existence.  
 We saw above (in the Interlude) that the State commences or recommences by 
territorializing or distributing land, and by the abolition of small debts. The two acts are 
inseparable, but the latter, by design, functions to quash or circumventing economic 
resistance movements which coalesce around the mounting levels of debt, be they 
personal, or commercial—a strategy for “raising and dealing with the agrarian problem in 
a comprehensive way.”187 Yet “in other cases where where a redistribution occurs,” 
which is to say in cases where debts are restructured, precisely in the manner which the 
IMF today ‘restructures’ the accounts of debtor-nations according to neoliberal pushes 
for austerity, “the cycle of credits is maintained, in the new form established by the 
State—money.”188 Whether absolute (total remission) or relative (restructuring, 
maintenance), the power of forgiveness always serves as the prima causa of the 
circulation of money, since it is always debts that circulate, and congeal to constitute 
insolvencies. “In a word, money—the circulation of money—is the means for rendering 
the debt infinite.” It is precisely the “abolition of debts or their accountable 
transformation [which] intimates the duty of an interminable service to the State.”189 
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 In language that will by now have become familiar, Deleuze and Guattari observe 
that  
[t]he infinite creditor and infinite credit have replaced the blocks of mobile and 
finite debts. There is always a monotheism on the horizon of despotism: the debt 
becomes a debt of existence, a debt of existence of the subjects themselves. A 
time will come when the creditor has not yet lent while the debtor never quits 
repaying, for repaying is a duty but lending is an option…190 
 
Everything is reversed with the Christian innovation: money as reality principle is no 
longer subordinated to the pleasure principle (injury = pain), rather the pleasure principle 
serves money as an imperative to repay, to sell one’s labor for a promise of value with 
which one can keep one’s own promise. Like an increasingly complex web, promises 
refer to promises, signs to signs, and debts to debts. The totality of society—all of the 
local solidarities and alliances, filiations and festivals—“finds itself taken up into an 
immense machinery that renders the debt infinite and no longer forms anything but one 
and the same crushing fate.”191 All that is solid does indeed melt into air, including the 
body of the debtor, which becomes a spectral existence equal only to its access to credit: 
the soul becomes a credit-card score—“the earth becomes a madhouse.”192  
 The human being qua subject (of the State, of law, of language) is produced as 
indebted. As indebted, the subject is the embodiment of a temporality which functions, 
not to conserve the past, but rather to generate, cultivate, and maintain a memory of the 
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future.193 The creditor possesses the future in advance by securitizing the living present of 
the debtor, and by extracting the subjective surplus value of pleasure/pain (desiring 
production) and the objective surplus value of labor (social production). In both of these 
senses, the human being qua indebted subject is the incarnation of money. Yet the infinite 
debt (thanks) to which the subject is subject has the peculiar character of a scene of 
forgiveness, testifying to the insistence of an apparatus that doubles and subtends the 
regime of debt. It is to the nature and the structure of this apparatus of forgiveness that we 




                                                











Chapter 5 – The Subject of Forgiveness 
 5.1 It is clear that an apparatus necessarily produces the subjects which populate its 
surface. We are badly mistaken when we speak of the subject as pre-existing its milieu or 
existing separately and autonomously from its dispositif, just as we are mistaken when we 
speak of a wind independently of the complex of atmospheric turbulence and pressure 
differentials of which it is composed. It is not that one cannot speak of a wind, or that 
speaking of a wind would have no sense, but that it’s condition—the being of the 
sensible—lies elsewhere.194 The subject is a mode of substance, a degree of power, a fold 
of being. We have seen the effects of the originary apparatus of the promise (which 
coincides with or doubles the invention or discovery of language), the manifestation of 
power in the creditor-debtor relation, and the indebted subject that is produced. The 
indebted subject emerges out of the system of cruelty and is caught up in the immense 
machinery of the infinite debt, moving from one apparatus to another in an incessant 
process of self-affection and subjectification. And yet, as Agamben observes, the 
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proliferation of apparatuses in late capitalism tends toward a seemingly opposed 
operation:  
What defines the apparatuses that we have to deal with in the current phase of 
capitalism is that they no longer act as much through the production of a subject, 
as through the process of what can be called desubjectification. A desubjectifying 
moment is certainly implicit in every process of subjectification.195 
 
 This process of desubjectification which doubles and subtends every process of 
subjectification was already implicit in Marx’s “Comments on James Mill,” where the 
becoming-money of the human is inseparable from a self-estrangement and alienation. 
For Marx, the figure of Christ eminently represents this paradox: “Christ is God alienated 
and man alienated.”196 Private property, according to Marx, ‘finishes up’ in money, and 
the human being qua indebted subject is a subject only inasmuch as the human being is 
estranged.197 As we saw above, under the conditions of neoliberal capitalism, the human 
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importantly, as an avenue of future research, one would have to take into account the 
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or dominium, is a relation between a person and a thing, characterized by the absolute 




being qua debtor increasingly becomes identical to their debt (the credit-card soul), and 
exists qua subject only in order to grease the gears of the flow of financial capital. “What 
we are now witnessing,” writes Agamben, “is that the processes of subjectification and 
processes of desubjectification seem to become reciprocally indifferent, and so they do 
not give rise to the recomposition of a new subject, except in larval or, as it were, spectral 
form.”198 This is the significance of the passage to the infinite debt: the apparatus of 
forgiveness transforms the indebted subject into a subject of forgiveness in a 
recomposition of the subject, a resubjectification or a resurrection. What was 
decomposed and alienated, a scar tissue on the body of the socius, now assumes the 
stigmata of a Christian subject: no longer guilty, the subject of forgiveness is innocent, 
which is to say freed from the finite or bad infinity of the system of cruelty, precipitated 
into the infinite debt, thereby guiltier than ever.  
 In this regard, the strategy of the apparatus of forgiveness marks a significant 
advance. The paradox of late capitalism is that it requires this constant negotiation 
between indebtedness and freedom, between guilt and innocence, desubjectification and 
                                                                                                                                            
thinghood, and is thereby placed under the total domination and control of the ‘owner.’ 
The word dominium itself turns out to be derived from domus, which means ‘house’ or 
‘household.’ If the capitalist mode of production requires as its minimal condition a 
theory or institution of private property, it would seem that capitalism is in fact 
inseparable from a logic of slavery and domination—and this well before the extraction 
of surplus value in exchange begins. For Graeber’s discussion of this question, see 
Graeber, Debt, 198-207. For a perspective in which the figure of the African slave 
replaces the Gramscian figure of the worker as the central subject of capitalism, see 
Frank Wilderson, “The Prison Slave as Hegemony’s (Silent) Scandal,” Social Justice, 
Vol. 30, No. 2 (92), War, Dissent, and Justice: A Dialogue (2003): pp. 18-27. 
 





resubjectification, crucifixion/torture and resurrection. If assuming one’s self and 
subjectivity as debtor marked the performance of the death of God, the acceptance of 
forgiveness requires not only the admission of one’s guilt (ratifying the terms of the debt 
in the form of a tacit confession) but also signifies the practical resurrection of God. 
God’s complete transformation into money requires these two complementary 
movements: the dissolution of the being of God into the kinetics of money according to 
the reciprocity of the creditor-debtor relation and the society of exchange (to which the 
indebted subject corresponds as the incarnation of money—a perverse general equivalent 
or medium of exchange), and the crystallization or reification of God as the creditor who 
alone can forgive the debt (the double genitive that lurks in the phrase, ‘subject of 
forgiveness’). If the unity and identity of God guarantee the identity and selfhood of the 
self, then one regains one’s identity in an analogical relation to God.  
 Deleuze has shown how Kant’s discovery of time as the inner sense effectively 
fractures the I. By contrast to Descartes’ method, which expels time and establishes space 
as an absolute background upon which selves as accidents play out their dramas, “and 
entrusting time to the operation of continuous creation carried out by God,” the Kantian 
fracture in the I signifies the death of God. There is a reciprocal relation between the 
identity of the I and the unity or identity of God (paralleling the reciprocal relation of the 
debtor and the creditor). As such, “the supposed identity of the I has no other guarantee 
than the unity of God himself.”199  
                                                





God survives as long as the I enjoys a subsistence, a simplicity and an identity 
which express the entirety of its resemblance to the divine. Conversely, the death 
of God does not leave the identity of the I intact, but installs and interiorizes 
within it an essential dissimilarity, a ‘demarcation’ in place of the mark or seal of 
God.200 
 
Yet already in Kant, “God and the I both underwent a practical resurrection … the 
fracture is quickly filled by a new form of identity,” an active and synthetic identity that 
disavows the conditions of its own constitution—the modern, autonomous individual 
quite rightly attributed to Kant.201 
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201 In practice, this resurrection appears perfectly efficacious. We see its realization in 
liberal democracy and live the formal freedom it grants us. Yet, as Deleuze points out, the 
resurrection of God and the self depends on a more profound, transcendental flux of 
being and subjectivity. Deleuze speaks of an ‘aborted Cogito’ and a ‘dissolved self,’ 
which underly and render possible the transcendental illusion of a transcendent God and a 
unified, autonomous self. It is again a question of temporality—and, decisively, of ‘larval 
subjects,’ as Agamben has pointed out. Deleuze demonstrates in Difference and 
Repetition that subject as typically understood by Western thought is in fact a global 
integration of an infinite multiplicity of local egos or larval subjects. By contrast, the 
Western philosophical, theological and political orthodoxy of modernity has tended to 
view the subject in terms of a unity or identity that precedes the accidents which befall 
it—whether it be the monadic, self-interested individual of neoclassical economics, or the 
transcendental ego of phenomenology. In short, a soul which is ‘trapped’ by a body and 
undergoes the passions and affections of life in the world. Nothing could be further from 
Deleuze’s theory of the subject, which insists on the production of subjects by virtue of a 
passive synthesis, a ‘contemplation’ in which substance modifies itself, and which 
constitutes the living present of the self. Crucially, this living present is not said of human 
beings as such, but of the “thousands of little witnesses which contemplate within us,” 
which are so many modifications, perceptions, contractions, and satisfactions of 
substance—the little partial or larval egos that knit together to form the ‘subjects’ we take 
ourselves for. (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 75). “The self does not undergo 
modifications, it is itself a modification,” and the human being is the always incomplete, 
aborted, global synthesis of these modification—a dissolved self, an aborted Cogito. A 
laceration or a burn are modifications just as much as a novel thought is a modification, 
and the same must be said of a scar, a muscle fiber, a spoken word: “Underneath the self 




 The preceding analyses have been an attempt to show that the analogia entis is 
grounded in the asymmetry of the creditor-debtor relation, but that, decisively, the true 
conditions for the emergence of an analogical relation to God are in fact grounded in 
immanence, in the perversity of the formula Deus sive Moneta. Analogy parasitizes 
immanence, and if everything appears analogical it is precisely because analogy requires 
a disavowal of immanence and a consequent narration or memory-making of the 
constitution of the self. To put it another way, the manner in which—and the grammar by 
which—we name God has the character of a self-affection: to the speculative death of 
God corresponds the (material) incarnation of money in the human being. It is therefore 
our task to investigate the manner in which—and the grammar by which—the (material) 
resurrection of God corresponds to the speculative absolution of the human being become 
                                                                                                                                            
and the active subject. We speak of our ‘self’ only in virtue of these thousands of little 
witnesses which contemplate within us: it is always a third party who says ‘me.’ These 
contemplative souls must be assigned even to the rat in the labyrinth and to each muscle 
of the rat” (Ibid., 75). Yet the question remains: how is the integration of these larval 
subjects achieved—how is an identity produced from these disparate and heterogenous 
selves? In a word: memory. The theory of memory deployed in Difference and Repetition 
is complex and cannot be fully recounted here, but let it suffice to note that upon the 
passive synthesis of the living present, in which the larval subjects that contemplate 
within us froth and form, is founded a passive synthesis of memory (what Deleuze, 
following Bergson, terms the ‘pure past’—of which the lived present is an extreme 
contraction) and an active synthesis of memory in which one plunges into this past in 
reminiscence (Proust’s theory of involuntary memory), in search of one’s identity, or a 
resemblance to oneself which can count as an identity. That the global process of 
subjectification should be characterized by an activity of memory should not surprise us: 
human beings as globally integrated subjects live in the past inasmuch as we dedicate 
ourselves to the maintenance of the memory of a promise, and we do not properly live in 
the future, since we are always departing from one present (which we do not properly 
experience) for a past present, and it is always the future (the spectral power of credit) 





money. The Christian drama of salvation, taken at face value, is a story of redemption. 
Yet the question to be raised suggests a different story or memory: who, precisely, is the 
subject of this story of redemption? In a sense, everything above has been leading toward 
this question, which henceforth assumes the character of a theodicy, an apology for God 
or money. It will become clear below that the answer to this question is necessarily 
equivocal, as it has precisely to do with a seemingly innocuous grammatical feature. The 
double genitive harbored in the phrase ’subject of forgiveness’ signals precisely the 
ambiguity of money, and bears in itself an integral relation to the Christian “stroke of 
genius” identified by Nietzsche. 
 It is as though the indebted subject and the subject of forgiveness occupied two 
seemingly separate planes of immanence. On the face of it, one does not pass from being 
indebted to innocence, or to the ‘state’ of being forgiven, without leaving a plane behind 
in favor of a new plane (one passes from the ‘prehistoric’ plane to the Christian plane, 
and is transformed in the process). Yet we have seen how the plane of immanence (upon 
which is erected the whole hierarchy of analogical being) is interleaved, and that various 
regimes or dispositifs can obtain in a single ‘subject.’ No doubt, the passage from a 
disciplinary society to a biopolitical society marks a fundamental transformation of the 
subject and the social relations which constitute the subject. Nonetheless, it remains the 
case that one is always in the middle, caught in this apparatus or that apparatus, as if in 




always between two folds,202 and for there to be folds between the fold between two 
folds.203  
 There is indeed a fundamental distinction between the system of cruelty which 
birthed the human subject as a rational, promising animal, and the apparatus of the 
infinite debt into which human beings have been plunged since the advent of 
Christianity—and one should insist on this distinction. I only wish to point out that there 
is an apparatus which has the precise function of weaving these two heterogeneous 
apparatuses together, guaranteeing the passage from one to another, ensuring the 
oscillation and amplification of guilt and innocence: the apparatus of forgiveness. This 
latter apparatus is more or less coterminous with the apparatus of the infinite debt, but in 
fact it grounds the credit-debt relation. The creditor was characterized by the pleasure 
derived from the suffering of the debtor, but with the Christian intervention (where the 
creditor forgives the debtor) this pleasure takes on the form of a power of judgment and a 
scene of forgiveness. Nietzsche notes that the spectacle of suffering required spectators—
in the form of gods or deities who look on as the human drama of credit and debt, 
                                                
202 Deleuze, The Fold, 13. “It is because the Fold is always between two folds, and 
because the between-two-folds seems to move about everywhere: Is it between inorganic 
bodies and organisms, between organisms and animal souls, between animal souls and 
reasonable souls, between bodies and souls in general?” 
 
203 Spinoza’s brilliance was to have demonstrated that one can speak of an actual infinity, 
by virtue of the infinite divisibility of infinite substance, opposed to the bad infinity 
identified by Hegel. The pure immanence of Spinozan substance gives rise, no doubt, to 
illusions of transcendence, and is always in danger of being parasitized by logics of 
analogy. As will become clear below, the whole aim of a philosophy and politics of 





exchange and circulation, takes place. The debt owed to one’s human creditor was 
gradually displaced onto these gods, such that the earthly creditor assumed the form of a 
deity. A doctrine of judgment (coterminous with the doctrine of the infinite debt, hence 
linked inextricably to the still nascent apparatus of forgiveness) begins, historically, to 
displace and inspire the system of cruelty, and the affective mnemotechnics gives way to 
a system or complex of lots, distributed by the gods.  
 “At bottom,” writes Deleuze, “a doctrine of judgment presumes that the gods give 
lots to men, and that men, depending on their lots, are fit for some particular form, for 
some particular organic end.”204 A hierarchy is established according to the moral 
judgment of the value of human beings. The debt is a lot, a cruel fate or a destiny, and the 
human subject which had so carefully constructed its identity through its memory-making 
becomes distributed as a variable or a fragment of chance in a cosmic game of value and 
pleasure—a profound desubjectification. The turning point, as I have pointed out, arrives 
with Christianity: 
There are no longer any lots, for it is our judgments that make up our only lot; and 
there is no longer any form, for it is the judgment of God that constitutes the 
infinite form. At the limit, dividing oneself into lots and punishing oneself 
become the characteristics of the new judgment or modern tragedy. Nothing is left 
but judgment, and every judgment bear on another judgment. […] We are no 
longer debtors of the gods through forms or ends, but have become in our entire 
being the infinite debtors of a single God. The doctrine of judgment has reversed 
and replaced the system of affects.205  
                                                
204 Gilles Deleuze, “To Have Done With Judgment,” Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. 
Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1997), 128. 
 






 Yet this reversal and replacement is more properly described as an inversion and 
subsumption. In fact, one could replace every instance of the word ‘judgment’ in the 
citation above with the word ‘forgiveness.’ Not every judgment is a forgiveness, but 
every forgiveness is a judgment that exceeds the juridical apparatus of cruelty. The very 
personal relation of the creditor-debtor relation that burned a memory into the human 
gives way to the impersonal, sovereign, and unconditional forgiveness of the Christian 
logic of salvation. Henceforth, the Christian subject is innocent, which is to say, 
inasmuch as the debt can no longer be paid—not even in principle—infinitely indebted. 
Moreover, the subject regains the identity it had lost in its alienation and self-
estrangement as a mere bundle of debts and securities; the money-form is no longer 
expressed in flesh and blood (a la Marx), but in the autonomy, identity, and innocence of 
the modern capitalist subject, specifically in the commodity-form which retroactively 
determines the human social relations which have given rise to it. The affective system of 
cruelty has not disappeared; it has rather been tamed and domesticated in keeping with 
the domestication of the human being. One no longer lops off the hand of a debtor or 
takes a ‘pound of flesh.’ One rather interiorizes what was once exterior, or as Deleuze 
and Guattari put it: “The debt must not only become an infinite debt, it will have to be 
internalized and spiritualized as an infinite debt (Christianity and what follows).”206 The 
entire neoliberal grammar of human capital, entrepreneurship of the self, and so on, has 
its ground in this new constitution of the subject. Good people spending good money in a 
                                                





good society. Before all else the market requires, or is, a morality—a psycho-social 
cartography whose paramount aim is its own justification or theodicy.  
 It will be objected that, if the system of cruelty, the whole prehistoric 
mnemotechnics, was such a disastrous beginning for humanity, then why not affirm the 
Christian-capitalist regime as an advance? One wonders why this turn of events—or 
rather, this tremendous event—should be coded negatively. Why should one consider the 
constitution of a robust and well-grounded subject deleterious? In other words, why a 
critique of forgiveness?  
 
 5.2 Forgiveness is by no means a simple concept. It is not even, strictly speaking, a 
concept, but rather an act and a scene. Forgiveness is a drama, in which the human being 
qua debtor is assigned a central role. The human being is the content or the material of 
this drama; God or money is its infinite form.207 Recall Derrida’s provocation: 
“forgiveness is a history of God.” This history is the history of a “covenant between God 
and God” which passes through body of human debtor as mediator. In another text on the 
question of forgiveness, Derrida suggest that the tradition or history of forgiveness is 
fundamentally Abrahamic (indeed, the text in which Derrida speaks of a covenant 
between God and God concerns the Noahic deluge; and nota bene the term ‘Abrahamic’ 
                                                
207 It is the logic and the grammar of forgiveness that is under scrutiny here. No doubt, a 
wholly different investigation could be undertaken with regards to the vicissitudes of 
various scenes (in the plural) of interpersonal forgiveness, and each case would have to 
be decided in a singular fashion. In any case, this essay is concerned with the singular 
scene of a general forgiveness, in which the human being qua debtor is the material of 





refers, for Derrida, to the three historical monotheisms: Judaism, Islam, and Christianity). 
“It is important,” writes Derrida,  
to analyze at its base [that is, at the base of this Abrahamic inheritance] the 
tension at the heart of the heritage between, on the one side, the idea which is also 
a demand for the unconditional, gracious, infinite, aneconomic forgiveness 
granted to the guilty as guilty, without counterpart, even to those who do not 
repent or ask forgiveness, and on the other side, as a great number of texts testify 
through many semantic refinements and difficulties, a conditional forgiveness 
proportionate to the recognition of the fault, to repentance, to the transformation 
of the sinner who then explicitly asks forgiveness.208 
 
 Derrida is concerned with the apparently problematic reading of forgiveness put 
forward by Vladimir Jankelevitch, according to which, on the one hand, forgiveness must 
be unconditional, mad, pure grace, and, on the other hand, the demand that Jankelevitch 
makes in the follow-up to his philosophical treatise on forgiveness which had emphasized 
the necessarily unconditional character of forgiveness, for a repentance on the part of the 
guilty.209 The scenario in which these two seemingly contradictory theories of 
                                                
208 Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, trans. Mark Dooley and 
Michael Hughes (New York: Routledge, 2001), 34-35. 
 
209 The paradox of the Jewish philosopher Jankélévitch’s theories of forgiveness lies 
principally in the apparent shift from his first philosophical volume on the subject, simply 
titled Forgiveness (published in 1967 as Le pardon) and the volume that followed it only 
a few years later (L’Imprescriptible, a section of which was translated into English as 
“Should We Pardon Them?”). In the former book, Jankélévitch mounts a staggeringly 
erudite and labyrinthine critique of forgiveness, resulting in a theory of a mad, 
unconditional forgiveness that holds the past injury in memory while nevertheless 
abolishing it in a quasi-involuntary act of pure grace. The final account of forgiveness, 
interestingly, resembles a Christian concept of forgiveness more than a Jewish one, as 
though Jankélévitch had ceded too much to Christianity in Le Pardon. In the latter 
volume, specifically in the section published in English, there is a remarkable shift—I 
would argue it is a shift towards a Jewish conception—towards a refusal of forgiveness  
altogether. The context surrounding the writing of “Should We Pardon Them?” is crucial: 




forgiveness emerge is different than the one that concerns us, though we can perhaps 
glean from Derrida’s interrogation an important structural truth, at the risk of challenging 
Derrida’s conclusions. Derrida insists that the unconditional and conditional characters of 
forgiveness must always be opposed, that forgiveness is never a matter of judgment but is 
always located in a zone of exception that exceeds and therefore grounds the juridical. 
One can see the same logic at work in Derrida’s commentary on Mauss: the gift as that 
which is radically aneconomic, and that upon which the economic as such depends for its 
principle of circulation. The gift is understood as the “first mover of the circle” of 
exchange, yet is immediately annulled qua gift as soon as it enters into this circle.210  
 There is a whole ontology at work here, and it accords with the overall trajectory of 
Derrida’s corpus as a critique of the metaphysics of presence. The conditions of the 
                                                                                                                                            
able to pardon the war criminals of National Socialism—their crimes are properly 
imprescriptible, hence inexpiable. Moreover, as Jankélévitch insists, the criminals had 
not asked for forgiveness, and in the absence of repentance forgiveness proper was 
properly impossible, despite the mad grace that he had espoused only a few years before. 
My own inquiry into forgiveness differs in kind from Jankélévitch’s—and, for that 
matter, from Derrida’s—but one can still glean a number of important structures and 
logics from their analyses. For the purposes of the present inquiry, I wish to call attention 
to the existence of real limits to forgiveness—even, and especially, unconditional 
forgiveness. And without being able to wade into the debate in the present essay, I essay 
that if there is a contradiction in Jankélévitch’s shift from one idea of forgiveness to 
another, the contradiction is less to do with his logic and more to do with the world to 
which his logic is addressed. See Vladimir Jankélévitch, Forgiveness, trans. Andrew 
Kelley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013). And see Vladimir Jankélévitch, 
“Should We Pardon Them?,” trans. Ann Hobart, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Spring, 
1996), pp. 552-572. 
 





possibility of the gift are also the conditions of its impossibility.211 The gift must not be 
recognized as gift, rather it must be forgotten in advance, or rather exist only as an 
absolute secret, as not-existing, yet as that which gives existence to existing. “Forgetting 
and gift would therefore be each in the condition of the other,” according to the 
Heideggerian theme of the oblivion or forgetting of Being which would be the condition 
of Being and the truth of Being.212 The familiar Derridean logic of the trace here shines 
forth: the gift would only be thinkable in terms of its absence or non-occurrence, since 
the appearance or presence of the gift immediately annuls the gift and precipitates the 
cycle of exchange, of gift-counter-gift described by Mauss. Derrida’s critique of Mauss 
amounts to the assertion that, in spite of the title of his work and its general theme, Mauss 
“speaks of everything but the gift,” dealing rather with “economy, exchange, contract,” 
missing entirely the zone of exception which for Derrida characterizes the time of the 
gift, and installs the gift beyond Being, as that which gives Being to beings.213 We 
witness the same opposition between unconditionality and conditionality that was put 
forward in the text on forgiveness in the Derridean logic of the gift.  
 There is nonetheless an apparent difference: whereas the condition of the gift is a 
certain forgetting or forgetfulness, the condition of forgiveness is a memory. The 
misdeed, the debt, or the broken promise must be remembered in order to be forgotten 
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and forgiven. And it is here where we can see clearly where the logics of the gift and 
forgiveness, in fact, coincide: if forgiveness qua forgiveness must necessarily be 
unconditional, mad, hyperbolic and without need of repentance on the part of the guilty 
subject, then forgiveness is given, precisely, as gift. Derrida never tires of pointing out 
that our juridical and economic life is conditioned by the globalization of Christianity, 
and without this globalatinization the very idea of “pure and unconditional forgiveness” 
would, as Derrida admits, “not have the least meaning.”214 The fact is that the two poles 
of forgiveness are absolutely heterogeneous, but nevertheless remain indissociable. The 
transcendental logic of forgiveness, like that of the gift, requires that forgiveness lose 
itself in coming to itself, or in coming upon the subject—yet one must always refer 
oneself to this unconditional nature of forgiveness.  
 What becomes clear is that the Christian logic of unconditional forgiveness has its 
conditions. It remains unconditional ideally, but is everywhere conditioned by the 
necessity of a guilty or indebted subject. The indebted subject is the material of 
forgiveness. The transcendental condition of forgiveness is neither an ideal form nor a 
law of nature, but the maimed body of the debtor, the memory of the future. Here again 
one perceives the brilliance of Nietzsche’s thesis: the forgiveness that is effected in 
Christianity is not asked for; repentance only occurs retroactively (I am forgiven 
unconditionally, but I must admit my guilt, assume my status as infinitely indebted, in 
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order to obtain this forgiveness and the innocence it promises). As in the case of the gift, 
one must respond to forgiveness by becoming worthy of forgiveness, but only after the 
fact. Forgiveness is not a trap, nor a mere bait-and-switch: it is the power inherent in 
sovereignty itself, and as we will see, functions always in the service of maintaining 
sovereignty. What we witness in Christianity is the weaponization of forgiveness. 
 What is the nature of this weaponization? Derrida refers to the power to forgive as 
the “right of grace.” This right of grace is always the prerogative of the sovereign, who, 
as absolute monarch, can “by divine right, pardon a criminal; that is to say, exercise in 
the name of the State a forgiveness that transcends and neutralizes the law. Right [droit] 
beyond the law [droit].”215 This transcendence of the law takes the form of an exception, 
according to the well-known formulation of Carl Schmitt: “Sovereign is he who decides 
the exception.”216 Derrida gives the following description of the structure of the 
exception: 
What counts in this absolute exception of the right of grace is that the exception 
from the law, the exception to the law, is situated at the summit or at the 
foundation of the jurido-political. […] As is always the case, the transcendental 
principle of a system doesn’t belong to the system. It is foreign to it as an 
exception.217 
 
 Yet there is reason to suspect that this formulation remains inadequate. One can, in 
fact, already see in the logics of the gift and forgiveness a slippage in Derrida’s analysis 
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toward a certain analogical conception of Being. This description of the transcendental is 
another red flag.218 As Agamben has tirelessly endeavored to demonstrate, the zone of 
exception is always a zone of indiscernibility.219 And while the structure of the exception 
does indeed testify to a certain foreignness or not-belonging to the system, this ex-static 
character of the exception becomes increasingly indiscernible from the interior of the 
system: the inside and the outside merge into a zone of absolute indiscernibility, and the 
exception becomes the rule. Benjamin had already pointed this out in his Theses on the 
Philosophy of History: “The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of 
emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule.”220 If the power to forgive 
is the most exceptional of exceptions, the power most befitting an absolute sovereignty, 
and if this exception has everywhere become the rule, then forgiveness is the most 
                                                
218 The transcendental is not the transcendent. On the contrary, the latter is produced as 
an illusion by the former. Derrida’s description of the transcendental is problematic not 
because the description does not resemble the structure or topology of the exception that 
in turn structures the world in which we live, but precisely because the world in which we 
live is always a product of immanence. The exception is a transcendental structure 
inasmuch as it is the structure of the world and the subjects that populate the world, but it 
is not transcendental in itself, since it must always refer itself back to its ground: 
immanence, the literal equality of being. 
 
219 See, for instance, Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 
trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), esp. 15-70. The 
first ‘part’ of Homo Sacer addresses the structure and the logic of the exception in some 
detail. Note also that, according to Agamben, the law presupposed the non-juridical in the 
same way that language presupposes the non-linguistic. In the case of the law: what is 
presupposed is the infinite debt; in the case of language, the cruelty of mnemotechnics 
(20). And see Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
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general, most universal structure of political and social life. The law itself is subject to, 
and constituted by, this rule of forgiveness: the rule (of law) is forgiveness, or as Deleuze 
and Guattari put it:  
Even the law, which we assume functions to protect us against tyranny and 
despotism, has its origin in the form of the creditor-debtor contract: before it 
becomes a feigned guarantee against despotism, the law is the invention of the 
despot himself: it is the juridical form assumed by the infinite debt.221 
 
That is to say, paraphrasing Deleuze and Guattari: Christianity has its metaphysics—its 
name is forgiveness.222 
 Hence, one can say that the Derridean slippage toward analogy identified above can 
perhaps be boiled down to this: the logics of the gift and forgiveness cede too much to an 
emanative ontology and transitive causality, where the transcendental is itself conditioned 
by criteria of transcendence—the Good beyond Being, the hierarchy of analogy that 
results from its giving Being to beings, and the logic of transcendence that characterizes 
the structure of sovereignty. Daniel W. Smith observes that for Derrida, there is a formal 
structure of transcendence immanent within metaphysics, though this structure can never 
be made present as such. The structure of transcendence rather “functions as the 
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condition (the ‘quasi-transcendental condition) of metaphysics itself.”223 The concepts of 
différance, the trace, and the supplement all refer to this transcendence, and therefore to a 
beyond of Being, the quintessential analogical term. Hence, the gift can only be given as 
not given (that is, the gift cannot be or become a datum, a perception or an experience), 
and must remain a pure transcendence vis-a-vis that which receives. Likewise, 
forgiveness can only forgive the unforgivable. Derrida in fact draws this insight from 
Hegel (perhaps the thinker of the State par excellence), who, according to Derrida, insists 
that  
nothing is impardonable but the crime against that which gives the power to 
forgive—the spirit according to Hegel, and what he calls ‘the Spirit of 
Christianity’—but it is precisely this unforgivable, and this unforgivable alone 
which the sovereign would still have the right to forgive.224 
 
 In other words, it is not enough to refuse the transcendence of the sovereign, or to 
commit the ‘crime’ against the power to forgive, because the sovereign is precisely that 
which forgives this unforgivable crime in order to maintain the coherence and control of 
the State. Worse than an enclosure or a prison, one is always already forgiven for the 
unforgivable, with no hope of escape from the infinite debt.   
 Perhaps this is the sense of Derrida’s invocation of the covenant between God and 
God: not that there is God on the one hand and the human being on the other hand, 
according to a relation of resemblance and analogy; rather that God and the human being 
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mutually condition one another according to the immanent criteria of the thesis of the 
univocity of being. It is not enough to espouse a vulgar Feuerbachianism, according to 
which God is merely the self-consciousness of humanity writ large, since this is merely 
the inverse of the story peddled by the partisans of the analogia entis (“How strange that 
God so resembles a human being,” the smug secularists intone). Even Marx— who is if 
nothing else a Feuerbachian—attenuates Feuerbach’s theses, insisting on the fact that 
human beings have an inverted consciousness of the world because the world itself is 
inverted.225 The human being as such is a crystallization of God or money, a congealed 
scar tissue, a fold of the power of forgiveness. A critique of forgiveness is therefore an 
immanent critique. Once again, the Spinozist question rises to the surface: how is it 
possible that we can come to the point at which we desire our own repression? 
 
 5.3 “Capitalism,” writes Benjamin in his famous fragment, “has developed as a 
parasite of Christianity in the West … until it reached the point where Christianity’s 
history is essentially that of its parasite—that is to say, of capitalism.”226 This claim is 
decisive for several reasons. First, Benjamin identifies a crucial feature of the religion of 
capital: it is “the first instance of a cult that creates guilt, not atonement.”227 The logic of 
this guilt without atonement seems—on the face of it—to contradict my own theses about 
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the apparatus of forgiveness. However, Benjamin himself complicates his claim and 
discovers in capitalism-Christianity a mechanism of guilt and atonement that, as we will 
see below, rather seem to confirm the foregoing analysis. Second, it allows us to 
displace—however minutely—the theses of Weber which are limited to conceiving 
capitalism as a social formation conditioned by Christianity.228 On the contrary, at the 
theoretical or conceptual register, Christianity is capitalism; at the material or social 
register, capitalism is the praxis of Christianity. The third decisive feature of Benjamin’s 
fragment in a sense unites the two preceding it: rather than accepting or confirming the 
usual story about the process of secularization, Benjamin’s fragment makes 
secularization a problem for thought. What we discover when we peel back the veneer of 
secularization (with its ideals of formal equality and formal freedom, the panoply of 
Enlightenment illusions of progress and historical development) is nothing other than a 
theodicy of money.  
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by exchange, arises from a prior Christian logic of the infinite debt, which itself was 
brought to bear upon the system of cruelty which constitutes the social milieu of the 
credit-debt relation. Christianity makes exchange possible; it is the social condition of 
possibility of the emergence of capitalist mode of production. See Michael Löwy, 






 Let us begin with the first of these decisive moments in Benjamin, as it will 
illuminate the others. Apropos of the religion of capital’s excess of guilt (or debt, 
according to the “demonic ambiguity” of the word Schuld) and its lack of atonement, 
expiation or forgiveness, Benjamin describes a critical threshold reached by capitalism, in 
which God—rather than remaining aloof as in the quasi-mythology of Deism, is absorbed 
into the system as such, incorporated into human existence. I quote Benjamin at length: 
Capitalism is probably the first instance of a cult that creates guilt, not atonement. 
In this respect, this religious system is caught up in the headlong rush of a larger 
movement.229 A vast sense of guilt that is unable to find relief seizes on the cult, 
not to atone for this guilt but to make it universal, to hammer it into the conscious 
mind, so as once for all to include God in the system of guilt and thereby awaken 
in Him an interest in the process of atonement. … The nature of the religious 
movement which is capitalism entails endurance right to the end, to the point 
where God, too, finally takes on the entire burden of guilt, to the point where the 
universe has been taken over by that despair which is actually its secret hope.230  
 
That this is a description of the internal logic of Christianity is evident in at least two 
instances, both pertaining to guilt: on the one hand there is the universal sense of guilt 
without relief, on the other hand the God who takes on the burden of this guilt. With 
respect to the argument at hand, the passage that follows immediately after the one 
quoted just now is all the more decisive: 
Capitalism is entirely without precedent, in that it is a religion which offers not 
the reform of existence  but its complete destruction. It is the expansion of 
despair, until despair becomes a religious state of the world in the hope that this 
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will lead to salvation. God’s transcendence is at an end. But he is not dead; he has 
been incorporated into human existence.231 
 
 The final two sentences of this remarkable passage require clarification: God’s 
transcendence is indeed at an end, inasmuch as God has become (or has always been) the 
immanent field of money understood as the complex of flows of matter-energy which are 
transmuted into the social relations of credit and debt. But a new transcendence arises in 
the wake of this transformation: God is not dead, but has been transformed into money—
money which incarnates itself in the body of the debtor, and the subject of forgiveness 
who bears her innocence like a terrible weight. This transcendence—the analogical 
production of credit and debt—is not the classical transcendence of an eternal supreme 
being, but that of an immanent Good, defined only as increase and development. It is 
transcendence as immanent limit: “The real barrier of capitalist production is capital 
itself.”232 The Good beyond being finds itself in the world, passes from hand to hand, 
circulates in markets, incarnated in the human being who promises. Not a Good become 
Goodness, but a Good become goods.  
 It is important to note the divergence of this genealogy of money from the usual 
narrative of secularization. If it was once possible to see secularization as an inevitable 
crawl out of the so-called primitive age of religion toward an enlightened and democratic 
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age of knowledge and emancipation (typified by Kant’s ‘Sapere aude!’)233, the 
experience of the 20th century, characterized by imperialist war, neocolonialism and 
capitalist expansion—not to mention the resurgence in the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries of religious extremism and the explosion of ‘religiosity’ in the global south, the 
‘return of religion’ that has so fascinated thinkers in almost every discipline—has called 
into question the very framework of the European Enlightenment. Gil Anidjar, along with 
Talal Asad and Tomoko Masuzawa, among others—have decisively and rigorously 
demonstrated that secularization (indeed, the very notion of the secular itself) is in fact a 
Christian project of globalization. The very distinction between the secular and the 
religious (the former which is supposed to have come to, or will come to, replace the 
latter) is a Christian invention. “Like that unmarked race,” writes Anidjar,  
which, in the related discourse of racism, became invisible or ‘white,’ Christianity 
invented the distinction between religious and secular, and thus it made religion. 
It made religion the problem—rather than itself. And it made it into an object of 
criticism that needed to be no less than transcended.234 
 
 In a recent essay, Alberto Toscano points out that Marx himself was on the track of 
this counter-genealogy of Christianity. It is possible, in fact, “to summarize Marx’s 
stance [in the 1840s] as a critique of the critique of religion.”235 Marx’s frequent assaults 
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and potent invectives against religion notwithstanding, Toscano clearly demonstrates that 
Marx, far from being the progenitor of what passes for critique of religion today (the 
phenomenon of the so-called New Atheists and their ilk), was in fact engaged in an 
altogether different enterprise. “When Marx writes of religion as a theory of the world, he 
is making a properly dialectical point: religion provides an inverted picture of the world 
because the world itself is inverted.”236 No doubt, human beings make or create religion, 
but everything hinges on the nature of this ‘make’ or ‘create.’ In fact, the whole problem 
is badly framed if one insists on speaking of religion in general. One must rather focus on 
the one religion that made religion by dividing itself into itself, producing on the one 
hand the lengthy list of ‘world religions’ (in which Christianity is ‘included’), and on the 
other hand the liberal democratic order of secularism. Hence, if one wishes to affirm the 
speculative identity of Christianity and secularism (though Anidjar would no doubt resist 
the word ‘speculative’), there still remains the question of whether or not secularism has 
a religious content, or whether it lives off of its ‘opposition’ to religion alone.  
 Toscano’s (which is to say Marx’s) answer appears unequivocal: capitalism is the 
religious form of secularism. And, moreover, Christianity is itself, in Marx’s own 
rendering, the special religion of capital: 
The development of capitalist production creates an average level of bourgeois 
society and therefore an average level of temperament and disposition amongst 
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the most varied peoples. It is as truly cosmopolitan as Christianity. This is why 
Christianity is likewise the special religion of capital. In both it is only men who 
count. One man in the abstract is worth just as much or as little as the next man. 
In the one case, all depends on whether or not he has faith, in the other, on 
whether or not has had credit.237 
 
The phrase ‘critique of the critique of religion’ should be read at this register: the 
predominant form of the critique of religion (in Marx’s time and in our own) is an 
essentially Christian critique, a Christian discourse, doomed to failure. In Toscano’s 
paraphrase of Marx, “in as much as religion is both a hypostasis of, and manner of coping 
with, not just natural forces but social ones … Christianity is in this sense a theory (or 
logic) of capitalism.”238 Conversely, capitalism is the praxis of post-Enlightenment 
Christianity.  
 Hence, the infamous passage concerning religion as the ‘opiate of the masses’ has 
to be read strictly in terms of the Marxist method of addressing the material conditions of 
social and ideal forms. It is not simply a matter of criticizing the false-consciousness of 
religious persons, but of determining and abolishing the conditions which constitute 
false-consciousness. Marx’s famous passage, so often misinterpreted by the partisans of 
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militant secularism, makes clear that the germ of Marx’s shift to a critique of Christianity 
was already underway in 1844:  
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for 
their real happiness. To call them on them to give up their illusions about their 
condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The 
criticism of religion is therefore in embryo the criticism of that vale of tears of 
which religion is the halo.239  
 
As Toscano observes,  
We might say that the early conviction whereby the struggle against religion is the 
‘embryo’ of true revolutionary transformation, gives way, through Marx’s 
deepening study of the system of exploitation and his own political engagement, 
to a belief that such an anti-religious struggle might even serve as a detour or a 
cloak for real political struggle, that is to the idea that the aims of atheism and 
Enlightenment cannot be accomplished through a bald affirmation of Godlessness 
and Reason as matters of consciousness or mere pedagogy.240 
 
It is not enough to simply critique religion as if religion in general could become an 
object of political critique. On the contrary, one must critique that which makes religion, 
that which makes religion “the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless 
world and the soul of soulless conditions.”241 One must critique Christianity.  
 The true secularization (quite apart from what passes for secularization in our own 
day and age), according to Toscano’s reading of Marx, can only be achieved by 
abolishing the liberal secular state—which, though it has sloughed off its religious 
‘content,’ maintains a religious form “by embodying the alienated freedom of man in 
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something external to him.”242 According to Marx, the state maintains the formal 
structure of a religion: “Religion is precisely that: the devious acknowledgement of man, 
through an intermediary. The state is the intermediary between man and man’s 
freedom.”243 And not just any religion: 
Indeed, the perfected Christian state is not the so-called Christian state, which 
recognizes Christianity as its foundation, as the state religion, and which therefore 
excludes other religions. The perfected Christian state is rather the atheist state, 
the democratic state, the state which relegates religion to the level of the other 
elements of civil society. The state which is still theological, which still officially 
professes the Christian faith, which still does not dare to declare itself a state, has 
not yet succeeded in expressing in secular, human form, in its reality as a state, 
the human basis of which Christianity is the exaggerated expression.244 
 
The modern state is a Christian state.245 Christianity is the form of the liberal democratic 
state, just as it is the theory of capitalism. The two central targets of revolutionary theory 
and praxis, the capitalist mode of production and the state-form, have in common this 
Christian genealogy. One can neither overcome capitalism nor abolish the state without a 
rigorous critique of Christianity. 
 The logic of salvation in Christianity only achieved its realization or materialization 
with the advent of industrial capitalism. Though the parasitization of Christianity by 
capitalism forces any analysis of their symbiotic development into a zone of 
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indiscernibilty, one can untangle the strange topology of their relations with reference to 
a decisive statement made by Marx in Capital, according to which the form of value as 
exchange-value could not have emerged in a epoch prior to the development of the 
capitalist mode of production. The reason he gives for this constraint is instructive, and 
bears directly upon the critique of Christianity: the general and equivalent character of 
human labor (from which exchange-value emerges as the expression of the value 
produced by abstract labor) “could not be deciphered until the concept of human equality 
had already acquired the permanence of a fixed popular opinion.”246 That is to say, there 
must be a system or set of social and material conditions in which human beings can be 
rendered formally equal to one another. We have already encountered this system or set 
of conditions: the apparatus of forgiveness. 
 No doubt, in accordance with Marx, money emerges as the general equivalent from 
the process of exchange of commodities. Yet money is first and foremost the general 
credit, the faith or credo which human beings circulate and distribute amongst 
themselves, and it is only with the Christian innovation—wherein God, the ultimate 
creditor forgives the debt and renders it qualitatively and absolutely infinite—that all 
human beings stand equally before God. If in the prehistoric system of cruelty and 
mnemotechnics human beings stood in various analogical relations to their creditors, with 
varying degrees or quantities of debts, in Christianity there is but a single analogon—God 
or money—toward which each human being corresponds as an analogate. Human beings 
                                                





are equal among themselves inasmuch as they are forgiven, inasmuch as each personal 
existence is reduced to a generalized and infinite debt. In the Grundrisse, Marx gives the 
conditions for the emergence of the capitalist mode of production: formal equality and 
formal freedom, each of which masks, respectively, the substantial inequality and 
substantial unfreedom which are the true condition of human being in modernity.247 
Christianity is the theory or logic of capitalism precisely because it establishes the formal 
equality and the formal freedom of the human being. Thus, we can essay a rough schema 
of the logical progression of forgiveness. Forgiveness is latent or virtual in the creditor-
debtor relation (the creditor is distinguished by the power to forgive); forgiveness is made 
explicit and generalized in Christianity (the creditor forgives the debtor, precipitating the 
latter into the infinite debt); forgiveness is actualized in capitalism (the debtor is always 
already forgiven, and must labor to become worthy of their innocence). 
 We can therefore make sense of Benjamin’s claim that capitalism creates debt but 
not forgiveness. In perhaps the most decisive reversal of all, forgiveness creates debt. The 
subject of forgiveness is the capitalist subject par excellence, and is in fact the expression 
of the subjective ground of the neoliberal indebted subject, as analyzed by Lazzarato. 
Christianity ‘overcomes’ the creditor-debtor relation by way of the doctrine of salvation 
and the apparatus of forgiveness—which together constitute the basis of the 
resubjectification of the debtor, in terms of formal equality and formal freedom. 
Christianity’s transformation into capitalism, God’s transformation into money: these 
                                                





mutations of the social-material field of human being and becoming have the effect, 
precisely, of displacing and obscuring the conditions of human bondage. It is religion—
irrationality, error, illusion, terrorism, or barbarism—that is the problem, rather than 
Christianity-capitalism, rather than God or money. The supposedly ongoing process of 
secularization, and the liberal democratic state to which it gives birth, is in fact the 
manner in which, and the method by which, God or money forgets and forgives itself—it 
is a theodicy of money.  
 
 5.4 Certain questions remain. I have laid out both a formal argument and historical 
argument for the genealogy of the apparatus of forgiveness, and in truth the most difficult 
task is to synthesize these two dimensions. They intertwine and merge with one another 
at one moment, then diverge and differentiate themselves at another. No doubt, more 
research is required to establish the specific historiographical conditions under which 
Christianity and capitalism came to assume their parasitic relation and their eventual 
identity. The problem of dating is one such difficulty. For example, Philip Goodchild has 
identified the founding of the Bank of England—the first properly central bank which 
subjected the crown to a war-debt and which increasingly became indistinguishable from 
the State—as a possible ‘date’ of the death of God (or God’s transformation into 
money).248 There are other aporias, each of them, in their recalcitrance, testifying to an 
irreducible paradox, to a genuine problem for thought. My own approach, despite its 
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obvious insufficiencies, has attempted to isolate the specific character of the genesis of 
money, which, as will have become clear by now, is rooted in the originary social relation 
between creditor and debtor, and the doctrine of the analogy of being which is both the 
ground of this relation and what is expressed in it.  
 There is, however, a final problem, to which I now turn: what is the general 
structure of this apparatus of forgiveness, prior to its deployment as the principle of 
equality and freedom in bourgeois, capitalist society? What is the sense of the claim 
made at the outset of this paper, that it is, in fact, not we who desire or undergo 
forgiveness, but God who forgives God in us? Let us return once more to the uncanny 
scene of forgiveness described by Derrida in “Literature in Secret.” 
In any case, before one can detect in it any particular status and value, before one 
has to believe in it or not, this inherited text offers this reading: forgiveness is a 
history of God. It is written and addressed to the name of God. Forgiveness comes 
to pass as a covenant between God and God through the human. It comes to pass 
through the body of man, through the flaw that crosses through man [à travers le 
travers de l’homme], through man’s evil or fault, which is nothing but his desire, 
and the place of the forgiveness of God, according to the genealogy, inheritance, 
and filiation of this double genitive. Saying that forgiveness is a history of God, 
an affair between God and God—and we humans are found from one end to the 
other of it—provides neither a reason for nor a means of dispensing with it. At 
least we have to realize that as soon as one says or hears ‘pardon’ … well, God is 
mixed up in it.249 
 
 For now I note simply that Derrida takes pains to point out that, in terms of the 
drama of forgiveness of God, what is at stake is desire. On the subsequent page he states 
explicitly: “As always, desire is what engenders fault. It is (the) failing itself. It therefore 
                                                





governs the logic of repentance and forgiveness.”250 Derrida is here concerned with a 
reading of the Noahic story in the Hebrew Scriptures, and the possibilities generated by 
the seemingly impossible scene of God forgiving God for, on the one hand, creating 
humans with evil in their hearts, and, on the other hand, the decision to destroy the earth 
by deluge. At the risk of introducing Christian elements into the logic that Derrida is 
attempting to draw out of this decidedly non-Christian story (note that, in contrast to the 
Christian approach, the very elements of the drama in themselves foreground the question 
of theodicy!), I simply want to attempt to articulate the decisive importance of this image 
of a covenant between God and God, and the body of the human being which serves as its 
stakes, site, and surplus. The subject of forgiveness—identified above as the capitalist 
subject—is also this God who needs or arranges for forgiveness.  
 Recall the ‘evaluating eye’ of Nietzsche’s second essay. We noted a certain sadistic 
dimension in the extraction of pleasure that characterizes the system of cruelty. Nietzsche 
claims that, by virtue of the punishment inflicted on the debtor, the creditor “participates 
in a right of the masters” and that the jouissance that accrues to the creditor as a surplus 
“will be the greater the lower the creditor stands in the social order.”251 The social 
hierarchy is simultaneously assumed and expressed in this scene of cruelty: the creditor is 
to the debtor as a god is to the sinner, yet the creditor himself is a debtor to another 
creditor, hence a sinner to yet another god. This is why Deleuze describes the system of 
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cruelty as a social network of personal and interpersonal relation of punishment. It is true 
that in sadism proper there is no such ‘network,’ and the sadist-libertine must presuppose 
her mastery in order to exercise it. Yet it remains the case that in Nietzsche’s vision of the 
system of cruelty, an incipient analogy of being reigns over the actions and passions of 
the creditors and the debtors. The human being was not simply made calculable and 
rational: such an operation could not be carried through without crucial reference to a 
proportion, a mean, in short, an analogical conception of the Good. The system of 
cruelty was not a rudderless festival of pain and punishment, but a strategy of instituting 
and effectuating a political economy of the promise, with a free will and a conscience as 
its immediate elements. 
 The creditor himself was the ‘first’ spectator of the spectacle of suffering. Yet once 
human beings had achieved, so to speak, their soul and their conscience, and having 
turned inward against themselves (the bad conscience), other spectators were required. 
Here Nietzsche invokes the gods: “Indeed, divine spectators were needed to do justice to 
the spectacle that thus began and the end of which is not yet in sight.” From now on, 
Nietzsche intones, “man is included among the most unexpected and exciting lucky 
throws in the dice game of Heraclitus’ ‘great child,’ be he called Zeus or chance.”252 Now 
it is the gods who are the sadists, tossing humanity like dice through the cosmos, reveling 
in each outcome of chance. Indeed, Nietzsche observes that this is what the rational, 
promise-making being truly can neither fathom nor tolerate: the senselessness of 
                                                





suffering.253 In the case of the “naive man of more ancient times,” there must at minimum 
be spectators who derive pleasure from suffering—or else suffering would collapse into 
meaninglessness. In this regard, one should insist that sadism is not merely the fact of 
taking pleasure in the pain of another, but is a structure of subjectivity that above all 
functions to bestow meaning on suffering and the world in which suffering occurs. 
Despite that fact that the meaning is meaning only for the sadist, it is enough that, for 
those undergoing the suffering, this meaning exists for someone.254  
 In the other case mentioned by Nietzsche, that of the Christian (“who has 
interpreted a whole mysterious machinery of salvation into suffering”),255 everything 
changes dramatically. Where the spectators were the transcendent gods, whose spectating 
was characterized by an indifference (the apathy of the sadist), now God becomes the 
sole spectator. And not only a spectator, but a participant: Christ is both spectator and 
spectacle. Christology is a theory of a fundamental masochism, and Christian ritual is its 
praxis.256 Deleuze has shown that sadism and masochism, far from being complementary, 
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or two sides of one ‘syndrome,’ are perfectly distinct from one another, each being 
subject to different logics and employing different means to obtain pleasure.257 Where 
sadism is characterized by a need for institutions (the contractual relation between 
creditor and debtor is oriented toward the codification and institution of the contract, the 
form of reason itself—law as the ‘juridical form of the infinite debt’), masochism 
                                                                                                                                            
is at stake), there is a significant development with the Christian scriptures and tradition. 
Blood comes to signify the substance shared by the community—the very being and 
identity of the community as such: Christianity constitutes itself as the community of 
blood. Decisively, at least for the political and social history of the West, the particular 
character of Christian blood comes to supersede and redistribute blood to all other 
‘faiths,’ all other ‘peoples,’ according to an order of resemblance. The manner in which 
one accesses Christian blood (e.g. The sanctifying blood of Christ) becomes 
indistinguishable from the Eucharist ritual. Exclusion from the Eucharist means exclusion 
from the community: “it was, on the one hand, a matter of relation of the body and blood 
of Christ to each other and to his person, and on the other hand, a question of how 
Christians gain access to the sanguis Christi that saves” (54). Christianity inaugurates a 
universal community of blood—in which everyone is formally equal and free—but the 
element quickly becomes differentiated and heterogeneous to itself: a difference between 
bloods. Hence, Anidjar credits, so to speak, Christianity with the invention of race, the 
state, and the nation—each of which constitutes itself in a relation to the blood of the 
people. With regards to the invention of race, the advent of the Spanish Statutes on the 
Purity of Blood in 1449 marks the moment when the blood of Christians comes to be 
identified as the ‘pure’ blood, and all other bloods considered polluted by degrees of 
dissimulation from Christian blood. Apropos of the Spanish statutes, Anidjar writes: 
“Among the historians themselves, the statutes constitute a divided point of origin, the 
historical and contentious beginning around which comes to be articulated what we have 
come to call ‘modern racism’” (61). One would have to think these semiotic and 
elemental hematologies through and through—but for now we should simply note that 
the Eucharist (perhaps the Christian ritual par excellence) has less to do with piety as it 
normally conceived, and more to do with access to God or money—to credit. That 
capitalist credit and the social relations of exchange have replaced the Eucharist as the 
central social and religious ritual in our time remains a speculation, but one would not be 
wrong to—at the very least—raise the question. The Christian question, that is. 
 





requires contracts and causes them to proliferate endlessly.258 It is true that sadism and 
masochism can and do overlap, but they do so just as apparatuses do—distinct yet 
indiscernible, as though implicated in one another without dissolving into one another.  
 The Christian innovation is to displace the sadism of the system of cruelty with an 
apparatus of forgiveness, wherein God undergoes the suffering of humanity and makes 
the human being an element of the contract rather than a party to it. For all of the apathy 
and indifference associated with sadism, it remains an intensely personal relationship, 
and could not be otherwise, since the cruelty inflicted by the sadist must be inflicted on a 
human being as human (an unwilling victim—a person with a will). By contrast, 
masochism, in spite of the requirement that another person participate in the contract or 
the alliance, is almost entirely impersonal, and in the end reduces the torturer to an 
instrument or mere element of the contract: the woman who inflicts pain on the masochist 
is not qualitatively differentiated from the whip in her hand, the furs that cover her body, 
or the mirror in which the tortured beholds his trials. In masochism, all of the bodies and 
objects are materials, props or furniture, of the scene of torture. Christianity is a 
masochism all the more extreme because it makes everything, the whole of existence, 
into the material of a torture according to the terms a single infinite contract and an 
infinite debt.  
 The fact that the Christian scene of forgiveness is a scene of torture is too quickly—
and too often—passed over. Here again the distinctions between sadism and masochism 
                                                





are decisive. God is not a sadist who places an unwilling victim on the cross. On the 
contrary, God places God on the cross—willingly—in an act of auto-crucifixion or self-
sacrifice. Per usual, Nietzsche has already noted the central contradiction of such a move, 
since the act of self-sacrifice is always implicated in an attempt at a reconstitution of the 
self. There is, writes Nietzsche, “one thing we know henceforth—I have no doubt of it—
and that is the nature of the delight that the selfless man, the self-denier, the self-
sacrificer feels from the first: this delight is tied to cruelty.”259 In other words, apropos of 
Christianity’s ‘stroke of genius,’ where God sacrifices God out of love for the debtor, 
Nietzsche’s question peals like a bell: can one credit that? Inasmuch as we are 
autonomous subjects of capitalism, endowed with a free will, a conscience, a soul, the 
answer is clear: verily, forever and ever, amen. 
 
 5.5 It is clear that the apparatus of forgiveness produces subjects as free and 
autonomous beings, equal amongst themselves in an analogical relation to God. What is 
more, we now have a sense of the process of desubjectification that, as in every 
apparatus, subtends the process of subjectification characteristic of the apparatus of 
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forgiveness. In short, the modern liberal subject is produced as the condition which 
allows the capitalist mode of production to emerge (formal freedom and formal equality), 
but in the same moment the subject of forgiveness is desubjectified, reduced to a 
purchasing-machine, or a conduit through which the fluxes and flows of capital circulate 
as securitized debts, bundled and sold, tossed back and forth between high-stakes traders 
and hedge-fund managers—like so many dice throws. The desubjectification effected by 
the apparatus of forgiveness renders its subjects as material for forgiveness, the elements 
of a scene of forgiveness which has a single subject; the status of the human being as an 
autonomous subject is retained as a purely formal condition for the expansion and 
accumulation of surplus—the self-valorization of God or money.  
 There is, in fact, only one subject of forgiveness: God or money. Derrida’s diction, 
in his description of the covenant between God and God, is exemplary. Not only does it 
alert us to the presence of a covenant or contract constitutive of the being of God, it 
makes the between of God and God a problem for thought. It is as though God were 
fractured from one end to the other, as if a broken promise—and everything, so to speak, 
takes place in this between. That this between should take the form of a scene, a veritable 
theater of the social, is due less to any ‘dramatic’ elements in it, and more to its 
masochistic character, the latter which is obsessed by a sort of directorial vision: in a 
masochistic fantasy (such as Christianity, or, for that matter, capitalism), what matters 
most is the mise en scene.  
 Masochism is primarily characterized not simply by taking pleasure in one’s own 




excitation.260 We gravely misunderstand pleasure by conferring on it the status of an 
unbound or unlimited excitation. Freud clearly defines pleasure as a diminution in 
excitation, a sort of binding or limiting of a given sensation.261 If desire is understood as 
the complex of heterogeneous flows of matter-energy, which (according to the Spinozan 
theory) invest living beings according to their capacity for affection, then masochism is a 
meticulous and complete staging of desire such that pleasure can be deferred and the 
excitation-desire can accumulate. It is as though God or money were a great body or 
plane upon which our sociality, our exchanges and our promises, play out autonomously. 
Here and there a subject crystallizes to bear a value or to break a promise, but it is always 
the tranquility and silence of the infinite surface of money which sees and speaks.  
 Deleuze notes that Masoch’s novels always “bear the stamp of decency,” according 
to a sort of bourgeois sensibility—“We never see the naked body of the woman torturer; 
it is always wrapped in furs.” Yet underneath the descriptions provided by Masoch of the 
scenes of torture, rosy or somber by turn, there rages the intensities of desire, always 
seeking out a determination by means of something determinable—a human being, a 
temporality. “The body of the victim remains in a strange state of indeterminacy except 
where it receives the blows.”262 In this regard, one can surmise that human beings are 
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erogenous zones263 of the body of God or money, yet also the whip and the chain that 
strike the body, and the sofa and mirror upon which the scene plays out, all of this at 
once—and for all. The masochist fantasy is the form of everyday experience in bourgeois 
society—titillating, yet adhering to certain standards or platitudes of conduct and 
contract. Moreover, and decisively, in the case of masochism, the subject is always the 
victim: subject = victim. In the masochistic fantasy,  
the masochistic hero appears to be educated and fashioned by the authoritarian 
woman whereas basically it is he who forms her, dresses her for the part and 
prompts the harsh words she addresses to him. It is the victim who speaks through 
the mouth of his torturer, without sparing himself.264 
 
It is as though the torturer, the ‘despotic woman’ of the masochist fantasy, were 
ventriloquized by the subject-victim of her affections—as though, at the limit, she were 
produced qua subject for the sole function of indemnifying herself, indicting herself.  
 One can grasp the direct link between masochism and Christian doctrine by 
examining the manner in which guilt is experienced by the masochist. It is not that the 
masochist is innocent. On the contrary the masochist “lives in the very depths of guilt; 
but far from feeling that he has sinned against the father, it is the father’s likeness in him 
that he experiences as a sin which must be atoned for.” The usual psychoanalytic 
explanation insists that the masochist experiences guilt in relation to the father; Deleuze’s 
innovation is to point out that it is rather “the father who is guilty in the son, not the son 
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in relation to the father.”265 In the latter case there is a relation of analogy: the son 
experiences the father as the Law, to which his crimes are addressed and from which he 
receives a punishment. Here atonement is a means of regaining the likeness of the Father, 
or what amounts to the same thing, of keeping the Law at a distance so as to maintain a 
relation of similitude to it. However, everything changes in the former case, in which it is 
the father who is guilty in the son. Here there is still analogy, but the analogical relation 
is now internal to the subject, and “guilt is turned completely upside down: it is both at its 
deepest and its most absurd. It is an integral part of the masochist’s triumph, and ensures 
his liberation.”266  
 Once again it is Kant who has effected the major displacement. Prior to Kant, the 
classical conception of the law was essentially analogical and Platonic, and took root in 
Christianity: one needs the law (or laws) only inasmuch as one does not know the Good. 
“If men knew what the Good was, or knew how to conform to it, they would not need 
laws: the law is only a representative of the Good in a world that the Good has more or 
less forsaken.”267 With the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant effects a general reversal 
or overthrow of this classical conception. Henceforth, the Good depends on the law and 
not the other way around: the moral law is purely formal, and it is no coincidence that 
Kant considered Christianity to be the only truly ‘moral’ religion, the only religion 
                                                









capable of teaching us or providing us with a framework for morality.268 “Clearly,” writes 
Deleuze,  
THE LAW, as defined by its pure form, without substance or object or any 
determination whatsoever is such that no one knows nor can know what it is. It 
operates without making itself known. It defines a realm of transgression where 
one is already guilty, and where one oversteps the bounds without knowing what 
they are, as in the case of Oedipus. Even guilt and punishment do not tell us what 
the law is, but leave it in a state of indeterminacy equaled only by the extreme 
specificity of the punishment.269 
 
One can immediately discern the structure of the infinite debt in the Kantian reversal: the 
law must be internalized as purely formal, such that one is always already guilty, and 
one’s awareness of one’s guilt is due only to the punctuations of punishment, the 
durations of which progressively stretch and fold until they envelope all of existence. The 
analogical relation to the law becomes immanent in the subject. As always, the law is the 
juridical form assumed by the infinite debt. Even the law is dissolved into the generality 
of money. God and the self undergo a practical resurrection—the good, innocent and 
autonomous subjects of secular liberal democracy and the capitalist mode of production. 
 Deleuze suggests that Sade and Masoch represent the two main attempts at 
subverting the law as pure form, the one by transgression and irony, the other by 
submission and humor. In the case of the latter, the masochist, “stands guilt on its head 
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by making punishment into a condition that makes possible the forbidden pleasure.”270 
That this should represent an overthrow of the law, a way in which to ‘have done’ with 
the judgement of God, seems more or less clear to Deleuze, but let us consider the matter 
more closely. Deleuze writes that  
The essence of masochistic humor lies in this, that the very law which forbids the 
satisfaction of a desire under the threat of subsequent punishment is converted 
into one which demands the punishment first and then orders that the satisfaction 
of the desire should necessarily follow upon the punishment.271  
 
It is not that the masochist derives pleasure from pain, but that pleasure is only achievable 
due to a prior submission to punishment; “the masochist must undergo punishment before 
experiencing pleasure.”272 In terms of our own critique, masochism does not appear to be 
as purely liberating as Deleuze would have us believe.  
 We saw above that God appears to be fractured from end to end, and that the 
between which is or effects this fracture is the space or place of the human (“we humans 
are found from end to end of it”). It is absolutely imperative to understand, first, that this 
fracture is the being of the human as such, and that, second, the fracture is constitutive of 
God. God is God because God and God. Yet again Christ is the ‘solution’ to the problem 
of the broken promise that is God. To the perennial theological question, “why did God 
become human?,” we reply that God has always, or is, become human. The specifically 
Christian innovation, the turn from the sadism of the system of cruelty to the masochism 
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of the doctrine of judgment and the infinite debt, is to have made the punishment and 
suffering of the human the prerequisite for the pleasure of God. That is to say, God or 
money wants to be a subject (it is always the subject that is missing in desire), and hence 
must convert the condition of its brokenness into the material for its absolution and 
reconstitution: the human being becomes the material of forgiveness of God.  
 In the Christian theodicy of money—to which this essay has addressed itself—and 
according to the masochist logic of the Christian reversal, the Father is guilty in the Son, 
the Father desires in the Son—yet the ‘place’ of the Son qua God-man is precisely the 
fracture in the Father, as both laceration and suture. A strange topology results, where 
inside and outside collapse into one another, as if stranded in a zone of total 
indiscernibility. One might object that this confuses everything, that the human being is 
now both a subject of forgiveness and the material of forgiveness. Yet this is precisely 
the function of the apparatus of forgiveness: to produce subjects as expressions of the 
forgiveness of God or money. According to the Spinozan ontology with which we began 
this inquiry, that which is expressed is not separate from its expression.273 The theodicy 
of money proceeds by making the human being—the free will and desire of the human 
being—the problem, rather than God or money. It is never God who is guilty. Money is 
never at fault. It is never capitalism that enslaves us; it is we who desire our own 
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enslavement. It is never Christianity as such which should be problematized; only its 
simulacra are worthy of critique.   
 Finally—at last—it is always a question of belief and desire. Nietzsche’s solution in 
the second essay of the Genealogy is revealed to be, in the last instance, insufficient. 
“[T]he prospect,” he writes, “cannot be dismissed that the complete and definite victory 
of atheism might free mankind of this whole feeling of guilty indebtedness toward its 
origin, its causa prima. Atheism and a kind of second innocence belong together.274” Yet 
this atheism is itself never complete, never total, because everyone believes in money.275 
Money is that which desires in us; and everyone believes in money: belief in money as 
that which makes belief in general possible (general credit), and belief in money as that in 
which we believe, on which we believe (our plane of immanence, the plane of analogy). 
Human beings are the stigmata of an invisible hand, from which forgiveness flows 
eternal.  
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 To have done with the judgment of God, to have done with the infinite debt—to 
have done with forgiveness—will require a wholesale refusal of the conditions under 
which we are produced as subjects and material of forgiveness. Which is to say, one must 
address the material conditions of our contemporary bondage, indebtedness, and 
innocence—and the theory or theodicy which we undergo, consummate and perform. In 
short, one must return to a thought and a practice of pure immanence, freed of the 
despotic monotheism, moralism, and analogy which parasitize it.  
 It is not enough to simply be anti-capitalist. It is not enough to be innocent. One 














Chapter 6 – Conclusion: The Politics of Immanence 
 6.1 Let us summarize the argument in two simultaneous movements; one logical or 
conceptual, the other historical.  
 (1) Forgiveness is essentially latent in the creditor-debtor relation in the system of 
cruelty. It oscillates between potentiality and actuality inasmuch as the creditor may or 
may not forgive the debtor, but the creditor is always fundamentally distinguished from 
the debtor inasmuch as the creditor has, or is, the power to forgive. (2) With the Christian 
innovation, forgiveness is made explicit and is generalized. It is no longer potential, but is 
‘incarnated’ or effectuated in the body and life of the human being. There is only one lot 
for all, the debt becomes infinite de jure rather than the de facto infinite debt of the 
circulation of the system of cruelty (where blocks of finite debts circulated as bonds of 
alliance or filiation). The formal equality and formal freedom of human beings is 
established by the Pauline doctrine of equality before God (forgiveness renders all 
humans equal before God). (3) The advent of industrial capitalism marks a 
materialization, a true incarnation, and a genuine praxis of Christianity: formal equality 




capitalist mode of production, and the existential labor of the debtor becomes the abstract 
labor of the capitalist subject. Whereas money qua general credit or collective faith 
provided the ground for the emergence of the capitalist mode of production, money now 
functions as general equivalent. Money qua credit promises value and gives a future to 
exchange, and money qua medium of exchange carries out this mediation and produces 
value, extending the process of circulation indefinitely. The debtor is always already 
forgiven, and labors to become worthy of her innocence. (4) The twinned neoliberal 
projects of governmentality and financialization are in fact internal to the capitalist mode 
of production, but nevertheless express a decisive transformation: the credit-debt relation 
regains an ascendency which had been more or less subsumed by the relation of capital 
and labor. The neoliberal turn, for all of its violences, expropriations and accumulations, 
has the virtue of making Christianity a problem for thought, of returning thought to the 
‘prehistory’ of the system of cruelty (which, as Nietzsche insists, accompanies every 
historical epoch like a specter). The neoliberal subject once again labors existentially, in 
the abstraction of late capitalist financial circulation.  
 Hence, the apparatus of forgiveness effects a theodicy of money; at first latent 
(cruelty), then explicit and general (Christianity), then actual and concrete (capitalism), 
and finally existential once again—or for the first time again, according to a structure of 
repetition in which prehistory haunts the present as a spectral power—a memory of the 
future (neoliberalism). The transformation of God into money is this theodicy, in its 
various guises of secularization, the liberal democratic form of the State, and the 




woof of globalatinization. However, a central problem remains to be addressed. I have 
throughout this inquiry insisted that the transformation of God into money occurs, so to 
speak, in stages—in the logical structure of credit and debt, and in history. This remains 
true—as I hope the summary above demonstrates—but I have also insisted that God is 
essentially money, and that this expresses a more or less originary or immemorial truth. 
How is one to reconcile these seemingly contradictory claims?  
 We must conceive of God’s transformation into money as the process by which 
God or money becomes adequate to its idea. Yet the idea to which God or money 
becomes adequate is not, in the last instance, ideal. One of Deleuze’s central 
contributions in Difference and Repetition is to have demonstrated that an idea must be 
understood as a problem.276 Ideas are essentially problematic, not in the sense that one 
normally speaks of problematic speech or actions, rather ideas are objectively 
problematic in that they are the expression of a virtual field of singularities (a plane of 
immanence) upon which are effected various strategies, solutions and integrations (such 
as the promise or the subject). God or money is the problem to which the human being is 
a solution, the question to which a promise is offered as an answer. Yet, conversely, the 
human being is the problem to which God or money is the solution, the question to which 
analogy answers. The reciprocal relationship of the human being and God or money is 
what characterizes our plane of immanence: one does not exist or insist without the other. 
God or money will be extinguished with the human, as the human extinguishes itself with 
                                                





God or money.277 What is absolutely crucial to understand is that the human being is not 
something different than God or money, yet neither is the human being the same as God 
or money. The human being is the expression of God or money, the actualization or 
realization of the latter. This is why one must attenuate Feuerbach’s thesis: it is not that 
God is simply humanity writ large, rather that God is the inscription of value in the 
human being. God is that which desires in us. God is not dead; it is rather much worse 
than that. God is unconscious.  
 Thus, we can hazard a formula: God or money is the plane of immanence that we 
are. Not only are we what is at stake in the apparatus of forgiveness, we are also that 
which desires those stakes, and that which constructs the apparatus in which we are 
captured. To say that God is unconscious is not to say that God is the unconscious. It is 
simply to recognize that God or money is what makes us human: to be human is to be 
unconscious. One cannot simply abolish money any more than one can simply kill God. 
Achieving a real liberation from our own desired enslavement will, in fact, require a 
radical rethinking of the material conditions of the actualization of God or money—and 
this essay represents an initial foray into such a project—hence the necessity of 
articulating a political theology of money that grasps money in all of its demonic 
ambiguity. A theodicy of money is equally a theodicy of humanity: a trans-millennial 
apology for hierarchy, violence, greed, and every other evil on the face of the earth. We 
                                                
277 With regards to the uncertain future of the human race and the implication of 
capitalism in the destruction of the planetary conditions of human existence, see Naomi 






are all guilty. Ergo, we are all innocent. Such is the operation—the stroke of genius—of 
the apparatus of forgiveness. 
 
 6.2 The question of debt forgiveness is not merely theoretical. In fact, this question 
is increasingly germane to our political sphere—for instance, the neoliberal amnesty 
packages offered to indebted states such as Greece, which are essentially ‘austerity with a 
human face.’ The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the global institution of creditors, 
or more precisely, debt-enforcers, will forgive the debt—on condition that… In this case, 
forgiveness comes with conditions (typically the balancing of budgets, the gutting of 
social services and welfare programs, amongst other essential state functions) that dangle 
the threat of default and economic catastrophe if the creditor’s ‘reasonable’ demands go 
unsatisfied. David Graeber recounts a story of attending a party at Westminster Abbey, 
where he was caught in a conversation with a stranger who, upon hearing that Graeber 
and his comrades supported abolishing the Third World debt that the IMF was enforcing, 
objected that “they’d borrowed the money! Surely one has to pay one’s debts.”278 The 
anecdote illustrates perfectly the common-sense that subtends and nourishes the moralism 
of the creditor-debtor relation—even at the level of international finance and sovereign 
debts. Everyone knows that one must pay one’s debts! Austerity policies are not limited 
to so-called debtor nations. Even though one rarely hears of the danger of a U.S. default 
on the national debt (with the exception of those moments when a recalcitrant GOP-led 
                                                





Congress refuses to raise the debt ceiling), the U.S. has in fact subjected its citizens to 
structural austerity for decades, and the consequences are becoming increasingly clear.279 
 The moralism of the creditor-debtor relation in our contemporary situation is 
perhaps best expressed in the student debt crisis. According to the Debt Resistors’ 
Operations Manual, a pamphlet published by an anonymous collective in association 
with Strike Debt and Occupy Wall Street, “total student debt in the United States 
surpassed the $1 trillion mark” in 2012.280 This is a staggering figure (the average level of 
debt for student leaving college is around $27,000). The consequences of such an 
enormous concentration of debt in the younger generation of consumers have yet to be 
fully realized, but there are already rumblings of the cataclysmic economic crisis to 
come. The Wall Street Journal recently published an article fretting that too many 
students are falling into default on their loans—to the tune of $200 billion.281 It often 
goes unnoticed that lending money to students for tuition functions as a shadow stimulus 
to the economy. Money is created ex nihilo and lent to students as credit, who take on the 
debt in order to finance their education, but also to provide for basic means of subsistence 
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(paying rent, buying groceries), as well as luxuries such as alcohol and video games—the 
practice is usually referred to as receiving ‘excess aid.’ The mechanism is as simple as 
signing a promissory note, typically online. Should this shadow stimulus disappear, as it 
may in the near future in the event of a freeze on lending due to the student debt bubble 
bursting, millions, perhaps billions of dollars a year would disappear from circulation. 
 The emergent focus on debt forgiveness is laudable, but it is nothing new, and one 
should approach it equivocally. On the one hand, it would be naive to refuse, as a matter 
of ‘principle,’ the forgiveness of one’s loans, were such forgiveness offered. The 
situation of many debtors is dire enough that a forgiven mortgage, or a forgiven tuition 
balance, could prove absolutely life-changing, with a net-positive effect on the individual 
or the family concerned. On the other hand, we have seen throughout this essay that 
forgiveness is not as straightforward as it seems. Devin Singh’s argument, cited in the 
Interlude, points to precisely such a hidden motive of debt forgiveness: forgiveness is a 
sort of reset-button for the sovereign,  “ultimately reinforc[ing] sovereign authority and 
emphasiz[ing] the system’s dependence on sovereign will and decision … Debt 
cancellation is a form of sovereign crisis management.”282 It is not that we should refuse 
forgiveness for the sake of a theoretical argument, or in order to safeguard some 
imagined pure subjectivity of resistance. Advocating the cancellation or forgiveness of 
debts can, and is proving to be, a crucial avenue of solidarity with one’s fellow debtors 
                                                







and a method of resistance to privatization of education, and the austerity measures that 
always threaten to leave the debtor drowning.283 The danger is that we accept forgiveness 
without calling into question the very structure of power that made us ‘guilty’ in the first 
place.  
 Forgiveness indeed erases the ledgers of debt, but it is also the condition for the 
accumulation of further debt. Forgiveness creates debt, at both the transcendental register 
of the infinite debt it inculcates in the subject of forgiveness and the register of the 
continued functioning of the empirical system of debts. As Deleuze and Guattari observe, 
“desiring-machines work only when they break down, and by continually breaking 
down.”284 The system functions only by malfunctioning, requiring periodic infusions of 
mercy and grace to grease its gears. The task of any anti-capitalist undertaking of the 
future is to make this malfunctioning a condition of emancipation, rather than the 
maintenance of the State and the economic machine of the capitalist mode of production. 
 As Singh points out: 
The case of debt cancellation reveals the persistence and necessity of sovereignty 
in our current economic arrangements. It calls into question whether debt 
cancellation policies are a truly radical act. Instead, they may function as pressure 
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valves designed to recalibrate the economic system and allow it to persist. 
Perhaps the most disruptive and transformative ways forward, then, involve 
allowing debt to balloon out of control, to default, and to jam the gears of a 
system that thrives on debt as its lifeblood. Perhaps what we need is not debt 
cancellation, but debt negation, a refusal and rejection of the category of debt 
altogether, and a striving to think human social, spiritual, political and economic 
relations in a vastly different register.285 
 
A massive debt cancellation may indeed be on the horizon. Negotiating its treacherous 
conditions and stratagems will require thinking the operations of the apparatus of 
forgiveness through to the end. That this will require an interrogation of the being of the 
human as such, and the manner in which this being is implicated in a plane of immanence 
dominated by an analogical hierarchy, is evident from the preceding argument. My 
suggestion, albeit a meager one, is that we must allow ourselves access to a certain 
negativity, a certain power of refusal, that is proper to immanence.  
 
 6.3 Recall the formula of the analogical production of money: credit in itself is debt 
for itself. The debtor is always for forgiveness, since forgiveness requires a guilty party. 
Forgiveness is always for the creditor, even if forgiveness is said of, or dispensed to, the 
debtor. In spite of the fact that I have spoken endlessly of the creditor-debtor relation, the 
emphasis has been on the two terms of the relation—the creditor and the debtor as 
respective relata. In these few words that remain, I would like to address the relation 
itself—relation as such.  
                                                







 One could attempt a formulation of immanence as follows: immanence in itself is 
for nothing. Immanence should be formally opposed to analogy on every point. As 
Deleuze remarks, “[Immanence] signifies that being itself is univocal, while that of which 
it is said is equivocal: precisely the opposite of analogy.”286 Immanence and analogy are 
formally opposed, because in fact analogy is a product of immanence misunderstood as a 
closed, claustrophobic system, from which no escape is possible. In fact, it is true that 
there is no escape in the sense that there is no beyond, in the sense that transcendence is 
always the triple illusion of consciousness: the illusion of final causes, the illusion of free 
will, and the theological illusion.287 Immanence in itself is indeed total and perfect—it is 
the real as such—but immanence in itself is the infinite modulation of itself. The danger 
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that one risks in speaking of immanence is that the latter will be misunderstood as the 
sum total of possibilities, when in fact immanence is nothing but necessity, pure 
necessity.  
 Deleuze has described the relation between possibility and necessity in terms of the 
tired person and the exhausted person. Inasmuch as one can never realize the whole of the 
possible—since one must necessarily fragment the possible, according to the logic of an 
either/or—the tired person and the exhausted person are like two subjective figures of an 
objective disjunction.  
The tired person has merely exhausted the realization, whereas the exhausted 
person exhausts the whole of the possible. The tired person can no longer realize, 
but the exhausted person can no longer possibilize … There is no longer any 
possible: a relentless Spinozism. Does [the exhausted person] exhaust the possible 
because he is himself exhausted, or is he exhausted because he has exhausted the 
possible? He exhausts himself in exhausting the possible, and vice-versa. He 
exhausts that which, in the possible, is not realized. He has had done with the 
possible, beyond all tiredness, ‘for to end yet again.’288 
 
The possible is that which can only be realized through exclusion: one chooses this path 
by excluding that path (“one even creates the possible to the extent that one realizes 
it”).289 The indebted subject and the subject of forgiveness are such tired persons. Money 
is that which gives possibility inasmuch as it is that which realizes a possibility: one 
makes plans according to money, one saves money according to money, one marries 
according to money, one wakes and sleeps according to money, etc. We are ruled by 
possibility and not the other way around. 
                                                







 Exhaustion is different. “The goal is no longer to go out or stay in, and one no 
longer makes use of the days and the nights. One no longer realizes, even though one 
accomplishes something.”290 It is as though possibility, in itself exhausted, has collapsed 
into necessity—the paradoxical freedom of the All of chance. For freedom lies not in the 
will, but in the necessity and swerve of the being of becoming, the thresholds of desire 
which lead not to a beyond but to transformation (the Dionysian bacchanal, the will to 
power—which is not a desire for power, but the infinite differentiality of desire itself, the 
dynamic identity of clinamen and conatus). Will is that which adjudicates, judges and 
decides between possibilities, but desire is that which is for nothing. “One does not,” 
writes Deleuze, “fall into the undifferentiated, or into the famous unity of contradictories, 
nor is one passive: one remains active, but for nothing. One was tired of something, but 
one is exhausted by nothing.”291 The exhausted person plays with the possible without 
realizing it. The exhausted person relates to the possible in a non-relation. To be for 
nothing; to be unable to possibilize by refusing the possible as such; to cease to be tired 
by the possible and to exhaust the possible—perhaps this is what it could mean to have 
done with forgiveness. Contra Derrida, forgiveness is not the impossible, nor, qua the 
impossible, the condition of possibility. It is possibility itself. The refusal of possibility, 
of the future that God or money gives, is the task of the theory and praxis to come. If 
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money is that which desires in us, such that we become something or someone that 
desires, then one must be, on the contrary, for nothing.  
 I close with a quote from Agamben’s State of Exception. I have made a minor 
modification which I trust will not constitute too grave a transgression: where Agamben 
has written ‘law,’ I have substituted ‘money.’  
One day humanity will play with [money] just as children play with disused 
objects, not in order to restore them to their canonical use but to free them from it 
for good. What is found after [money] is not a more proper and original use value 
that precedes [money], but a new use that is born only after it. And use, which has 
been contaminated by [money], must also be freed from its own value. This 
liberation is the task of study, or of play.292  
 
One can only hope that—just as I have erased ‘law’ in this passage—one day ‘money’ 
will in its turn be erased, refused, replaced with nothing.  
                                                
292 Agamben, State of Exception, 64. See also Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 116. 
“It is claimed that man does not know how to play: this is because, even when he is given 
a situation of chance or multiplicity, he understands his affirmation as destined to impose 
limits upon it, his decisions as destined to ward off its effects, his reproductions as 
destined to bring about the return of the same, given a winning hypothesis. This is 
precisely a losing game, one in which we risk losing as much as winning because we do 
not affirm the all of chance: the pre-established character of the rule which fragments has 
as its correlate the condition by default in the player, who never knows which fragment 
will emerge. The system of the future, by contrast. must be called a divine game, since 
there is no pre-existing rule, since the game already bears upon its own rules and since 












 In the conclusion to Blood, Anidjar raises a final question: what is the future of 
murder?293 The concluding essay departs from the theme of blood with which the volume 
as a whole is occupied, and addresses a certain, albeit effaced, Christian dimension of the 
thought of Sigmund Freud. Anidjar’s argument proceeds through a reading of Moses and 
Monotheism, demonstrating that, in the last analysis, Freud’s final monograph is in fact a 
meditation on the figure of Christ, and that the logic of atonement appears to displace the 
logic of Totem and Taboo, which famously claimed that civilization was founded on the 
repressed guilt of the band of brothers who murdered their father. In other words, Freud 
discovers in the sacrificial logic of Christianity a new theory of the unconscious—“our 
Christian unconscious.”294 I will not recount the entirety of the argument here, save to 
observe that the feature which Anidjar is so intent to isolate, so as to answer the question, 
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what is the future of murder?, has precisely to do with the play of guilt and innocence 
peculiar to Christianity.  
 In a progression that should be familiar by now, one begins with murder (the 
murder of God the father), then proceeds to universalize that murder (we are all guilty of 
this murder), and finally to confession (we are all guilty of this murder, but because of the 
nature of this murder, and by virtue of having confessed to it, we are all innocent). “We 
have all killed him. Except for the innocent, who forgave and forgot—themselves.”295 In 
what is perhaps the most stringent indictment of Christianity conceivable, Anidjar gives 
his answer:  
The future of murder is innocence. In Benjaminian terms, this means that the 
distinction between law-instituting violence and law-preserving violence is 
transformed into law-abolishing violence, and then into violence-denying love. 
Instead of collective guilt, collective innocence. Such is the Christian 
dispensation…296 
 
 In the same manner, and by means of the same mechanism, one should pose the 
question: what is the future of money? The answer is, mutatis mutandis, quite clear: the 
future of money is forgiveness. Hence the imperative to refuse the future, to have done 
with forgiveness, and to, at every moment, seek to shake the foundations of the 
possible—that still, small voice of possibility which we have called, from the very outset, 
God or money.  
 
                                                
295 Ibid., 255. 
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